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Abstract
Malaysian politics has long been dominated by tensions arising out of inter-ethnic
inequality. However, economic policy in the earlier years of independence took a
laissez-faire approach. Following the racial riots in 1969, there was a re-think on
policy and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was promulgated in 1970. The
underlying objective of the policy was to achieve national unity, which entailed
improving the economic and social status of the Malay (Bumiputera) community vis-
a-vis the non-Malays (non-Bumiputeras), especially the Chinese. The policy also
attempted to transfer ownership of industries to the Malay (Bumiputera) community
to develop a capitalist economy under the control of the Malay (Bumiputera) ethnic
group. This study argues that, whilst the policy was successful at the outset in
generating economic growth and reducing poverty, especially in the rural areas, it
became obsolete even for that narrow purpose. The exclusive focus of the policy on
inter-ethnic inequality made it insensitive to the problem of intra-Malay inequality.
Due to the very success of NEP in the earlier years, the Malay community has become
less homogeneous and cross-cutting cleavages have begun to emerge. Also, Malay
tolerance of intra-Malay inequality has begun to erode. Many of Malaysia's current
economic and political problems can be explained by the failure of income
redistribution policy to reflect these changes within the Malay community. The
argument is presented here using an analysis of the trends in income distribution. The
required data are obtained from the literature and also from the Malaysian Family Life
Survey (MFLS).
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Chapter 1
Background, Objectives and Organisation of the Study
1.1 Background of the Study
In 1970, the Malaysian government announced the New Economic Policy (NEP),
which was to be carried out in the span of twenty years (1971-1990). The formulation
of the NEP came about after the race riots in 1969, which were perceived to be the
result of a glaring economic imbalance between ethnic groups, particularly between
the Malay and the Chinese. Thus, it is not surprising that the underlying objective of
the NEP was to attain national unity and foster nation-building. These objectives were
to be achieved through a two-pronged strategy: eradicating poverty irrespective of
race, and restructuring the society so as to correct the economic imbalances that exist
between ethnic groups. Under the NEP, the government played an active role in
raising the Malay income through poverty reduction measures in the rural area and the
expansion of employment opportunities in the urban area. The government also
played an active role in increasing the share of the Malay corporate wealth targeted to
reach 30.0 percent by the year 1990. Thus, the NEP could be viewed as an affirmative
action economic policy to advance the Malay socio-economic position, finally
reducing the existing imbalances with other ethnic groups. The National Development
Policy (NDP) replaced the NEP when it came to end in 1990. While there are
adjustments in terms of strategy and priority, nonetheless, the main spirit of the NEP,
i.e. to preferentially uplift the economic and social status of the Malay, is still
maintained in the NDP.
During the NEP period (and also during the National Development Policy), Malaysia
experienced very rapid economic growth. Indeed Malaysia has been recognised as one
of the "economic miracles" of East Asia (World Bank, 1993). It is not surprising
therefore that the government has highlighted this remarkable economic growth as a
vindication of the success of the NEP. It has been argued that the NEP has provided
the basis for socio-political stability in the multiethnic society of Malaysia, which in
turn allows the economy to grow rapidly and improve income distribution. In the
Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) 1991-2000, it has been claimed that
(Malaysia 1991, p. 98):
"A remarkable achievement of the NEP was that it significantly improved
income distribution without adversely affecting growth. In fact, the economy
was able to achieve a high rate of economic growth during the 1971-1990
period on the account of the social and political stability created by the
NEP".
The above claim has raised expectations that ethnicity (i.e. the pro-Bumiputera
policy) 1
 would remain the cornerstone of economic policy in Malaysia. Indeed, as
mentioned above, ethnicity is still the basis in formulating and implementing the NDP
(1991-2000). However, continued use of ethnicity as the foundation of economic
policy is no longer coherent, and hence could only be undertaken with the risk of
greater discontent, paradoxically amongst the Malay community. This discontent is
due to the success of the NEP in uplifting the economic position of the Malay as a
group. However, this has changed the structure of Malay society because the
distribution of income and wealth has changed within it. As a result of the success of
the NEP, poverty amongst the Malay has been reduced substantially, a Malay urban
working class has emerged, and the Malay middle class and new rich Malay have
expanded. Thus the Malays are no longer so homogeneous, economically speaking, as
they were in the early years of the NEP. This was expected since the aim of the NEP
was to make ethnic groups more equal, regardless of how unequal each group might
be within. The NEP was about redistribution between ethnic groups, not individuals.
It could not address tension created by intra-group inequality amongst the Malay
community.
As a result, while there may have been improvement in the overall income
distribution in the country, the problem of intra-ethnic inequality, particularly
amongst the Malay, has remained a significant problem throughout the NEP period. It
I Bumiputera literally means the "son of the soil". The Malays are the main Bumiputera in Peninsular
Malaysia. In Sabah, the main Bumiputera are Kadazan, Bajau and Murut, while in Sarawak they are
Iban, Malay, Bidayuh and Melanau. Since this paper concentrates on Peninsular Malaysia, the term
"Malay" and "Bumiputera" will be used interchangeably.
2
seems that intra-Malay inequality could easily have been played down at the onset of
the NEP, as the Malay tolerance towards inequality was high, when there was still
significant inter-ethnic inequality in the country. Intra-Malay inequality could no
longer be played down once the intra-ethnic differences were reduced. A high intra-
Malay inequality would lead to the emergence of cross-cutting cleavages, 2 and hence,
deeper social and political cleavages would evolve in the society (Rae and Taylor,
1970). The formation of cross-cutting cleavages would deepen socio-political
divisions and conflicts would arise not only between the Malays and non-Malays, but
within the Malays themselves. Furthermore, the NEP could only be sustained if the
tolerance of the Malay towards intra-Malay inequality remained high. However, there
is a limit to the societal tolerance towards inequality (Hirschman, 1973). The
persistence of high inequality amongst the Malay would be likely to erode their
tolerance towards it. Thus, continuation of ethnicity as the basis of economic policy,
such as the NEP, would be incoherent and unsustainable.
Therefore, policy with regards to income redistribution has to confront intra-ethnic
redistribution. This requires policy reform. For example, if the policy is to be coherent
and address effectively the problem of intra-ethnic inequality, the redistribution policy
should focus on the poor, regardless their ethnic groups. The problem with this kind
of policy reform, however, is that it might be difficult to accomplish since the NEP is
articulated in the political rhetoric of ethnicity. When the political sphere is still
immersed in ethnicity, the rhetoric of distribution along ethnic lines is expected to
continue. In other words, as long as the solution to economic problems is a political
one, and as long as political parties continues to pursue inter-ethnic distribution issues
to garner and maintain their political support, the issue of intra-ethnic distribution
might be difficult to address. The failure to address intra-ethnic distribution issues, in
turn, would prove to be socially and politically destabilising, particularly to the Malay
community.
2 Cleavages are the criteria that divide the members of the society into groups. There are three general
cleavages: (i) ascriptive or trait (e.g. race); (ii) attitude or opinion (e.g. ideology or preferences); and
(iii) behaviour or action (e.g. voting). Cross-cutting cleavages are the extent to which individuals are
divided by one cleavages (e.g. race), but will be brought together by another cleavage (e.g. religion).
For a more detailed discussion, see Rae and Taylor (1970).
3
However, despite the significance of the intra-ethnic inequality problem, the current
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, continued to insist that inter-ethnic inequality
will remain the main focus of Malaysia's economic policy. Consider the following
paragraph, where he re-iterated his stance (Mahathir Mohamad, 1998, pp. 33-34):
"The NEP, it must be iterated, was not concerned with making all the
bumiputeras earn equally, or share equally, the wealth distributed amongst
them. ...The intention of the NEP was to create in the bumiputera community
the same division of labour and rewards as was found in the non-bumiputera
communities, particularly the Chinese. ... The equitableness was not to be
between individuals, but between communities".
This leads to the central argument advanced in this study. The study argues that the
pro-Bumiputera economic policy, i.e. the NEP, has lost its raison d'être. While the
NEP has been successful in the past in generating economic growth and development
of the country in general, and in the development of Malay in particular, it is unlikely
to be sustainable due to the following two reasons. First, for the NEP to be
sustainable, a coherence of interest amongst the Malay is necessary. This coherence of
interest implies that there should be less fragmentation or division within the Malay
community. However, since what matters for the NEP is the equality between ethnic
groups rather than between individuals, the NEP is more likely to create division
amongst the Malays themselves. In fact, as will be seen later in this study, even
though declining, there has been a persistent high level of intra-Malay inequality
during the NEP period. This suggests that deeper division amongst the Malay
community has emerged, and hence the emergence of cross-cutting cleavages (Rae
and Taylor, 1977). In other words, there emerged diverse and conflicting interests
within the Malay community. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the rhetoric
of ethnicity, which views the conflict of economic interest simply in ethnic terms to
solve the problem of economic conflict within the Malay community. The ethnicity-
oriented policy, such as the NEP, will be impotent to respond to the new problem of
inequality. As a consequence, the Malay political party (LTMNO) that initiated the
NEP (and created the expectations of greater equality in the distribution of income)
found that it became a hostage to its own rhetoric. The political rhetoric of ethnicity
cannot articulate a coherent response to the new problem of distribution. The
contradictions have continued to become more apparent in recent years.
4
One might argue that the problem of intra-ethnic inequality, particularly amongst the
Malays, had existed even at the outset of the NEP. Why has it only now become a
matter of concern? Why is it politically and socially destabilising now and not before?
The answer to this question lies in the attitude of society with regard to inequality.
This leads to the second reason why the exclusive emphasis on inter-ethnic inequality
of the NEP would make it unlikely to be sustainable. The socio-political stability
during the last three decades or so, which is claimed attributable to the NEP, is a
manifestation of the "tunnel effect". The term "tunnel effect" is a term used by
Hirschman (1973) to describe the changing tolerance of a society towards inequality.
In this regards, the NEP, which is articulated in the political rhetoric of ethnicity, was
initially accepted by the majority of the Malay since the existing income inequality
did indicate a clear demarcation between the Malay and the Chinese. The majority of
the Malay were poor and rural, while the Chinese were rich and urban. Ethnicity, as
the cornerstone means of the NEP to solve the economic problem facing the Malay
community, then became doubly attractive because it leads to the empowerment of
the countryside and the creation of a domestic market for industrial products. Indeed
the policy has been successful in securing the support of the Malay for the NEP.
Initially, the tolerance of the Malay to intra-Malay inequality was high since the NEP
in a sense functioned as the "hope factor" to the Malay. They perceived the NEP
would improve their economic condition. However, as intra-Malay inequality
remained high over time, there was a shift in the spotlight from inter-ethnic (Malay-
Chinese) inequality to intra-Malay inequality. The persistence of high intra-Malay
inequality subsequently changed the perception of the Malays towards intra-Malay
inequality. Intra-Malay inequality that was tolerable before was no longer acceptable,
and the tolerance of it has been eroded. Consequently, towards the end of the NEP
period, the support of the Malay community towards UMNO started to fall apart. This
is evidenced in the general elections in the 1990s, particularly in the 1999 general
election. The results of the 1999 general election showed that UM:NO had
significantly lost the traditional support of the Malay. Rough estimation revealed that
about 70 percent of Malay voted against UMNO (see discussion in Section 6.3 of
Chapter 6).
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However, it should be mentioned that the erosion of tolerance towards intra-Malay
inequality (and consequently the support for UMNO) was not so much that the Malay
were under an illusion about the success of the NEP or harboured a "false hope". This
is most unlikely since the NEP was actually successful beyond its narrow objective,
and reduced overall inequality and poverty in the country. The erosion of the tunnel
effect was due to the unintended effect of the NEP. The NEP created an expectation
of greater equality not only between ethnic groups (e.g. Malay and the Chinese), but
equality within ethnic groups (e.g. intra-Malay) as well. Therefore, while the NEP
might have produced rapid economic growth, reduced inequality between the Malay
and the Chinese, reduced poverty amongst the Malay, as well as increasing the Malay
economic position, the insignificant improvement of intra-Malay inequality during the
NEP then became a problem, at least as far as the Malay were concerned. The NEP
had been successful in terms of achieving its original objectives, but that success then
changed the Malay perception of what constituted success. The "hope factor" or the
expectation created by the NEP changed the perception of the Malay that what might
have been considered as a success in the past (i.e. achieving the NEP objectives) was
viewed now as a failure. This partly explains the recent socio-political tension that has
arisen amongst the Malays in Malaysia.
The two arguments described above seem to indicate that the success of the NEP is
paradoxical. The paradox is that while the NEP has claimed to achieve remarkable
economic growth, and indeed has transformed not only the structure of the economy
but also the Malay community, this very success of the NEP has created new
problems that leads to its continuation becoming difficult, if not impossible. By
neglecting the intra-ethnic inequality problem, the NEP may have planted the seeds of
future problems for itself. The economic position of the Malay might have been
improved, but the Malays have disintegrated. The government that articulated the
NEP in the political rhetoric of ethnicity appears to have become its own captive. This
leads back to the central argument of this study that the ethnicity-oriented policy, i.e.
the NEP, while it may have been successful in the past, paradoxically is unsustainable
(see Figure 1.1.1).
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Figure 1.1.1: Ethnic Nationalism (Ethnicity-Oriented Policy) and Income Inequality
Ethnicity-Oriented Policy
(Emphasis on redistribution along
ethnic lines, not individuals. Intra-
ethnic inequality is acceptable)
Reduction of inequality between ethnic
groups is likely to create (or maintain)
high inequality within ethnic groups.
(Chapter 3 and 4)
43- 43-
Emergence of cross-cutting cleavages;
deeper social, economic and political
division within the ethnic group. The
policy that was initially coherent, later
becomes incoherent.
(Chapter 5)
Erosion of tolerance towards intra-ethnic
inequality. (Tolerance towards intra-
ethnic inequality is essential for
maintaining the support to the ethnicity-
oriented policy).
(Chapter 6)
--.11	 -0-
Ethnicity-Oriented Policy
becomes incoherent and unsustainable.
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1.2 The Research Question and Objective of the Study
The study is motivated by two main reasons. First, some observers of Malaysia's
economic development have argued that Malaysia appears to represent one of the
success stories of a developing economy [see for example Chowdhury and Islam
(1996) and World Bank (1993)]. During the implementation of the NEP (1971-1990),
Malaysia has achieved a very rapid economic growth and structural change, together
with declining poverty and inequality. While to certain extent these observations are
correct, what they fail to see is that these achievements are basically the initial impact
of the NEP. As mentioned earlier, the NEP is articulated in the language of ethnicity.
The policy appears to be coherent when majority of the Malays were in poverty (i.e.
they were basically economically homogeneous) and there is greater tolerance of the
Malays towards intra-Malay inequality. When the policy successfully raised income
of the Malays and substantially reduced poverty amongst them, the question of intra-
Malay inequality come to the surface. It can no longer be ignored. Articulating the
policy in the political rhetoric of ethnicity then become internally inconsistent. Thus,
along with the economic success, the NEP is also sewing the seeds of future problems
for itself.
Second, the study is also motivated by the realisation of the importance of income
inequality and poverty in the policy choice debate in Malaysia. Despite its
importance, attention to the effect of growth on inequality and poverty, as well as the
impact of income distribution on policy choices, seems to have received less attention
in recent years. The focus of policy debate is more on the way to sustain the rapid
economic growth rather than on how the rapid growth has affected income and wealth
distribution. This is regrettable since in the final analysis, whether development has
taken place or not, is not so much depend on how fast income have grown, but rather
more on who has benefited from that growth.
It is with this motivation that the study seeks to answer the following central question:
is the NEP, a policy based on ethnicity, sustainable? Keeping this basic question in
mind, the central aim of the study is therefore, to show that despite the success of the
NEP in enhancing the economic well-being of the Malay, concomitantly it has also
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resulted in greater division amongst the Malay via its effect on income and wealth;
and to argue that the tolerance of the Malay towards inequality has changed. This in
turn, entails investigation of the patterns and trends of income distribution in Malaysia
that will encompass the following aspects:
(i) to examine and analyse the trends and changes in income inequality in
Malaysia, covering the overall inequality, within and between area
inequality (urban and rural) and also within and between ethnic groups
inequality (particularly the Malay and the Chinese);
(ii) to estimate and analyse the contribution and the effect of different sources
of income to the overall income inequality;
(iii) to measure and explore the question of polarisation, i.e. the "disappearing
middle-class" in Malaysia;
(iv) to assess the extent of poverty in Malaysia and the contribution of different
groups of population to total poverty; and
(v) to analyse the political consequences of the trends and changes in income
inequality and poverty.
It should be mentioned here that it is not the intention of this study to pass judgment
on whether the NEP is good or not for development of the Malay community in
particular, and for the country's development in general. What this study intends to do
however, is to examine and describe the pattern of income inequality in Malaysia
before and after the implementation of the NEP, and then to draw some political
implication from the observed pattern of income distribution.
1.3 Literature Review
As can be seen, this study is concerned with income distribution and the New
Economic Policy (NEP) in Malaysia. In general, literature with regards to income
distribution and the NEP in Malaysia could be divided into two lines of research.
First, there are studies that mainly focus their discussions on the trends and patterns of
income distribution before and after the implementation of the NEP as well as on the
relationship between income inequality and socio-economic development in
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Malaysia. Second, there are studies that focus on the politics of the NEP, where
implicit in these studies is the assumption that political factors are more prominent in
shaping the NEP as well as its implementation. Among others included in the first
group are the studies by Snodgrass (1980), Anand (1983), Ikemoto (1985), Perumal
(1989), Shari and Zin (1990), Shireen (1998) and Shari (2000), while included in the
second group are the work of Milne (1976), Mauzy (1997), Toni (1997) and Stafford
(1998).
Snodgrass (1980) examines income inequality in Malaysia from 1957 to 1970. He
uses income distribution figures mostly from the government survey data - Household
Budget Survey of the Federation of Malaya (1957-58), the Federation Saving Survey
(1959), the Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Household 1967-68, the SRM/Ford
Social and Economic Survey 1967/68, and the Post Enumeration Survey (PES) 1970.
He finds that there has been a substantial increase in income inequality between 1957
(i.e. the year of Malaysia's independence) and 1970 (i.e. the year the NEP was
announced). The income of higher income groups is found to grow faster (in
percentage terms) than those of the bottom 80.0 percent of the population. Also,
income inequality is greater amongst the urban households than amongst the rural
households, and the urban household income is double the income of rural households
on average. He also found that between 1957 and 1970, the Malay ethnic group
experienced the largest increase in income inequality. Furthermore, on average, the
non-Malay households earn more than double the income of the Malay households.
Anand (1983) probably has undertaken the most thorough study on income inequality
and poverty in Malaysia. He examines income inequality in Malaysia at the onset of
the NEP period using income data from the Post Enumeration Survey (PES) 1970. He
decomposes income inequality to examine the contribution of inter-ethnic and inter-
regional inequalities to total inequality by employing the Theil index of inequality. He
found that about 90.0 percent of income inequality arises from inequality within each
ethnic group. Similarly, Anand (1983) found that there are large income inequalities
within rural as well as within urban households. Urban-rural inequality only explains
a small portion of the total household income inequality. Hence, he suggests that
policies that aim at reducing inter-ethnic economic imbalance would probably have a
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limited impact on reducing the overall inequality. Anand (1983) also estimates the
extent of poverty in Malaysia using the income data from the Post Enumeration
Survey (PES) 1970. He found that 78.1 percent of poor households are Malay and
therefore poverty is overwhelmingly a problem of the Malay. In addition, poverty also
is overwhelmingly a rural problem. Anand (1983) calculated that 87.7 percent of poor
households are found in the rural areas.
While Snodgrass (1980) and Anand (1983) examine income inequality in the 1957 to
1970 period, Ikemoto (1985) examines income inequality and its decomposition for
the period before and after the implementation of the NEP, i.e. between 1957 and
1980. He uses income data from the Household Budget Survey (FIBS) 1957/58, the
Post Enumeration Survey (PES) 1970, and the Household Income Survey (HIS) 1980.
He finds that the Gini index of income inequality has increased between 1957/58 and
1970, but declined between 1970 and 1979. His findings also confirm the results of
Anand (1983) that it is intra-ethnic inequality, particularly inequality amongst the
Malay and rural households, which contributed a large portion to the total inequality.
Thus he concludes that, while the NEP might have been successful in reducing the
overall inequality, inequality within each ethnic group is becoming significant.
Perumal (1989) examines income inequality and economic growth in Malaysia for the
period of 1957 and 1984. Besides the sources used by Snodgrass (1980) and Ikemoto
(1985), he also uses income data from the National Agricultural Census 1977 and
Household Income Survey (HIS) 1984. His main focus is on examining the
relationship between economic growth and income inequality, i.e. the Kuznet's
inverted-U hypothesis. He finds that income inequality has risen from 1957/58, peaks
in 1976, and decreases thereafter. He carried out a regression analysis with the Gini
index as the dependent variable and GNP per capita as the independent variable. His
results suggest that there is a presence of Kuznet's inverted-U hypothesis, where the
turning point is estimated to occur in 1976. He argues that the rapid growth of the
economy after 1957 has resulted in a significant increase in income inequality due to
the widening rural-urban, as well as inter and intra-ethnic, income inequality. This
trend continues until the middle of the 1970s, when growth was then associated with a
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declining income inequality due to a reduction in both rural-urban as well as inter-
ethnic income inequality.
Shari and Zin (1990) examine the trends and pattern of income inequality in the post-
NEP period, i.e. between 1970 and 1987. Their main aim was to assess the trend of
income inequality since the implementation of the NEP in 1970. Besides the
distribution figures already published by the previous authors, they also used the
published figures from the Household Income Survey (FRS) 1987. Their studies show
that income inequality initially increases in the earlier period of the 1970s, peaks in
1976, and declines thereafter. They argue that the apparent decline in income
inequality after 1976 could be explained by the "redistribution through growth"
strategy, which underlies the NEP. Most important are the rural development and
education programs. They argue that these programs appear to benefit the poorest
section of the population, which happens to be in the rural areas. Since the Malay
constitute the largest proportion of the rural population, strategies that were aimed at
raising the income of the rural household has resulted in the rural and the Malay
household incomes increasing at a faster rate than those of the other groups, and
hence reduced income inequality over time.
Shireen (1998) examines the trends of income inequality and poverty in Malaysia in
the 1980s. She uses income distribution figures from the Household Income Survey
(HIS) of 1980, 1984, 1987 and 1989. Unlike the previous authors who examined
income distribution only for Peninsular Malaysia, she also examines the trends of
income distribution in Sabah and Sarawak. With regards to Peninsular Malaysia, she
found that the Gini index of income inequality has consistently fallen throughout the
1980s. This is also true for rural and urban households, as well as for each ethnic
group. She also observed that the largest declined in income inequality is amongst the
Chinese. Shireen (1998) also performs decomposition of income inequality to its
various sub-group components using the Theil index of inequality. Her results
confirm the earlier studies that intra-groups (intra-ethnic and intra-area) inequality
explain most of the total income inequality.
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The most recent study was done by Shari (2000). He examines the trends of income
inequality between 1971 and 1995, i.e. during the NEP and the earlier period of the
NDP (1991-2000). For the period of the NEP, he uses income inequality figures
available from the previous studies, while income inequality figures in the post-NEP
(1991-1995) are derived from the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000). Here, he
reviews the trends of income inequality during the NEP period (1971-1990) already
studied by Shari and Zin (1990). However, his main focus is on the impact of
liberalisation measures implemented since the mid-1980s on income distribution.
Shari (2000) shows that the declining trend of income inequality during the NEP
period has been reversed in the post-NEP period. Between 1990 and 1995, the Gini
index of income inequality has increased, and thus the rapid growth of the economy in
the early 1990s is no longer associated with declining income inequality.
Furthermore, he also shows that the income gaps between groups have begun to
widen after 1990. The Chinese-Malay, and the Indian-Malay, as well as the urban-
rural disparity ratios have increased from 1990 to 1995. He argues the increase in
income inequality after 1990 might indicate that liberalisation measures did not
victimise and alienate all sections of society. He argues that while liberalisation
measures might have marginalized the peasant and urban low-income workers, the
upper and middle-income groups might have been benefited from them, hence
widening the income inequality.
Unlike the above authors, the works of Milne (1976), Mauzy (1997), Torii (1997) and
Stafford (1998) focus on the politics of the NEP. These studies in turn fall into two
lines of arguments. The first are those who argue that the NEP is shaped by internal
(domestic) political forces and power struggle. The work of Milne (1976), Mauzy
(1997) and Torii (1997) fall in this category. Milne (1976) and Mauzy (1997) examine
the interaction between the Malay and the Chinese political parties (UMNO-MCA)
and how it has shaped and determined the implementation of the NEP. They view the
political process of the NEP as an inter-ethnic political game where UMNO and MCA
become the major players. Among others, Milne (1976) argues that the political
influence of the MCA in economic policy-making process diminished substantially
when the influential ministerial posts such as the Minister of Trade and Industry and
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the Minister of Finance (previously held by the MCA) were later held by UMN0.3
Thus, since the racial riot in 1969, UMNO has started to consolidate its political
hegemony on the economic policy-making process by controlling the influential
ministerial posts and is in the position to assert a pro-Malay (Bumiputera) policy.
Mauzy (1997) also follows this line of argument. She argues that UMNO's political
hegemony over economic policy-making process has been more entrenched in the
1980 under the Mahathir administration, and therefore the political influence of MCA
in economic policy-making is diminishing further. While both Milne (1976) and
Mauzy (1997) focus their analysis on the interaction between UMNO and MCA, Toni
(1997) on the other hand, examines the extent to which the internal power struggle
within the Malay political party (UMNO) itself is the main determinant in shaping
and implementing the NEP. He argues that Malay nationalism was at its peak in the
1970s and the Malay nationalist appears to have a major influence in UMNO. It is in
the 1970s that the NEP restructuring objective is pursued rigorously. However, Toni
(1997) argues that it has been gradually thinned away in the 1980s as the influence of
Malay nationalism in UMNO has faded away.4
The second line of arguments of the politics of the NEP is the argument put forward
by Stafford (1998). He argues that the NEP is shaped by the interaction between
external economic forces and the response from the state, rather than by the political
demands of the Malay and the Chinese as argued by Milne (1976) and Mauzy (1997)
or by the political demands of certain faction within UMNO as argued by Toni
(1997). Stafford (1998) argues that the external economic forces limit the ability of
the government to rigorously implement and carry out the restructuring objective of
the NEP. In other words, in pursuing the NEP restructuring objective, the government
is viewed as attempting to balance the desire to realise rapid growth via greater
liberalisation of the economy and the desire for uplifting the economic position of the
Malay. This balancing action of the government, in turn, shaped the NEP and its
3 The Minister of Trade and Industry has allocated to UMNO since 1969, while the Finance Minister
has also been allocated to UMNO after the resignation of Tun Tan Siew Sin from MCA in 1974.
4 In the mid-1980s, there were various liberalisation measures undertaken by the government,
particularly with respect to attracting foreign investments.
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implementation. Therefore, the liberalisation measures undertaken by the government
since mid-1980s could be seen in this light.
As seen above, the subject matter of the present study is not really new. The novelty
of the present study, however, rests on two aspects. First, it attempts to combine the
two lines of research, and second, the data employed in the present study is different
from the data employed in the previous studies. This study examines the distributional
impact of the NEP on the one hand, and also how the distribution of income explains
political interaction between different groups in the Malaysian society on the other.
Given the close connection between economics and politics in Malaysia, exploration
on the link between the economic and politics of the NEP would be not only
interesting, but also useful. In this regards, Gomez and Jomo (1997, p. x) has rightly
pointed out that a political economic analysis of the Malaysian economy, deemed
necessary because of the link between economics and politics, has become stronger
since the 1980s.
As already mentioned, none of the previous studies on income distribution really
focus their attention on the game theoretic problems as well as the interaction between
different groups in the Malaysian society that arises from the distributional impact of
the government policy, i.e. the NEP. On the other hand, studies on the politics of the
NEP did not use income distribution as the basis of their argument. This is
unsatisfactory since the argument for the formulation of the NEP is the income
imbalances between ethnic groups in Malaysia. Besides, the centre of analysis in the
studies by Milne (1976, 1986), Mauzy (1997), Toni (1997) and Stafford (1998) is the
state. The state is viewed as having to balance the forces that demand the NEP
objective to be met and the forces that oppose it. In contrast to these studies, here the
individual is the centre of the analysis. It attempts to understand the impact of the
NEP on income distribution on the one hand, and the relationship between income
distribution and individual behaviour with regards to their political choices on the
other. The trend in income distribution is used as the basis to explain individual
behaviour with regards to their political choices. The link between income distribution
and the political choices of the individual could be found by looking at it from
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rational choice perspective as well as by employing Hirschman's (1973) argument on
the changing tolerance of society towards income inequality.
With regards to the second aspect, the data employed in the present study is different
from the data employed in the previous studies. Most previous studies on income
distribution in Malaysia used government survey data that was published in aggregate
form. While aggregate data did contribute to understanding changes in income
distribution in Malaysia, the factors that contributed to inequality and poverty were
difficult to examine from that aggregate data. In this study, besides the income data
available so far, additional data from the Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS) were
employed. It was possible to disaggregate the MFLS income data not only by location
(rural-urban) and ethnic groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian), but by the sources of
income as well. Thus, the MFLS data permitted analysis to be carried out to identify
the factors that contributed to inequality and poverty. Besides, previous studies only
examine the contribution of inequality in different population subgroups to total
inequality. This study extends the analysis to examine the contribution of inequality
from different sources of income to total inequality, the question of polarisation and
the contribution of different groups to total poverty. Furthermore, a better poverty
index is used in this study besides the head-count ratio and poverty income gap ratio
that have been generally used in most of the previous studies as well as in government
documentation. Therefore, the broader and deeper analysis on the different income
data set (MFLS) undertaken by this study could be used to compare findings from
previously studies that used the government survey data, and also used to substantiate
and verify the previous findings.
1.4 Methodology and Organisation of the Study
The study will be organised in seven chapters, which consist of four essays related to
income distribution and the NEP in Malaysia.
Chapter 1 describes the background, objectives and organisation of the study.
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Chapter 2 describes the data and measures used to calculate income inequality and
poverty. The study relies on the Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS) data, but data
that has already been published from previous studies and government documents is
used as well. The most commonly used measures of inequality are used here — the
Gini, Theil and Shorrock's indices of inequality — where these indices are
decomposed to examine the contribution of different population subgroups and
different income sources to total inequality. The Wolfson index of polarisation (W) is
used to examine the question of polarisation. With regards to poverty measures,
besides the usual simple head-count ratio (H) and poverty income gap ratio (I),
poverty measures employed in this study includes Sen (S), Clark, Hemming and Ulph
Index (P*), and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT). The FGT index of poverty is
decomposed to examine the contribution of different groups to total poverty.
Chapter 3 is the first of the four essays in this study. It examines the trends and
changes of income inequality as well as poverty in Malaysia using the MFLS data.
Here, a comparison is also made with other previous studies that mostly use the
government survey data. Income inequality is decomposed to examine the
contribution of between- and within-group inequality to total inequality. The same is
also carried out for poverty. The question of polarisation (which does not appear to
have been investigated in previous studies) is also examined in this first essay.
Chapter 4 is the second essay of this study, an extension of the first essay (Chapter 3).
It examines the contribution of different sources of income to total inequality, again
an investigation not previously carried out.
Chapter 5 and 6 are the third and fourth essay of this study, respectively. These essays
examine the political implications of the trends and pattern of income distribution.
Using the rational choice framework, these two chapters attempt to show why the pro-
Malay economic policy (NEP), while successful in bringing the Malay into the
mainstream economic activities, has however become incoherent, and hence
unsustainable. Nevertheless, the lines of argument in these two chapters are different.
Chapter 5 examines how the NEP emerged from Malay nationalism and also how the
nationalist approach to the Malay economic problem has resulted in the neglect by the
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NEP of intra-Malay inequality. Consequently, there is a persistent high intra-Malay
inequality, and cross-cutting cleavages begin to emerge. Thus, the nationalist
argument for continuation of inter-ethnic redistribution becomes incoherent.
Chapter 6, on the other hand, examines why intra-Malay inequality has become a
problem now, and not at the earlier period of the NEP even though evidences show
that intra-Malay inequality is actually high at the earlier period. In other words, intra-
Malay inequality is tolerable in the earlier period of the NEP, but not in the later
period. This has been reflected in the decline of support from the Malay community to
UMNO, a party that initiated the NEP. The main proposition here is that this is a
manifestation of the Hirschman (1973) "tunnel effect", i.e. there has been a changing
tolerance towards inequality amongst the Malay.
Chapter 7 is the final chapter. It summarises the main arguments and concludes the
study.
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Chapter 2
Data and Measures
2.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the sources of data as well as the measures that will be
employed to evaluate the level of inequality and poverty in Malaysia. Most studies on
income inequality and poverty in Malaysia have employed the government survey
data undertaken by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. The Department of
Statistics (Malaysia) periodically conducts a survey of household income from which
figures regarding income inequality are published. This study however employs a
different set of income data, which is available from the Malaysian Family Life
Survey (MFLS).
With regard to measures of income, the most commonly used indices of income
inequality are used here, namely the Theil, Gini and Shorrock's indices of inequality.
The Theil index is decomposed to examine the contribution of different population
subgroups to total inequality, while the Gini and Shorrock's indices are decomposed
to examine the contribution and effect of different income sources to total inequality.
Another related aspect, which escapes the discussion on income inequality in
Malaysia, is the question of polarisation. Here, the Wolfson index of polarisation (W)
is used. With regard to poverty, better poverty measures than the usual head-count
and poverty income gap ratios are considered here. These are the Sen (S), Clark,
Hemming and Ulph (P*), and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) indices of poverty.
The Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) index of poverty is decomposed to examine
the contribution of different groups to total poverty.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the MFLS data and other
sources of data employed in the study. Section 2.3 discusses the various measures of
inequality, while Section 2.4 deals with the measure of polarisation. The final section,
i.e. Section 2.5, discusses measures of poverty.
2.2 The Sources of Data
2.2.1 The Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS)
The present study employs household income data from the Malaysian Family Life
Survey (MFLS), which was conducted in Peninsular Malaysia by the RAND
Corporation, USA. There are two surveys — the M1FLS1 and the M1FLS2. 1
 The MFLS1
was fielded in 1976-1977, while the MFLS2 was fielded in 1988-89 as a follow-up
survey to the MFLS1. The main purpose of the MFLS1 was "to provide data for
estimating the magnitude of key economic and biomedical relationships affecting
birthspacing, family size, and breastfeeding patterns of families in Peninsular
Malaysia" (Terry Fain and Tan Poh Keong, 1982, p. 1), while the purpose of the
MFLS2 "was to enable study of household behaviour in diverse setting during a
period of rapid demographic and socio-economic changes" (Haaga et.al , 1993, p.1). In
both surveys, information was collected through interviews on fertility related events,
marriage, employment, migration, income and wealth, attitudes and expectations
regarding family size and composition, community characteristics, time allocation and
transfers of resources. Thus, the information gathered in both surveys seems not only
suitable for demographic related studies such as fertility, family planning, marriage
and migration as the surveys intended, but also appropriate for studies on income
distribution since information on income and wealth was also collected.
'The first Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS1) was funded by the U.S. Agency for International
Development. The MFLS1 was conducted by the RAND Corporation in collabouration, initially, with
the Department of Statistics of the Government of Malaysia, and subsequently, with Survey Research
Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. For more information about the survey, see Butz and Da Vanzo (1978). The
second Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS2) was a colloborative project between RAND and the
National Population and Family Development Board of Malaysia, with the support from the National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development (USA) and the National Institute on Ageing (USA).
For more information about the MFLS2, see Peterson (1993).
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The household samples in both the MFLS1 and the MFLS2 were selected from a
sampling frame designed by the Malaysian Department of Statistics. It should be
mentioned that the household samples of the MFLS included only households with at
least one ever-married woman aged 50 years or younger, i.e. one who had been
married at least once, regardless of her present marital status. Therefore, the
household samples of the MFLS were not fully representative of the entire population
of Peninsular Malaysia. However, it is most likely that households that did not fall
within the MFLS sampling criteria were small and insignificant. Therefore, even
though the household samples of the MFLS might not be fully representative of the
entire population of Peninsular Malaysia, nonetheless analysis of the MFLS data
would still provide useful information on the distribution of income in Malaysia.
The relevant data used in the analysis is taken from the following questionnaires of
the MFLS1: ME! (Household Roster), MF4 (Female Time Budget), MF5 (Male Time
Budget), and MF6 (Income and Wealth). On the other hand, the data from the MFLS2
is taken from these questionnaires: MF25 (Household Economy), MF21 (Household
Roster), and MF26EB and MF27COMM (Community Level Data). There is a total of
1263 and 1512 households in the MFLS1 and MFLS2 samples, respectively.
Households with incomplete data are omitted. The number of household samples left
for analysis in the study totals 1245 for MFLS1 and 1507 for MFLS2. The household
samples in the MFLS can be classified according to their location (i.e. rural or urban)
and their ethnic groups. When comparing between ethnic groups, households
classified as "Other races" are omitted. "Other races" constitute only about 0.1 percent
of the total respondents.
The MFLS gathered information generally on all income received by the household —
cash and non-cash income, which included the value of self-activities such as
housework products and services for own consumption. Income data was collected on
agricultural production, ownership of animals, businesses owned, services performed,
gifts from non-household members, inheritance or dowries received, income from
insurance, pensions, retirement programs and interest; income received from renting
rooms, houses or land; ownership of land; and possession of durable goods. Thus, the
concept of income used in the MFLS was fairly broad and the income data could also
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be classified according to its sources. Here household income, which refers to total
annual income received by each household, is broadly grouped into the following
sources:
(i) Paid employment — refers to income before tax received from work, which
is mainly wages and salaries, including bonuses as well as payments in-
kind;
(ii) Self-employment — refers to gross income from self-employment including
income from agriculture and business activities;
(iii) Rent (from property such as housing, and land), interest and dividends;
(iv) Pensions and employment provident funds (EPF);
(v) Remittances;
(vi) Welfare payment and zakat2;
(vii) Inheritance, gifts and dowries;
(viii) Home produce and consumption, and
(ix) Others
Thus, the MFLS data sets allow analysis to be carried out not only to examine within-
and between-group contribution, but also to examine the contribution of different
source of income to total inequality.
Table 2.2.1 below shows the proportion of MFLS household samples by ethnic groups
as well as by location (rural-urban). Table 2.2.2 on the other hand shows the MFLS
rural and urban household samples by ethnic groups. It was estimated that the
population in Peninsular Malaysia in 1988 was made up of 58.0 percent Malays, 32.0
percent Chinese and 10.0 percent Indian (See Haaga, J.G. et.al 1993, p.5). Other
ethnic groups made up less than 1.0 percent. Therefore, with regards to the MFLS2
(1988/89), the household samples appear to be fairly representative of this distribution
of ethnic groups.
2 According to the Shariah (Islamic Law), zakat is a compulsory payment that is due to the poor from
the wealth of well-to-do Muslims.
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Table 2.2.1: MFLS Data: Number and Percentage of Households of the MFLS Sample,
1976/77 and 1988/89.
MFLS1 (1976/77) MFLS2 (1988/89)
No. % No. %
Rural Households 722 57.99 965 64.03
Urban Households 523 42.01 542 35.97
Malay Households 591 47.47 911 60.45
Chinese Households 496 39.84 399 26.48
Indian Households 147 11.81 184 12.21
Others 11 0.88 13 0.86
Total Households 1245 100.00 1507 100.00
Table 2.2.2: MFLS Data: Number and Percentage of the MFLS Rural and Urban Household
Samples by Ethnic Groups, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
MFLS1 (1976/77) MFLS2 (1988/89)
No. % No. %
Rural Households 722 100.00 965 100.00
Malay 435 60.25 688 71.30
Chinese 201 27.84 182 18.86
Indian 76 10.53 86 8.91
Others 10 1.39 9 0.93
Urban Households 523 100.00 542 100.00
Malay 156 29.83 223 41.14
Chinese 295 56.41 217 40.04
Indian 71 13.58 98 18.08
Others 1 0.19 4 0.74
Table 2.2.3 summarises the MFLS household income data - the total, mean, median,
standard deviation and the number of household samples. Table 2.2.4 compares the
household income statistics from the MFLS data with the government survey data
reported in Shari (2000). Interesting enough, a comparison of the mean, median as
well as income shares of the MFLS data with the figures reported in Shari (2000)
shows that both sources appears to produce more or less comparable figures. Thus,
while the MFLS household samples might not be as representative as the government
survey, nonetheless, it can still provide useful information on the income distribution
in Malaysia.
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Table 2.2.3: MFLS Data: Summary of Household Income Data, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
Standard
Total Mean Median Deviation n
1976/77
By Population Groups
All Households 7759289 on32 3840 9825.113 1245
Rural Households 2988184 4139 3106 4641.70 722
Urban Households 4771105 9123 5425 13633.07 523
Malay Households 2242982 3795 2647 4095.55 591
Chinese Households 4389536 8850 5747 12368.83 496
Indian Households 1089441 7411 4220 13636.27 147
By Income Sources
Paid Employment 4555731 3659 2224 5829.11 937
Self-Employment 2769058 2224 118 8147.67 769
Rent,Interest and Dividends 97192 78 0 703.81 127
Pensions and EPF 10182 8 0 107.98 14
Welfare Payment/Zakat 1080 1 0 22.72 5
Remittance 67750 54 0 306.80 347
Inheritance, Dowries and Gifts 11889 10 0 145.33 15
Home Consumption & Production 219338 176 0 670.08 286
Others 27069 22 0 194.20 80
TOTAL 7759289 6232 3840 9825.11 1245
1988/89
By Population Groups
All Households 19849517 13172 9000 15173.74 1507
Rural Households 10527669 10910 7310 13669.17 965
Urban Households 9321848 17199 12738 16811.23 542
Malay Households 10160719 11153 7200 14006.95 911
Chinese Households 6902714 17300 12140 16583.30 399
Indian Households 2462786 13385 10465 10261.18 184
By Income Sources
Paid Employment 11877028 7881 5400 10834.35 1141
Self-Employment 4843315 3214 0 8136.25 706
Rent, Interest and Dividends 642061 426 0 2566.96 271
Pensions and EPF 661656 439 0 4382.66 107
Welfare Payment/Zakat 4293 3 0 56.50 19
Remittance 996128 661 0 2613.74 542
Inheritance, Dowries and Gifts 130184 86 0 520.87 67
Home Consumption & Production 480715 319 0 1409.66 428
Others 214137 142 0 1498.53 106
TOTAL 19849517 13172 9000 15173.74 1507
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Table 2.2.4: A Comparison of Mean, Median and Income Share of Household Income from
the MFLS Data and Previously Reported Data.
Shari (2000) MFLS
1976 1987 1990 1976/77 1988/89
All Households
Mean 514 1074 1163 6232 (519) 13172 (1098)
Median 313 738 808 3840 (320) 9000 (750)
Income share of:
Top 20% 57.7 51.2 50.4 57.88 51.77
Middle 40% 31.2 35.0 35.3 32.21 34.90
Bottom 40% 11.1 13.8 14.3 9.91 13.34
Rural Households
Mean 392 852 927 4139 (345) 10910 (909)
Median 262 629 697 3106 (259) 7310 (609)
Income share of:
Top 20% 54.5 48.3 47.1 51.65 52.47
Middle 40% 33.7 36.7 37.1 37.20 34.06
Bottom 40% 11.8 15.0 15.8 11.15 13.47
Urban Households
Mean 830 1467 1591 9123 (760) 17199 (1433)
Median 495 1004 1104 5425 (452) 12738 (1062)
Income share of:
Top 20% 55.9 50.8 50.6 57.79 48.41
Middle 40% 32.2 35.0 35.1 31.68 36.29
Bottom 40% 11.9 14.2 14.3 10.53 15.30
Malay Households
Mean 345 868 931 3795 (316) 11153 (929)
Median 233 612 677 2647 (221) 7200 (600)
Income share of:
Top 20% 53.8 50.2 49.5 53.91 53.72
Middle 40% 34.5 35.7 35.7 35.66 33.24
Bottom 40% 11.7 14.1 14.8 10.42 13.04
Chinese Households
Mean 787 1430 1582 8850 (738) 17300 (1442)
Median 480 1021 1137 5747 (479) 12140 (1012)
Income share of:
Top 20% 56.0 48.9 49.2 55.70 48.65
Middle 40% 31.4 36.0 35.7 32.78 35.71
Bottom 40% 12.6 15.1 15.1 11.52 15.64
Indian Households
Mean	 538	 1089	 1201	 7411 (618)	 13385 (1115)
Median	 329	 799	 881	 4220 (352)	 10465 (872)
Income share of:
Top 20%	 52.4	 47.2	 47.7	 58.00	 43.07
Middle 40%	 33.0	 35.9	 35.8	 28.11	 39.06
Bottom 40%	 14.6	 16.9	 16.5	 13.89	 17.87 
Note:
The mean and median income reported by Shari is the current monthly household income. The mean
and median income of the MFLS data reported here is the current annual household income. The
current monthly household income of the MFLS figures is given in parenthesis.
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2.2.2 Other Sources of Data
Since the MFLS data is only available for two periods — 1976/77 and 1988/89 — to get
a better picture on the trends and changes in income inequality over a longer period,
the study has also relied on the readily available figures on income inequality and
poverty. Readily available figures on income inequality such as the Gini index,
income shares and poverty incidence have been obtained from official government
documents such as the Outline Perspective Plan (OPP) and Malaysia Five-Year Plans.
In addition, published figures on income inequality and poverty have been obtained
from the previous studies. Among those who have studied income distribution in
Malaysia are Snodgrass (1980), Anand (1983), Ikemoto (1985), Perumal (1989), Shari
and Zin (1990), Shireen (1998) and Shari (2000). These studies, in turn, have used
readily available data from official government documents or from the government
surveys listed below:
a. Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the Federation of Malaya 1957/58
(Department of Statistics).
b. The Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households 1967-1968 (SES)
(Department of Statistics).
c. Survey Research Malaysia/Ford Social and Economic Survey 1967/68
(Survey Research Malaysia Sendirian Berhad).
d. The Post Enumeration Survey (PES) of the 1970 Population Census,
(Department of Statistics).
e. Household Expenditure Survey 1973 (HES) (Department of Statistics).
f. National Agricultural Census 1977 (NAC) (reference year 1976).
g. Household Income Survey (HIS) 1980 (reference year1979) (Department
of Statistics).
h. Household Income Survey (HIS) 1984 (Department of Statistics).
i. Household Income Survey (HIS) 1987 (Department of Statistics).
I . Household Income Survey (HIS) 1989 (Department of Statistics).
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In addition, other data such as that on economic performance and elections that is
relevant to the study has come from various relevant sources. These include official
publications and reports such as Annual Economic Report of the Ministry of Finance,
Bank Negara Malaysia Annual Report, Monthly Statistical Bulletin of Bank Negara
Malaysia. Data published by international institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund and The World Bank has also been used.
2.3 Measures of Inequality
There are many measures of inequality that have been proposed in the literature, and
each measure has its own strengths and weaknesses. An index of inequality is a scalar
measure of an array of numbers describing different aspects of distribution. Thus
there is loss of information in constructing any index of inequality. This study,
therefore, has reported a number of commonly used measures — Gini, Shorrocks,
Theil and Wolfson indices -- to capture different aspects of inequality. The Gini,
Shorrocks, and Theil indices of inequality are decomposable into its various
components. In general, the decomposition of an income inequality index can be
divided into two categories. First, when the income data can be classified into
different mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups, it is possible to examine how
much of the total inequality is due to "intra-group" inequality and how much is due to
"inter-group" inequality. For this purpose, the study has used the Theil index of
inequality, which is then decomposed to its "intra-group" and "inter-group"
contribution. Decomposition of the Theil inequality index provides a measure of the
amount of contribution of the different groups to total inequality. The inter-group
component is defined as the inequality index when intra-group income differences are
suppressed. Hence, it is the level of inequality resulting from income disparities
between different groups. On the other hand, the intra-group component is the level of
inequality resulting from intra-group income differences, i.e. when between-group
income differences are suppressed.
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Second, when income is derived from different sources such as labour, capital and
transfers, it is possible to examine the contribution of inequality in the income sources
to total inequality. For this purpose, the study has considered two measures of
inequality, which are decomposed to examine the contribution of different sources of
income to total household income inequality. The first measure is the usual Gini
inequality index. Here, the Gini decomposition is performed following the method
described by Yao (1997). The second measure is Shorrock's index of inequality, that
is a variance measure, explained in Shorrocks (1982). The calculation of Theil, Gini
and Shorrock's indexes, as well as their decomposition is explained below.
2.3.1 Theil index
Consider a population that consists of n number of households. Let y = yz, yn)
denote an income distribution among the n households, where y i is the income of
household i (i=1, 2, ...,n). Let also the arithmetic mean income of the distribution be
v., i.e. 1.1 =1/n (Ey,), where i=1,
	 n. Theil index is then expressed as follows:
[1] T(y,n)=(1/n) E [y/[1] [in (yi/ti)] } }, where i=1,2,.. .,n.
Now, suppose that the households can be classified into m groups. There are nk
households in each group, where k=1,...,m. Let household income in group k be
,‘xk i • • • , xkno,denoted by x k =	 and let [ik denote their arithmetic mean income, i.e.
= 1/nk(Exk), where k=1, 2, ..., m. The groups are mutually exclusive and exhaustive,
which means that no household is a member of more than one group, and that the sum
of nk for all groups taken together is equal to the total number of households, n, and
that union of the sets { xk } is the set {y i }. The Theil index, T(y,n), can then be
decomposed as follows:
[2] T(y,n) = [ GOO T( ck,nk) (flan)] + { E (4/11) On (gag)) WO
where k=1,...,m; and T(x k,nk) = (link) {
	 { [xkii[tk] [In (x ki/[0] } }, where k=1, 2, ...,
m and i=1,2,	 n.
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The Theil index of equation [2] can be broken down into two parts, Tw and TB, as
follows:
T(Y,n)= Tw + TB
where Tw = [E 0-4/0 T(xk,nk) (flan) 1, and TB={ 04/ [0 (in ([11/11)) (nan)}.
The first part, Tw, can be interpreted as the "intra-group" (within-group) inequality
contribution to inequality, while the second part, TB, can be regarded as the "inter-
group" (between-group) contribution to inequality. The percentage contribution of
within-group inequality is then derived by taking the ratio of Tw to T(y,n) and
multiplying by 100. Similarly, the percentage contribution of between-group
inequality is derived by taking the ratio of TB to T(y,n) and multiplying by 100.
2.3.2 Shorrock's Index and Decomposition
Once again, consider a population that consists of n number of households, i=1, 2,
...,n. Their income is derived from k sources, say sources r = 1, 2, ...k. Let y ir be the
income derived from source r by the i th household. The aggregate income for that ith
household, yi , is the sum of yi r, summed over r=1, 2, ..., k. Let also the symbols
and R, represent the arithmetic mean of yi and yir respectively. If I is the index of
inequality of yi , then Shorrocks (1982) demonstrates that,
[1] CrA = I	 zn 1, where, z i= y1 `+( -11,), for i=1,...,n, and
[2] C,B= I { yi,...,yn} - I (w1,...,w.), where w i=( yi - Yir- 1-1.0, for i=1,...,n.
CrA
 could be interpreted as the value of inequality index if income in all other sources
other than source r were equally distributed. In other words, C rA is the inequality
index if the only source of income differences arose from source r. Cr B on the other
hand, could be interpreted as the decline in inequality index when income from source
r is equally distributed, while all other income source remain unaffected. Shorrocks
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(1982) also demonstrates that the two components, C rA and C,B, can be
unambiguously separated if the inequality measure selected comes from a limited
class of measures, such as the square of coefficient of variation. Therefore, the
inequality index I can be decomposed into the contribution of each income source.
The aggregate inequality then is the sum of these components over the entire range of
the income sources, r=1, 2,...k, i.e.
[3] I{ y i , y2, • • • ,Yn }=ESr(Y1,...,yn;Yir,„ •,Yn r), where Shorrock (1982) has demonstrated
that;
[4] Sr(yi,...,Yn;Yirr) = (1/2)( CrA + CrB ).
The fractional contribution of source r to the total inequality is Sr/I, and the
percentage contribution could be obtained by multiplying this amount by 100. The
inequality index, I, considered here is the C-Square, i.e. the square of coefficient of
variation.
Besides examining the contribution of each source, it is also interesting to calculate
the likely impact of each source on total income inequality. Thus, it would be
worthwhile to estimate the proportion of inequality that would remain if the only
source of income differences is from source r, while inequality in the rest of the
sources were eliminated; and also to estimate the proportion of inequality that would
remain if the income from source r were equally distributed while the distribution of
the rest of the sources remains unchanged. Let the former be denoted a r, while the
latter pr. Following Jenskins (1995) and Papatheodorou (1998), ar and r are
calculated as follows:
[5] ar = CrA/I and
[6] f3r = (I - CrB)/ I
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2.3.3 The Gini Index and Decomposition
The most commonly used measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient. It is
the ratio of the difference between the line of complete equality and the Lorenz curve
to the triangular region underneath the diagonal (line of complete equality). The
Lorenz curve plots the percentage of the population on the horizontal axis, starting
with the poorest, while the vertical axis is the percentage of total income. The Gini
coefficient is exactly one-half of the relative mean difference, which is defined as the
arithmetic average of the absolute values of differences between all pairs of incomes
(Sen 1997, pp. 30-31), i.e.
[1] G= (1/2n 2 1.1.) { Ei
	 iy'- Yil
If income is arranged in a descending order, i.e. y i > y2 > ...> yn, then the above
expression is reduced to the following:
[2] G= 1 + (1/n) — (2/(n214[y i
 + 2y2+..•+ nYn]
One of the attractions of using the Gini coefficient as an inequality index is that "it is
a very direct measure of income difference, taking into account the differences
between every pair of incomes" (Sen 1997b, p. 31). In most other measures of
inequality, only the distance between the mean value and income levels is considered
in the expression of inequality.
When the total income is divided into a number of sources, the Gini coefficient
measuring the total income inequality can be decomposed into its various sources.
Yao (1997) develops a new decomposition approach which is simple to follow and
applicable regardless of how the population is grouped. Following Yao (1997),
consider a population that is divided into n groups. Let m i denote the mean income of
group i (i=1,2,...,n), m the mean income of the total population, p i the population
share of group i, and wi , where wi pimi/m, is the income share of group i in total
income. Yao (1997) expresses the Gini index measuring total income inequality as
follows:
31
[1] G=1- E p 1 (2Q-w1 ) , i=1, 2, ..., n.
i=1
where E p i= i, E w i=i, wi=pi m i/m, and
i=1	 1=1
Q.= E wk , for k = 1, 2, ..., n, is the cumulative income share from group 1 to group i,
k=1
and pi and wi
 follow an ascending order of m i
 (m1 < m2 <...< me). Now, suppose that
the total income is derived from F sources. Let w fi=pimfi/mf
 denote the income share
of group i in the total income arising from factor f (f=1,2,...,F), where p i
 is defined as
above, mf is the population mean income of factor f, and mfi is the mean factor income
of group i. If p,'s and wfi 's are arranged so that they strictly follow a monotonically
ascending order of group mean factor income m fi 's (or mn < m f2 <• • .< M fe), the Gini
coefficient for income source f is defined as follows:
[2] Gf =	 p1 (2Qfi - wfi)
i=1
where
pi=1, Qj = wik is the cumulative income share from group 1 to i with p i 's and
i=1	 k=1
wi 's following mn < m f2 <...< M fn. If p,'s and w fi 's follow an ascending order of group
mean total income, m i 's, instead of group mean factor income, m fi 's, the same equation
can be used to calculate the factor concentration ratio, Cf, , as below:
[3] Cf =	 p 1 (2Qfi - wfi)
i=1
with pi 's and wfi 's following m i <m 2 <...< me. Substituting equation [3] into equation
[1], the Gini index can then be decomposed as:
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F
G = EwtCf
f= 1
where,
F	 F
Ewf = E infim=i
f=1	 f=1
In other words, the Gini index of total income is the weighted average of
concentration ratios. Thus, the decomposition of the Gini index only involves the
factor concentration ratio, C f's, and the factor income shares in total income, wf, and
does not involve the calculation of factor Gini index, Gf's. Dividing the factor
concentration ratio, Cf, with the total Gini index, G, gives the relative concentration
coefficient, gf, which is defined as follows:
F
[4] gf = Cf/G, and E wfgf=1
f= 1
If the ordering of mfi's is exactly the same as that of mi's, then C f=Gf. If the ordering
of mfi's is different from that of mi's, Yao (1997) demonstrates that Cf < Gf. The
relative concentration ratio, g f, shows the effects of income source f on total
inequality. If the gf value for an income factor is greater than unity, that income factor
is said to be an inequality-increasing factor, which means that, ceteris paribus, an
enlarged share of that income factor will lead to an increase in total income
inequality. On the contrary, if the g f value of an income factor is less than unity, that
income factor is said to be an inequality-decreasing factor. The percentage
contribution of an income source can then be obtained by multiplying the w fgf value
of the income source by 100.
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2.4 Measure of Polarisation
Wolfson (1994, 1997) has shown that inequality measures such as the Gini index are
unable to capture the distributional changes with regards to changes in the share of
income held by the middle-income group. As a result, analysis that examines only the
inequality aspect of income distribution might have missed relevant aspects of how
the distribution has really changed. It is for this reason that Wolfson (1994, p. 358)
has suggested that measures that captures the changes with regards to the middle of
the distribution, i.e. the question of polarisation, should be included when examining
distribution of income. Thus, the question of polarisation merits investigation.
Hypothetically, polarisation can be perceived as signifying two aspects of
distributional changes — "spreadoutness" and bimodality (Wolfson 1997, p.402).
Spreadoutness signifies that there are fewer individuals or households with middle
level income, i.e. the distribution is spreading out from the middle. Bimodality, a
concept that is related to "spreadoutness", denotes the clustering of formerly middle
level incomes at either higher or lower levels. Thus, polarisation is said to exist when
income is largely concentrated in both end of the distribution, with less in the middle.3
Distribution X is said to be more polarised than distribution Y if income distribution
in X is more bimodal in the sense that it contain more poor and rich, but fewer people
in the middle. In this sense, polarisation can also be perceived as the degree by which
a population is divided between the "haves" and the "have-nots" (Ravallion and Chen,
1997, p.366).4
3 It might be for this reason that the concept of polarisation is also known as the "disappearing middle-
class" phenomenon.
4 A more polarised distribution does not necessarily imply that the distribution is more unequal. This
could happen if there is a transfer of income within the poorest half of the population as well as in the
other richest half, such that the gainers are poorer than the losers. In this case, inequality will decrease,
but polarisation might increase. To take an example given by Ravallion and Chen (1997, p.367),
suppose there are four people with incomes £1, £2, £3 and £4. We take £0.50 from the person with £2
and give it to the person with £1, and we take £0.50 from the person with £4 and give it to the one with
£3. Thus the new distribution is £1.50, £1.50, £3.50 and £3.50. Obviously inequality has fallen,
because gainers are poorer than losers. However polarisation has increased, in the sense that the
distribution is now more sharply divided into "rich" and "poor" than previously.
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Here, a measure of polarisation developed by Wolfson — called the Wolfson index of
polarisation (W) — is considered. Wolfson (1994, 1997) developed a measure of
polarisation that is based on the Lorenz curve. His derivation of the polarisation
measure begins with the demonstration that both the Lorenz curve and the polarisation
curve could be derived from a cumulative density function (cdf) for a distribution of
income (Figure 2.4.1a). The derivation of the Lorenz curve shown in Figure 2.4.1c
involves one intermediate step between the cumulative density function (cdf) and the
Lorenz curve. This step involves exchanging the axes of the cumulative density
function (cdf) of Figure 2.4.1a so that population percentiles are ranged along the
horizontal axis and income along the vertical axis, followed by dividing each
individual income by the mean income. The result of this transformation is as in
Figure 2.4.1b.
Integrating the curve in Figure 2.4.1b from the origin to the right will result in the
Lorenz curve as in Figure 2.4.1c. The derivation of Wolfson's polarisation curve also
follows a similar and parallel path of graphical transformation of the cumulative
density function (Figure 2.4.1a) as with the derivation of Lorenz curve. It begins with
exchanging the axes of the cumulative density function (Figure 2.4.1a), so that
population percentiles are ranged along the horizontal axis and income along the
vertical axis, but then continues with the following order of operations:
i. individuals' income is normalised by dividing by the median (rather than
the mean as in the derivation of Lorenz curve);
ii. the horizontal axis is then shifted up to touch the resulting median-
normalised parade at the mid-point of the horizontal axis, the 50th
population percentile, which is now equal to one as a result of the
normalisation; and
iii. the curve for the 50 percent of the population with income below the
median, i.e. the curve that now lies below the horizontal axis, is then
flipped around the horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.4.1b
Ad
Figure 2.4.1c Figure 2.4.1e
Figure 2.4.1d
Figure 2.4.1: Graphical Development of Lorenz and Polarisation Curves.
Population
Figure 2.4.1a
Income
Source: Wolfson (1997, p.405).
The result is a curve as shown in Figure 2.4.1d. For any population percentile along
the horizontal axis, Figure 2.4.1d shows how far its income, expressed as a proportion
of the median, is from the median. The curve in Figure 2.4.1d therefore indicates the
degree of spread of income distribution from the middle (50 th population percentile).
A less spread-out distribution, i.e. one with a larger middle class, will have a curve
that is lower.
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Figure 2.4.1d however does not capture the second notion of polarisation, which is
bimodality, since a progressive transfer wholly on one side of the median will result
in a second curve that crosses the first. To overcome this problem, Wolfson
performed a simple transformation of Figure 2.4.1d that makes it simultaneously
sensitive to both distributional attributes — spreadoutness from the middle and
bimodality. This involves integrating the curve in Figure 2.4.1d out in both directions
from the mid-point along the horizontal axis (where by construction the height of the
curve is zero) to get the "cumulative spreadoutness" or polarisation curve shown in
Figure 2.4.1e. The area under this polarisation curve, W, is the measure (index) of
polarisation.
Both the Lorenz (Figure 2.4.1c) and polarisation curves (Figure 2.4.1e) can actually
be brought together in one graph as shown in Figure 2.4.2. Figure 2.4.2 shows the
usual Lorenz curve. The only addition here is that there is a tangent line to the Lorenz
curve at the 50 th
 population percentile, with the vertical axis extended down to meet
this tangent line. Wolfson demonstrated that if the vertical axis of the polarisation
curve in Figure 2.4.1e is renormalized by multiplying it by the ratio of the median to
the mean, and then tilting the horizontal axis until it has the same slope as the tangent
line to the Lorenz curve at the 50 th population percentile, the transformed polarisation
curve is identical to the Lorenz curve.
It can be shown that, W, the area under the polarisation curve of Figure 2.4.1e, i.e. the
scalar indicator of the extent of polarisation or the size of the middle class, is a simple
transform of the lightly shaded area in Figure 2.4.2. The lightly shaded area in Figure
2.4.2 between the tangent line and the Lorenz curve is,
[1] T — Gini/2
The area under the polarisation curve of Figure 2.4.1e, W, is
[2] W = (T-Gini/2)/(m/tt)
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0where m/p, is the slope of the tangent line to the Lorenz curve at the 50th population
percentile; m is the median; u is the mean; and T is the area of the trapezoid defined
by the 45 degree line and the median tangent. T in turn equals the vertical distance
between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line at the 50 th population percentile.
This in turn is equal to the difference between 50 percent and the income share of the
bottom half of the population, which is denoted by 0.5 — L (0.5). For a perfectly equal
distribution of income, W has a value of zero, which is its minimum value. For a
perfectly bimodal distribution, W has a value of 0.25, which means half of the
population has zero income and the other half has 2p. (with the median being equal to
in this case).
Figure 2.4.2: Wolfson Measure of Polarisation Based On the Lorenz Curve
Source: Wolfson (1997, p.407).
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In order to have an index that has a similar range of values as the Gini, i.e. between 0
and 1, Wolfson arbitrarily defined W as having four times the area discussed so that
the Wolfson polarisation index became as follows:5
[3] W = 2(2T-Gini)/(m/A)
Thus, Wolfson's index of polarisation (W), like the Gini index, has a value between 0
and 1. As mentioned above, the value 0 indicates that there is no polarisation, while
the value 1 indicates a complete polarisation. Zero polarisation occurs in a situation
where there is complete equality, while complete polarisation occurs when half of the
population has zero income and the other half has twice the mean.
2.5 Measures of Poverty
A decline in income inequality does not necessarily imply that there will be an
improvement in the standard of living of the poorest section of the households. Even
when there has been a decline in income inequality, one cannot conclude with
certainty that there is also a reduction in poverty, since it is possible to have an
improvement in the overall income inequality, but the poorest section of the
households could become poorer or at least remain the same. For instance, inequality
index can show an improvement if there is a transfer of income from the richest to the
less rich people amongst the rich, with no change to the poor section of the society.
Therefore, the question is: what happens to the poorest section of the households? The
question of poverty needs examination. There are basically two steps to poverty
assessment (Sen 1997b, p.165). The first is to identify who are the poor among the
population, and the second is to gather the relevant data describing the poor to arrive
at an aggregate poverty index of the population.
5 Ravallion and Chen (1997, p.369) expressed Wolfson's index of polarisation, W, as follows: W =
2(12* - 111 )/m; where 11* is the distribution-corrected mean income (given by the actual mean times 1
minus the Gini index), [I L is the mean income of the poorest half of the population, and m is the median
income.
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The most common approach to identify the poor is by defining the income poverty
line, i.e. the borderline of income that separates the poor from the non-poor. Thus,
those incomes falls below the poverty line are considered to be the poor. While this
approach seems simple, it actually involves complex and difficult conceptual issues.
The problem is determining the appropriate poverty line. There are different
perceptions on poverty, and therefore various suggestions on how to define the
poverty line. Indeed, there is often disagreement on how to define the poverty line.
Basically there are two approaches: the absolute approach and the relative approach.
The absolute approach defines the poverty line independent of the standard of living
of the general population. This approach involves a concept of a minimum standard of
living, i.e. the minimum level of consumption (for instance nutritional requirement)
for survival. Thus, the poverty line is the estimated cost of the bundle of goods
necessary to ensure that the basic minimum requirements are met. The difficulty
however is to identify what these minimum requirements are. Usually this refers to
physical requirements for survival, for example, nutritional requirements. Thus, one
of the most important components of basic requirements is food expenditure, which is
usually based on food energy intake level. In addition, a certain amount of non-food
items such as housing and clothing is also included.
The relative approach however, defines the poverty line in relation to the general
standard of living that prevails in the society. This approach defines a person as being
poor when his or her income is significantly below the national average. One relative
measure defines poverty as the situation at the lower end of the income distribution
scale, for example the bottom 10 or 20 percent. However, using this definition,
poverty will only be diminished if complete equality of income is achieved, since the
bottom 10 or 20 percent will surely always exist whenever income is not equally
distributed. Besides, this relative approach to poverty is also likely to give no
indication on the quality of life of the poor.
With regards to income poverty line in Malaysia, it is surprising to find that income
poverty lines were not officially published until the publication of the Mid-Term
Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan in 1989, where the official income poverty line in
1987 as mentioned in the Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan was RM350
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for a household of 5.14 persons in Peninsular Malaysia (Shireen, 1998, p. 151). This
is quite surprising since poverty eradication is one of the main objective of the NEP,
and poverty incidence has been reported in various government official documents
long before. Shireen (1998) however has taken the trouble to estimate the income
poverty line from 1978 to 1990, using the income poverty line estimated by Mahbob
(1976) as her point of reference. 6
 She derived her estimation of the income poverty
line by updating annually, component by component the Mahbob (1976) income
poverty line. Table 2.5.1 below shows her estimation of the income poverty line.
Table 2.5.1: Income Poverty Line in Peninsular Malaysia (current prices), 1977-1990.
Year Poverty Line Income (RM)
1977 252.36
1978 264.47
1979 273.08
1980 287.33
1981 318.07
1982 339.98
1983 352.34
1984 353.00
1985 352.47
1986 353.40
1987 356.17
1988 366.02
1989 375.98
1990 389.41
Notes: (1) 1977-1983: household size of 5.4 persons; 1984-1990: household size of 5.14 persons. (2)
The government has changed the average household size in 1993 to 4.8 persons.
Source: Shireen (1998, p. 153).
Shireen (1998, p.153) claimed that her estimation is "very close to those given by the
EPU" and is fairly correct. In this study, the income poverty line estimated by Shireen
(1998) is employed, which is RM252.36 for a 5.4 member household in 1977 and
RM366.02 for a 5.14 member household in 1989. While this could be a source of
disagreement, it is nonetheless sufficient for the purpose of the present study.
Once the income poverty line has been determined, the next step is to determine how
much poverty exists with reference to it. Below we discuss the measures of poverty
that are mostly used in the literature and in this study.
6 Unpublished EPU paper by Mahbob (1976) estimated that the income poverty line in 1976 was
RM252.36 for a household of 5.4 persons in Peninsular Malaysia (See Shireen 1998, p.151).
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2.5.1 Head-Count Ratio (H)
One of the simplest and the most widely used measures of poverty is the "head-count
ratio", or the poverty incidence. The head-count ratio is basically the proportion of
total population whose income falls below the specified poverty line. Thus, suppose
there are n households, whose income is v v„17 ,29 ••• 1 yn• Let z be the income poverty
line, and there are m households with income yi, yz, • • •, ym, that are less than (or equal
to) z, then the head count ratio (H) is simply the ratio of m to n, i.e.
H(y,z) = mmn
However, one of the shortcomings of the head-count ratio is that it fails to take into
account the extent to which the income of the poor falls below the income poverty
line. The poor who are just below the income poverty line and the poor who are really
in destitution are treated as the same by the head-count ratio. In other words, it
ignores the "depth" as well as the "distribution" of poverty (Sen 1997b, p.168). Thus,
the poverty-income gap ratio might be preferred.
2.5.2 Poverty-Income Gap Ratio (I)
The poverty-income gap measures the sum of the shortfall in income of each of the
poor from the poverty line. Thus, it measures the depth of the poor person's poverty.
If the income of the i th poor person is yi , and the income poverty line is z, then the
poverty-income gap is z-y,. If the total income unit that are poor is m, then the
aggregate gap of all of the poor would be the summation of all individual income gap,
i.e.,
I=	 (z-y,), i=1, 2, ..., m.
The advantage of the poverty-income gap is that it identifies the total amount of
income needed to lift all the poor up to the poverty line, i.e. the minimum amount of
income needed to wipe out poverty. Since the above expression ignores the number of
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people falling below the poverty line, the poverty-income gap ratio is preferred. It is a
normalised version of the poverty-income gap, to make it independent of the number
of the poor (as well as the currency in which poverty income is recorded). The
poverty-income gap ratio is obtained by normalising the above expression by dividing
it by the factor mz;
I = E (z-yi)/(mz), i=1, 2, ..., m.
Yet shortcomings of this index remain. The poverty-income gap ratio still ignores the
distribution of income among the poor, i.e. how the total income gap is divided
among them. For instance, a transfer of income from the poorest household to a less
poor household, but leaving the recipient household still below the poverty line would
not be reflected in a change of the index. Thus, both H and I indices are "best seen as
partial indicators of poverty" (Sen 1997b, p.169). To overcome the problem, Sen
(1997) proposes a distribution-sensitive of poverty measure, which is discussed
below.
2.5.3 Sen Index (S)
Sen (1997b) proposed an improvement on the poverty measure by combining a
measure of distribution among the poor (G o) with the head-count ratio (H) and the
poverty-income gap ratio (I). Thus, this index introduces a welfare function, which is
sensitive to income distribution among the poor. The Sen index is defined as follows:
S = H (I - (1- I) (1 - Gp (m/(1+m))1]
For a large number of poor, the Sen index is reduced to,
S = H [I + (1- I) G].
A problem with the Sen index is that a transfer from a poor household to a less poor
household could decrease the index if the latter crosses the poverty income line
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resulting from the transfer. This property of Sen index might be tolerable if both
households were just a little bit below the poverty line and were close to each other.
This might be tolerable since the transfer contemplated to enable the less poor
household to cross the poverty income line were likely to be small. However, if the
household that loses out suffers significantly as a result of the transfer, the decrease of
the index would be questionable. Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981) have suggested a
partial remedy to the problem of the Sen index, which is explained below.
2.5.4 Clark, Hemming and Ulph Index (P*)
A partial remedy to the problem of the Sen index suggested by Clark, Hemming and
Ulph (1981) is to make the greater is the sacrifice of the household making the
transfer to enable someone to cross over the poverty line, the lesser is the amount, if
there is any, of poverty reduction. Thus, if there is a transfer from a poor person to a
less poor person who is near to the poverty line, such that the latter crosses the
poverty line, the poverty index may be decreased. However, the poorer the person
making the transfer, the lesser the power of that transfer is to reduce the poverty
index. An index, P*, which was suggested by Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981) that
holds such properties is defined as follows:
P* = 1- [ H {(1-A)(14)}(1-e) + (1-H)(141-E))
where A is the Atkinson index over the income distribution of those who fall below
the poverty line. The Atkinson index is defined as below:
A = 1-(Ye/1-10
where ye and P.p are equivalent and mean income, respectively, for the poor. The
equivalent income, ye, is defined as that income which makes the utility function
equal to the mean of the utility of the poor. Thus,
[Ye] 	 = ( 1/m) E[Yi](1-E), summed over i=1„...,m.
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The Atkinson index is defined for a particular utility function in these calculations:
U(y1) = (1/13)[y]'c), where i=1,2,...,m, those below the poverty line.
To ensure the concavity of the utility function, the parameter E must be less than
unity. The parameter E is regarded as an inequality aversion parameter in the Atkinson
index of inequality. It can be regarded as a poverty aversion parameter in the context
of P* index because here what is being considered is income distribution among the
poor.
2.5.5 Foster, Greer and Thorbecke index (FGT)
All of the above poverty indices are not decomposable in the sense that they do not
necessarily establish sensible relationships between subgroup poverty and overall
poverty with a view to determining how much each subgroup contributes to total
poverty. Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) proposed an index, which was not only
designed to overcome this shortcoming, but also generalised the H and I poverty
indices. The FGT index is defined with respect to the parameter a? 0 as follows:
FGT(a) = E (z - yki )a/ne, summed over i=1,...,m.
For a=0, the head-count ratio is obtained, i.e. FGT(a)=H. For a =1, the FGT(a)=HI
where I is the poverty-income gap ratio. It becomes more interesting for a =2, where
the above expression becomes the following:
FGT(a=2) =H [j2 + (14) 2 (CVrn)2
where CV,„ is the coefficient of variation of the income of those who fall below the
poverty line, which is defined as below;
(cv.)2 = z(p., - yi)2/ ([6)2.
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Here, [tin is the mean value of the income of the poor, and y i , i=1,2,...m, is the income
of the i th individual among the poor. Thus, as can be seen above, for a =2, the FGT(a)
index has taken into account the income distribution among the poor. To see how
decomposing the FGT(a) poverty index could be done, suppose that there are k
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subgroups of the sample population. Group j
contains nj number of individuals, and the sum of nj for j=1,...,k is equal to n, the total
population. Not all individuals in any subgroup may have income below the poverty
line, which is z. They are only mi number of poor individuals in group j. Thus the sum
of mj for j=1,...k is equal to m, the total number of the poor individuals in the sample.
Those who fall below the poverty line is given by:
FGT(a) = E (nj/n) FGT.; (a).
The FGT index for subgroup j of the above equation is given by:
FGT./ (a) = [ E (z - yu ) ],[njzi,
summed over the counter j=1,2,...,k, where yu is the income of the i th person whose
income is below z in the j th subgroup. The percentage contribution to total poverty
index of the i th group is given by Rni/n)FGTj(a)]/ FGT(a) * 100.
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Chapter 3
Income Inequality and Poverty: Evidence from the
Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS) Data
3.1 Introduction
Many have investigated the question of income inequality and poverty in Malaysia.
Among others, there are the studies by Snodgrass (1980), Anand (1983), Ikemoto
(1985), Perumal (1989), Faaland et.al (1990), Shari and Zin (1990), Shireen (1998)
and Shari (2000). These studies use income distribution figures provided by the
government survey data such as the Household Budget Survey (HBS) of the
Federation of Malaya 1957/58, the Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Household
1967-1968 (SES), the Post Enumeration Survey 1970 (PES), the Household
Expenditure Survey 1973 (HES), the National Agricultural Census 1977 (NAC), and
various Household Income Surveys (HIS). Here, a different income data set from the
previous studies is used: the income data from the Malaysian Family Life Survey
(MFLS).
The MFLS data set consists of information that could be used to carry out an analysis
of income inequality as previously achieved. Furthermore, using the IV1FLS data set,
the present study also attempts to examine the question of polarisation, an aspect of
income distribution that appears to have never been investigated before. Besides, this
study also employs a better poverty index than in the previous studies. The commonly
used measures of poverty in the previous studies as well as in government documents
are the head-count ratio and poverty-income gap. These measures have shortcomings
for gauging poverty [see for example Fields (1994), Sen (1997b) and Zheng (1997)].
Using the information provided in the MFLS data set, better measures of poverty - the
Sen index (S), Clarke, Hemming and Chu (P*) index, as well as Foster, Greerer and
Thorbecke (FGT) index - are calculated. Thus, analysis on income distribution of the
income data set available from the NIFLS not only allows comparison to be made
between the findings of the present study with the previous studies, but also allows
the present study to complement and substantiate the findings of the previous studies.
The MFLS data is available for two periods — 1976/77 and 1988/89. As such, the
MFLS data analysis only gives a snapshot view of the changes of income inequality
between these two dates. To get a better picture of the trends and changes in income
inequality over a longer period, this chapter will also rely on published income
distribution figures that are readily available in the government documents as well as
in the previous studies. Nevertheless, the changes of income inequality and poverty
between these two periods covered by the MFLS data are likely to capture the
changes in income distribution during the New Economic Policy (NEP), which is
implemented in the 1971-1990 period.
This chapter is organised into five subsections. Following this introduction, the
following Section 3.2 will examines income inequality of the overall, rural-urban, and
each ethnic group, as well as the contribution of between-group and within-group
inequality to total inequality. Section 3.3 examines the question of polarisation, while
section 3.4 analyses the extent of poverty. Section 3.5 summarises as well as
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Income Inequality
This subsection reports the results of the analysis on income inequality of the MFLS
data and compares the results of this study with the findings of the previous studies.
The examination of income inequality covers the overall inequality, inequality within
and between areas (urban and rural), and also inequality amongst and between ethnic
groups. Furthermore, the contribution of between- and within-group inequality to total
income inequality is also examined. Measures of inequality as well as decomposition
of income inequality to the between- and within-group contribution presented here
has been discussed in Chapter 2.
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3.2.1 The Overall Inconze Inequality
Table 3.2.1 below reports the distribution of household income from the MFLS data
analysis. It shows that between 1976/77 and 1988/89 household incomes increased, as
indicated by the increase in the mean household income. The results also suggest that
between 1976/77 and 1988/89, there was a reduction in the overall income inequality
as indicated by the fall in the Gini, Shorrock's and Theil index of inequality. For
example, the Gini and Shorrock's indices of inequality fell from 0.5418 and 2.4852 in
1976/77 to 0.4666 and 1.3271 in 1988/89, respectively. It can also be seen that the
middle and lower income groups increased their income share, while the upper
income group lost out. Thus, between 1976/77 and 1988/89, i.e. between the earlier
and towards the end of the NEP period (1971-1990), income inequality generally
improved.
Table 3.2.1: MFLS Data: Distribution of Household Income, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Gini Index (G) 0.5418 0.4666
Shorrock's Index 2.4852 1.3271
Theil Index 0.5889 0.4055
Income share of:
Top 10% 41.76 35.65
Top 20% 57.88 51.77
Middle 40% 32.21 34.90
Bottom 40% 9.91 13.34
Mean 6232 13172
Median 3840 9000
Table 3.2.2 and Figure 3.2.1 below show the figures on income distribution in
Malaysia as reported in previous studies and government documents. It suggests that
income inequality initially increased at the beginning of the first half of the 1970s,
reaching a peak in 1976, and declined thereafter until it reached the lowest level in
1990, and started to deteriorate again after 1990. Thus, it seems that the results from
the MFLS data analysis reported above fell within this longer trend of income
inequality in Malaysia. It could be observed from Table 3.2.2 that, while there was a
reduction in income inequality during the 1970-1990 periods, it never fell back to the
pre-NEP level. The lowest Gini coefficient during the implementation of the NEP
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(1971-1990), which is 0.445 in 1990, was still higher than the Gini coefficient in
1957/58 and 1967/68. It also appears that the middle and lower-income shares
increased, while income share of the upper income group declined. However, the top
20 percent of the population still held more than half of the total household income,
which is also found in the MFLS data analysis.
Table 3.2.2: Overall Household Income Distribution in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1995.
Income Share of:
Mean (RM	 Median (RM
	
Gini	 Top Middle Bottom
per month)	 per month)	 Coefficient	 20% 40% 40%
1957/58	 215	 156	 0.412	 48.6 35.5 15.9
1967/68	 140	 154	 0.444	 51.3 34.4 14.3
1970	 264	 166	 0.513
	
55.7 32.9 11.5
1976	 524	 313	 0.529	 57.7 31.2 11.1
1979	 693	 436	 0.508
	
55.7 32.4 11.9
1985	 1095	 723	 0.480	 53.2 34.0 12.8
1987	 1074	 738	 0.456	 51.2 35.0 13.8
1990	 1163
	 808	 0.445	 50.4 35.3 14.3
1993
	 n.a.	 n.a.	 0.459	 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1995
	 2007	 n.a.	 0.464	 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note:
n.a. = not available
Source: Snodgrass (1980), Malaysia (1990, 1996) and Shari (2000).
Figure 3.2.1: Trends of Gini Coefficient, 1957 to 1995.
Besides examining how Malaysia performed in terms of income distribution between
the periods available, it might be interesting to have a rough idea on how Malaysia
performed in terms of income distribution compared to other countries. Table 3.2.3
shows income inequality in Malaysia was comparable to income inequality of some
Latin American countries. Table 3.2.4 shows income inequality in the early 1970s for
sixteen selected countries that were more or less at the same level of development and
Borda score'. It can be observed that the performance of Malaysia in terms of income
inequality is not that impressive. Income inequality in Malaysia was worse compared
to developing countries in Asia such as Taiwan, Sri Lanka, India, South Korea, and
Philippines, and also to some developing countries in Latin America such as
Venezuela, Chile and Argentina. Income share of the lower income groups was lower,
while the income share of the high-income group was higher in Malaysia, compared
to the countries mentioned above. Only three of the sixteen countries (Peru, Honduras
and Brazil) selected in Table 3.2.4 had an income distribution (in the late 1960s and
early 1970s) that was more uneven than Malaysia.
The recent ranking by Jong-II You (1998) also showed that the ranking of Malaysia in
terms of income inequality has not changed much (see Table 3.2.5 below). Compared
to the eight "East Asian Miracles" countries, Malaysia stood out the last. Besides,
among the 66 countries listed and compared by Jong-I1 You (1998), Malaysia ranked
49 out of 66, i.e. ranked in the bottom third. Indeed, when ranked among the countries
classified as the upper-middle income group, Jong-I1 You (1998) found that Malaysia
had the highest income inequality. Therefore, while Malaysia has been describes as
one of the "East Asian Miracles" (World Bank 1993), its performance in terms of
equitable distribution of income has unfortunately never been that extraordinary. A
rough comparison with other countries reveals that, while there has been a reduction
in income inequality in Malaysia, the level of income inequality could still be
considered relatively high.
1 The Borda's method of rank-order scoring gives points equal to the rank value of each country in each
criterion of comparative ranking. This produces a complete ordering based on all the criteria taken
together in terms of lowness of the sum of ranks (Borda score).
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Table 3.2.3: Gini Coefficient of Selected Latin American Countries and Malaysia.
Country 1979-1981 1989
Argentina 0.389 0.461
Brazil 0.574 0.625
Colombia 0.578 0.515
Costa Rica 0.451 0.410
Panama 0.376 0.446
Uruguay 0.452 0.420
Venezuela 0.512 0.498
Malaysia
Government Survey Data 0.508 (1979) 0.445 (1990)
MFLS data 0.544 (1976/77) 0.473 (1988/89)
Source: (i) Fiszbein and Psacharopoulos (1995, p. 73, Table 3-1) in Lustig (1995); (ii) Shari
(2000).
Table 3.2.4: Comparisons of Income Inequalities between Selected Countries.
Share of:
BordaBottom Bottom Bottom Bottom
Country 20% 40% 60% 80% Score
Taiwan (1971) 8.7 21.9 38.5 60.8 4.0
Sri Lanka (1969-1970) 7.5 19.2 34.7 56.6 10.0
Yugoslavia (1973) 6.5 18.4 36.0 60.0 11.0
India (1964-65) 6.7 17.2 31.5 51.1 17.0
South Korea (1976) 5.7 16.9 32.3 54.7 18.0
Argentina (1970) 4.4 14.1 28.2 49.7 25.5
Chile (1968) 4.4 13.4 27.2 48.6 27.5
Philippines (1970-1971) 3.7 11.9 25.1 46.1 34.0
Costa Rica (1971) 3.3 12.0 25.3 45.2 37.5
Turkey (1973) 3.4 11.4 23.9 43.4 42.0
Mexico (1977) 2.9 10.3 23.5 45.5 45.5
Venezuela (1970) 3.0 10.3 23.2 46.0 45.5
Malaysia (1970) 3.3 10.6 22.8 43.5 46.5
Peru (1972) 1.9 7.0 18.0 39.0 59.5
Honduras (1967) 2.3 7.3 15.3 32.2 60.0
Brazil (1972) 2.0 7.0 16.4 33.4 60.5
Source: Meier (1984, p. 79, Table 1).
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Table 3.2.5: Ranking of Income Inequality Between Selected Countries.
IR	 Rank Country	 IR	 Rank
6.0	 23	 Australia	 9.6	 45
6.0	 24	 UK	 9.6	 46
6.3	 25	 Venezuela	 10.3	 47
6.5	 26	 Peru	 10.5	 48
6.6	 27	 Malaysia	 11.7	 49
6.7	 28	 Costa Rica	 12.7	 50
7.0	 29	 Mauritania	 13.2	 51
7.1	 30	 Dominican R.	 13.2	 52
7.1	 31	 Mexico	 13.6	 53
7.3	 32	 Colombia	 15.5	 54
7.4	 33	 Zimbabwe	 15.6	 55
7.5	 34	 Botswana	 16.4	 56
7.8	 35	 Senegal	 16.7	 57
8.1	 36	 Chile	 17.0	 58
8.3	 37	 Kenya	 18.2	 59
8.6	 38	 Lesotho	 20.7	 60
8.6	 39	 Honduras	 23.5	 61
8.7	 40	 Tanzania	 26.1	 62
8.8	 41	 Guinea-Bissau	 28.0	 63
8.9	 42	 Panama	 29.9	 64
8.9	 43	 Guatemala	 30.0	 65
9.6	 44	 Brazil	 32.1	 66
IR Rank
3.2	 1
3.5	 2
3.9	 3
4.0	 4
4.1	 5
4.3	 6
4.3	 7
4.4	 8
4.4	 9
4.5	 10
4.6	 11
4.6	 12
4.7	 13
4.7	 14
4.8	 15
4.9	 16
4.9	 17
5.2	 18
5.7	 19
5.8	 20
5.8	 21
5.9	 2/
Country
Finland
Italy
Ghana
China
Israel
Algeria
Morocco
Canada
Denmark
Jordan
Philippines
France
Tunisia
Jamaica
Thailand
Switzerland
Bolivia
Hong Kong
New Zealand
Zambia
USA
Singapore
Country
Hungary
Bulgaria
Poland
Rwanda
Bangladesh
Japan
Nepal
Spain
Sri Lanka
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
India
Pakistan
Ethiopia
Indonesia
Uganda
Taiwan
Korea
Germany
Cote d Ivoire
Norway 
Note:
IR (Inequality Ratio) = income share of the top quintile/income share of the bottom quintile.
Source: Jong-I1 You (1998, Table 1, p. 40).
What the above findings show is that there is no doubt that income inequality in
Malaysia declined from 1976/77 to 1988/89. This has been indicated by both the
MFLS data analysis of this study as well as the analysis of government survey data in
previous studies. Indeed, the success in reducing inequality during the implementation
of the NEP has been regarded as one of Malaysia's economic successes (Malaysia
1991, p. 98). However, it appears that when a comparison is made with other
countries, the success appears not to be that extraordinary. Income inequality in
Malaysia appears to be still relatively high when compared to other countries at a
similar stage of development. Indeed, the achievements in reducing income inequality
could have been much better given the fact that the economy is growing rapidly, and
hence Malaysia is in a better position to undertake redistribution programs.
Furthermore, Malaysia's success in reducing income inequality might not be much to
be admired when income inequality after 1990 is taken into account. As already
shown earlier, after 1990, income inequality in Malaysia began to increase.
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3.2.2 Rural and Urban Income Inequality
Table 3.2.6 reports the rural and urban household income distribution from the MFLS
data analysis. It shows that between 1976/77 and 1988/89, both rural and urban
household income increased quite significantly. However, while the rural household
income significantly increased, there is no significant improvement in the distribution
of rural household income between 1976/77 and 1988/89. The Gini index for rural
households only fell from 0.4824 in 1976/77 to 0.4708 in 1988/89, i.e. a very
marginal improvement in rural income inequality. The Shorrock's index of inequality
on the other hand showed that there was a worsening income inequality among the
rural households. Besides, it appears that the rural upper and lower income groups
gained their income shares at the expense of the rural middle-income group.
On the contrary, income inequality among the urban households improved quite
dramatically. The Gini index for the urban household decreased from 0.5343 in
1976/77 to 0.4230 in 1988/89, while the Shorrock's index fell from 2.2333 to 0.9554.
It also appears that income share of the urban upper income group fell, while income
share of the urban middle and lower-income groups increased. Thus, figures in Table
3.2.6 implies that the fall in the overall income inequality could be mainly attributed
to the fall in urban income inequality, since there was almost no improvement in the
rural household income inequality.
Table 3.2.6: MFLS Data: Distribution of Rural and Urban Household Income, 1976/77 and
1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Gini Index (G) 0.4824 0.5343 0.4708 0.4230
Shorrock's Index 1.2578 2.2333 1.5699 0.9554
Theil Index 0.4240 0.5673 0.4300 0.3239
Income share of:
Top 10% 34.81 41.37 36.86 32.66
Top 20% 51.65 57.79 52.47 48.41
Middle 40% 37.20 31.68 34.06 36.29
Bottom 40% 11.15 10.53 13.47 15.30
Mean 4139 9123 10910 17199
Median 3106 5425 7310 12738
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A comparison of the results from the MFLS data (Table 3.2.6) with the results
reported in the previous studies (see Table 3.2.7) shows that there seems to be a
conflicting view with regard to rural household income inequality. The MFLS data
analysis shows that there is lack of improvement in rural income inequality between
1976/77 and 1988/89. However, the results from previous studies and government
documents indicate that rural income inequality improved. The Gini index reported
from previous studies fell from 0.500 in 1976 to 0.427 in 1987, while the Gini
calculated from the MFLS data only fell marginally from 0.4824 in 1976/77 to 0.4708
in 1988/89. Besides, in the previous study it was found that both the lower and
middle-income groups increased their income shares, while the upper income group
lost out. The result from the MFLS data analysis however shows that the upper and
the lower income groups incresed their income share at the expense of the middle-
income group. With regards to urban households income inequality, however, the
result from the MFLS data analysis appears to be in agreement with the results
reported in the previous studies.
Table 3.2.7: Distribution of Rural and Urban Household Income in Peninsular Malaysia,
1970-1995.
1970 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990 1995
Urban Households
Mean Income (RM per month) 432 843 1121 1541 1467 1617 2596
Median Income (RM per month) 265 506 611 1027 1004 n.a. n.a.
Gini Coefficient 0.494 0.512 0.503 0.466 0.449 0.445 n.a.
Income Share of:
Top 20% 55.0 55.9 55.6 52.1 50.8 50.6 n.a.
Middle 40% 32.8 32.1 32.1 34.5 35.0 35.1 n.a.
Bottom 40% 12.2 12.0 12.3 13.4 14.2 14.3 n.a.
Rural Households
Mean Income (RM per month) 	 202	 385	 590	 824	 853	 951	 1300
Median Income (RM per month)
	 139	 257	 382	 596	 629	 n.a.	 n.a.
Gini Coefficient
	 0.463	 0.500	 0.466	 0.444	 0.427	 0.428	 n.a.
Income Share of:
Top 20%	 51.0	 54.5	 53.2	 49.5	 48.3	 47.1	 n.a.
Middle 40%
	 35.9	 33.7	 34.4	 36.4	 36.7	 37.1	 n.a.
Bottom 40%	 13.1	 11.8	 12.4	 14.1	 15.0	 15.8	 n.a. 
Note:
n.a..not available
Source: (i) Snodgrass (1980); (ii) Shari and (1990); (iii) Malaysia (1990, 1997); (iv) Perumal
(1989); (v) Shireen (1998).
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The explanation for this conflicting result could arise from the differences between
the MFLS data and the government survey data used in the previous studies, such as
the concept of income being employed, and also on the sample selected as well as the
size of the sample. With regards to the concept of income used, it appears that the
concept in the MFLS data is fairly comprehensive (see Chapter 2), and indeed fairly
similar to the concept and definition of income found in the Post-Enumeration Survey
(PES), which is used by Anand (1983). Thus, differences in the concept of income
used could be ruled out as the source of the conflicting results.
It is worth mentioning again that the household samples in both the MFLS1 and
MFLS2 were selected from a sampling frame designed by the Malaysian Department
of Statistics. Thus the sampling frame of the MFLS was the same as the sampling
frame of the government survey. The differences therefore might only lie with the
household samples selected and their size. The household samples of the MFLS
include only households with at least one ever-married woman aged 50 years or
younger, i.e. one who has been married at least once, regardless of her present marital
status. Thus, households that do not contain a woman who has been married once, or
contain an ever-married woman over the age of 50, were not included in the sample.
However, it could be argued that most households are likely to contain at least one
ever-married woman aged 50 years or younger. Therefore, even though the MFLS
samples excludes households that do not contain a woman who has been married
once, or contain an ever-married woman over the age of 50, the probability of this
occurring will be low. Thus, while the degree of representativeness of MFLS samples
might be less than that of the government survey, nonetheless the aggregate data of
both MFLS and government survey might not be significantly different from each
other. This might explain why a comparison of the mean and median income, as well
as income shares of the various income groups between the MFLS data and the
government survey data shows that they are quite similar (see Chapter 2).
It also should be noted that the results are different only with regards to rural
household inequality. With regard to the urban household inequality, there seems to
be a similarity between the MFLS and the figures reported in the previous studies.
Therefore, while the sample of the MFLS is relatively small and not as fully
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representative as the government survey, there is no strong reason to believe that the
findings from the MFLS data with regards to the rural income inequality are wrong,
and hence to be disregarded. As far as the rural income inequality is concerned, the
results from the MFLS data analysis has thrown some doubt on the prevailing
perception in the previous studies that income inequality amongst the rural
households has improved between the early NEP period and towards its end.
With regards to income inequality between the urban and rural household, there is
evidence that the income gap between the rural and urban household has been
narrowing in the NEP (1970-1990) period. Table 3.2.8 and Table 3.2.9 below show
the urban-rural disparity ratio - the ratio of the mean income between the urban and
rural households, which signifies the income gap between the rural and urban
households. The urban-rural disparity ratio calculated from the MFLS data fell from
2.204 in 1976/77 to 1.576 in 1988/89, while the urban-rural disparity ratio calculated
from the figures reported in the previous studies fell from 2.19 in 1976 to 1.70 in
1990.
Table 3.2.8: MFLS Data: Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio in Peninsular Malaysia, 1976/77 and
1988/89.
Year	 Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio
1976/77	 2.204
1988/89
	 1.576
Source: Calculated from Table 3.2.6.
Table 3.2.9: Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio in Peninsular Malaysia, 1970-1995.
Year Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio
1970 2.14
1976 2.19
1979 1.90
1984 1.87
1987 1.72
1990 1.70
1993 1.75
1995 2.00
Source: Calculated from Table 3.2.7 and Shari (2000, Table 4, p.121).
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The decline in the urban-rural disparity ratio implies that between 1976/77 and
1988/89, rural household income increased at a faster rate than the urban household
income. In other words, rural household income seemed to be catching up with the
urban household income, and subsequently, improving the income gap between them.
However, in the post-NEP period (post-1990), the urban-rural disparity ratio was
reversed, i.e. it rose to 2.00 in 1995. Thus in the post-NEP, it seems that the urban
household income rose at a faster rate than the rural household income, thus widening
the income gap between them.
3.2.3 Income Inequality Within and Between Ethnic Groups
Table 3.2.10 below reports the distribution of household income by ethnic groups
from the MFLS data. It seems that income distribution among the Malays followed
quite a similar pattern with the distribution of rural household income (see Table 3.2.6
above). This should be obvious since the majority of the Malay lives in rural areas.
Between 1976/77 and 1988/89, the Gini index showed that there was only a marginal
improvement in income inequality amongst the Malay households, while the
Shorrock's index showed that income inequality amongst the Malay worsened. On the
other hand, there was quite a substantial improvement in income inequality amongst
the Chinese and Indians. These observations are still within the long-term trend of
inequality (see Table 3.2.11 below).
Table 3.2.10 also shows that the relative position of the Malay in terms of income
inequality changed. In 1976/77, household income amongst the Malay was more
evenly distributed than among the Chinese and Indians. In 1988/89, however, the
distribution of household income amongst the Malay was the most unevenly
distributed when compared to that amongst the Chinese and Indians. Besides, for the
Chinese and Indian households, the income share of their middle and lower-income
groups increased, while the income share of their high-income group declined. On the
contrary, for the Malays, the high-income group and the lower-income group
increased their income share, while the middle-income group lost out. Thus, while the
Chinese and the Indians made a significant improvement in the distribution of
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income, the Malay did not show any significant improvement, and in fact became the
most unequal of the ethnic groups. This seems to be interesting given the fact that
there was an explicit redistribution policy in favour of the Malays. What these results
imply is that, while the redistribution policy of the NEP might have benefited the
Malays, the benefit was distributed unevenly among them. The Malay lower and
upper income group gained more than the Malay middle-income group. This might
partly explains why income inequality amongst the Malay did not show much
improvement.
Table 3.2.11 below shows the household income distribution of the three major ethnic
groups in Malaysia - the Malay, Chinese and Indian - that have been reported in the
previous studies. With the exception of a slight decrease of income of the Chinese and
the Indians in 1987, Table 3.2.11 suggests that throughout the NEP (1970-1990)
period, the income of the three ethnic groups increased. Between 1970 and 1976,
income inequality amongst the Malay households initially increased, and declined
thereafter until 1984. However between 1984 and 1987, income inequality amongst
the Malay household increased slightly, before it started to decline in 1990.
Table 3.2.10: MFLS Data: Distribution of Household Income by Ethnic Group in Peninsular
Malaysia, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Malay Chinese Indian Malay Chinese Indian
Gini Index (G) 0.5009 0.5130 0.5146 0.4810 0.4249 0.3620
Shorrock's Index 1.1645 1.9534 3.3855 1.5772 0.9189 0.5877
Theil Index 0.4389 0.5200 0.6376 0.4418 0.3246 0.2281
Income share
Top 10% 36.43 39.77 46.52 37.54 32.68 27.07
Top 20% 53.91 55.70 58.00 53.72 48.65 43.07
Middle 40% 35.66 32.78 28.11 33.24 35.71 39.06
Bottom 40% 10.42 11.52 13.89 13.04 15.64 17.87
Mean 3795 8850 7411 11153 17300 13385
Median 2647 5747 4220 7200 12140 10465
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Table 3.2.11: Household Income Distribution by Ethnic Groups in Peninsular Malaysia,
1970-1995.
1970 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990 1995
MALAY
Mean Income (RM per month) 177 345 513 852 868 940 1600
Median Income (RM per month) 122 233 332 581 612 n.a. n.a.
Gini Coefficient 0.466 0.494 0.470 0.469 0.477 0.428 n.a.
Income Share of:
Top 20% 52.5 53.9 52.6 51.9 50.2 n.a. n.a.
Middle 40% 34.8 34.3 35.5 34.8 35.7 n.a. n.a.
Bottom 40% 12.7 11.8 11.9 13.3 14.1 n.a. n.a.
CHINESE
Mean Income (RM per month) 399 787 1094 1502 1430 1631 2895
Median Income (RM per month) 269 480 636 1024 1021 n.a. n.a.
Gini Coefficient 0.455 0.505 0.473 0.452 0.430 0.423 n.a.
Income Share of:
Top 20% 52.6 56.1 52.8 51.1 49.2 n.a. n.a.
Middle 40% 33.5 31.3 35.3 34.9 35.7 n.a. n.a.
Bottom 40% 13.9 12.6 11.9 14.0 15.0 n.a. n.a.
INDIAN
Mean Income (RM per month) 310 538 776 1094 1089 1209 2153
Median Income (RM per month) 195 360 522 770 799 n.a. n.a.
Gini Coefficient 0.463 0.458 0.452 0.417 0.402 0.394 n.a.
Income Share of:
Top 20% 54.2 52.6 50.8 48.4 47.2 n.a. n.a.
Middle 40% 31.5 32.7 36.3 35.3 35.9 n.a. n.a.
Bottom 40% 14.3 14.7 12.8 16.3 16.9 n.a. n.a.
Source: (i) Snodgrass (1980); (ii) Shari and Zin (1990); (iii) Malaysia (1990, 1996).
Income inequality among the Chinese appeared to follow the trends of the overall
income inequality, with an initial increase between 1970 and 1976, but a decline
thereafter. As for the Indians however, in contrast with the experience of the Malay
and the Chinese there has been a consistent decline throughout this period, from 1970
to 1990. The picture for the Malay community is more complex. There was no
decrease in income inequality from 1970 to 1987. Inequality worsened. Improvement
occurred between 1987 and 1990. The government stopped publishing intra-ethnic (as
well as rural and urban) distribution figures that were readily made available until
1990. It is likely that intra-ethnic inequality worsened for at least the Malay ethnic
group. 2
2 This could be foreseen from the acknowledgement of the government that inequality improvement in
the last two decades have not occurred evenly for all the three major ethnic groups. Income inequality,
even amongst the Bumiputera, is still high (Malaysia 1991, p.100). The latest published figure in the
Mid-Term Review of the Seventh Malaysia Plan shows that the overall inequality in 1997 increased to
0.470. Information on intra-ethnic inequality is still unavailable in the Mid-Term Review of the
Seventh Malaysia Plan. Even though it is possible that intra-Malay inequality could fall given that
inequality amongst the Chinese and Indian increased, the probability of this is likely to be small. It is
more likely that intra-Malay inequality is also rising as the overall inequality.
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It appears that during the NEP (1970-1990) period the Malay household income rose
at a faster rate than that of the Chinese and the Indians. Thus, even though income
inequality amongst the Malay was the highest of the three ethnic groups, nonetheless
income inequality between the Malay and the other ethnic groups improved. Table
3.2.12 and Table 3.2.13 show that there was a decline in the income disparity ratio
between the Chinese as well as the Indians and the Malay. However, after 1990, the
income gap between the Chinese and the Malay started to increase again. It should be
noted that, while there was a narrowing in the income gap between the Malay and the
Chinese, as well as with the Indians, the income of the Malay nonetheless was still
considerably less than that of the Chinese and the Indians.
Table 3.2.12: MFLS Data: Income Disparity Ratio Between Ethnic Groups, 1976/77 and
1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Chinese-Malay 2.332 1.551
Indian-Malay 1.953 1.200
Chinese-Indian 1.194 1.292
Source: Calculated from Table 3.2.10.
Table 3.2.13: Income Disparity Ratio Between Ethnic Groups, 1970-1995.
1970 1976 1979 1984 1987 1990 1993 1995
Chinese-Malay 2.25 2.28 2.13 1.76 1.65 1.74 1.78 1.81
Indian-Malay 1.75 1.56 1.51 1.28 1.25 1.29 1.29 1.35
Chinese-Indian 1.29 1.46 1.41 1.37 1.31 1.35 n.a 1.34
Source: Calculated from Table 3.2.11 and Shari (2000, Table 4, p.121).
Using the MFLS data, the analysis was taken further to examine income distribution
amongst each ethnic group by their location, i.e. rural and urban. The results are
presented in Table 3.2.14. It can be seen that, with the exception of the Indian, both
the Malay and Chinese rural households experienced a worsening income distribution.
It also appears that the upper-income as well as the lower-income groups of both the
Malay and Chinese rural households increased their income share significantly at the
expense of their rural middle-income groups. On the contrary, between 1976/77 and
1988/89, income inequality among the urban households improved across all ethnic
groups. The income share of the urban upper-income group declined, while income
share of the urban middle and lower-income groups increased across all ethnic
groups.
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Thus figures in Table 3.2.14 partly explain the observation that there was not much
improvement in income inequality amongst the rural household, nor amongst the
Malay households. It seems that there was not much change in rural household
income inequality since there was not much change in income inequality amongst the
rural Malay, Chinese and Indians. Likewise, the reason for the lack of any perceptible
improvement in the Malay income inequality was associated with the lack of
improvement in income inequality amongst the rural Malays, although the urban
Malay income inequality declined marginally.
Table 3.2.14: MFLS Data: Distribution of Rural and Urban Household Income by Ethnic
Groups, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Malay Chinese Indian Malay Chinese Indian
Rural Households
Gini Index (G) 0.4880 0.4254 0.3542 0.4878 0.4328 0.3419
Shorrock's Index 1.0402 0.9182 1.4246 1.9306 1.0132 0.4264
Theil Index 0.4106 0.3328 0.3105 0.4790 0.3431 0.1931
Income share
Top 10% 34.83 33.26 30.31 38.93 34.63 25.89
Top 20% 51.51 48.54 43.54 54.18 49.71 41.11
Middle 40% 38.02 36.50 35.63 32.68 35.51 39.29
Bottom 40% 10.47 14.96 20.83 13.13 14.79 19.60
Mean 3044 6351 4645 10142 14184 10586
Median 2202 4944 3447 6531 10200 8850
Urban Households
Gini Index (G) 0.4589 0.5339 0.5574 0.4324 0.4042 0.3513
Shorrock's Index 0.8894 2.0224 3.1388 0.8675 0.8092 0.5728
Theil Index 0.3577 0.5568 0.6822 0.3222 0.2915 0.2177
Income share
Top 10% 33.98 41.05 50.20 31.20 32.31 26.84
Top 20% 51.03 57.16 63.64 48.89 47.35 41.14
Middle 40% 35.53 32.63 25.08 36.93 35.79 39.80
Bottom 40% 13.44 10.22 11.28 14.18 16.85 19.06
Mean 5890 10553 10372 14272 19913 15841
Median 4007 6545 5339 10102 14820 13414
Table 3.2.15 below shows the income disparity ratio between ethnic groups by
location. It is clear from Table 3.2.15 that the income gap between the Malay and the
Chinese, as well as that between the Malay and the Indians in both the rural and urban
areas showed an improvement. For instance, the Chinese-Malay disparity ratio in the
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rural areas declined from 2.086 in 1976/77 to 1.399 in 1988/89, while in the urban
areas the ratio declined from 1.792 to 1.395. These figures imply that the income of
the Malay is catching up with the income of the Chinese (as well as with the Indians)
in both the rural and urban areas.
Table 3.2.15: MFLS Data: Income Disparity Ratio Between Ethnic Groups by Location,
1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Rural Households
Chinese-Malay 2.086 1.399
Indian-Malay 1.526 1.044
Chinese-Indian 1.367 1.340
Urban Households
Chinese-Malay 1.792 1.395
Indian-Malay 1.761 1.110
Chinese-Indian 1.017 1.257
Source: Calculated from Table 3.2.14
Besides examining the income gap between ethnic groups, it is also interesting to
examine the urban-rural income gap for each ethnic group. Table 3.2.16 below reports
the urban-rural income disparity ratio by ethnic groups, which is calculated from
Table 3.2.14. It is apparent that urban-rural income disparity narrowed for all ethnic
groups. The urban-rural income disparity ratio of the Malay for example, declined
from 1.935 in 1976/77 to 1.407 in 1988/89. Thus, between 1976/77 and 1988/89, not
only was there a narrowing income gap between urban and rural households, and also
between ethnic groups, but was a narrowing urban-rural income gap for each of the
major ethnic groups as well.
Table 3.2.16: MFLS Data: Urban-Rural Income Disparity Ratio by Ethnic Groups, 1976/77
and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Malay 1.935 1.407
Chinese 1.662 1.404
Indian 2.233 1.496
Source: Calculated from Table 3.2.14.
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3.2.4 Decomposition of Income Inequality by Population Sub-Groups
The income disparity ratio, which is used above to indicate the extent of income
inequality between different groups, however simply reflects the mean income
differences between these different groups. The ratio therefore fails to take into
account the differences in income within the group. Thus, there is a need to
investigate the extent to which inequality between and within groups contributes to
total inequality. For instance, the disparity ratio has shown that the income gap
between the rural Malay and the urban Malay (see Table 3.2.16 above) narrowed
quite significantly. Why then was this decline in the urban-rural income gap never
reflected in a significant reduction in income inequality amongst the Malay?
Besides, as observed earlier, even though the overall income inequality declined from
1976 up to the end of the NEP period, when compared to other countries at the same
level of development, it could be argued that Malaysia did not show a really
remarkable performance in terms of income inequality as it did in terms of economic
growth. This raises an interesting question. Why is it, despite the rapidly growing
economy, and hence being in a better position to carry out redistribution programmes
under the NEP,3 Malaysia did not make a really significant improvement in terms of
total income inequality? The explanation for this probably lies in part in the growing
role of intra-group inequality. Thus, while there might have been a reduction in inter-
group inequality during the NEP period, simultaneously there also might have been an
increase in intra-group inequality. The reason for this is fairly obvious - the NEP is
more concerned with reducing inter-group rather than intra-group inequality. Thus,
the impact of the reduction in inter-group inequality on the total inequality will be
minimal if there is simultaneously a significant increase in intra-group inequality. The
reduction in total inequality as a result of the decline in inter-group inequality will be
offset by the increase in intra-group inequality. The contribution of between- and
within-group inequality to total inequality, which will be examined below, will shed
some light on this argument.
3 High economic growth is a prerequisite for the implementation of the NEP since redistribution under
the NEP is designed to be from newly created rather than existing wealth.
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Table 3.2.17 below reports the decomposition of the Theil index to its inter- and intra-
area inequality contribution to total inequality. It is clear that in both 1976/77 and
1988/89 the contribution of rural-urban inequality to total inequality was significantly
small compared to the contribution of inequality within the rural and urban household.
Furthermore, Table 3.2.17 also indicates that the contribution of rural-urban
inequality to total inequality significantly declined, while the contribution of
inequality within the rural and urban household increased. This implies that the role of
inequality between rural and urban households in explaining the changes in total
inequality became less importance. On the contrary, inequality within rural and urban
household not only important, but also became increasingly crucial in explaining the
total inequality between 1976/77 and 1988/89.
Table 3.2.17: MFLS Data: Theil Index and the Contribution of Inter- and Intra-Area (Rural-
Urban) Inequality to Total Inequality, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77	 1988/89
%	 %
Theil index	 Contribution	 Theil index	 Contribution
Inter-Area 0.0766 13.02 0.0254 6.25
Intra-Area 0.5121 86.98 0.3802 93.75
Total 0.5887 100.00 0.4055 100.00
Table 3.2.18 below reports the contribution of inter- and intra-ethnic inequalities to
total inequality. It shows that the contribution of inter-ethnic inequalities to total
inequality was relatively small compared to the contribution of intra-ethnic
inequalities. This implies that it was inequalities within each ethnic group that
explained most of the total inequality. Moreover, not only have intra-ethnic
inequalities explained most of the total inequality, they have also become more
important between the periods under study.
Table 3.2.18: MFLS Data: Theil Index and the Contribution of Inter- and Intra-Ethnic
Inequality to Total Inequality, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77	 1988/89
%	 %
Theil index	 Contribution	 Theil index	 Contribution
Inter-Ethnic 0.0756 12.85 0.0196 4.99
Intra-Ethnic 0.5130 87.15 0.3734 95.01
Total 0.5887 100.00 0.3931 100.00
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Therefore, both Table 3.2.17 and Table 3.2.18 suggest that it is intra-groups inequality
that contributed the most to total inequality. Indeed, it became more crucial in
explaining total inequality between 1976/77 and 1988/89. On the other hand inter-
group inequality was less important in explaining the changes in total inequality.
Thus, based on the above findings, it could be argued that the decline in the overall
income inequality between 1976/77 and 1988/89 was due to the reduction in inter-
group inequalities, i.e. a decline in income inequality between the rural and urban
households, as well as inequality between ethnic groups. However, since
simultaneously there was an increase in intra-group inequality, i.e. inequality within
the rural and urban households, as well as inequality within each ethnic group, the
reduction in total income inequality was not as great as it would have been if there
had been no increases in intra-groups inequality. This explains why even though total
income inequality declined between 1976/77 and 1988/89, it nevertheless still
remained quite high.
The Theil decomposition analysis was also carried out further to examine the
contribution of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic inequality to the rural and urban income
inequality. Table 3.2.19 below reports the results. As found above, figures in Table
3.2.19 also suggest that the main determinant of both the rural and urban income
inequality was inequality within-ethnic groups rather than inequality between-ethnic
groups. In fact, as found above, the contribution of inter-ethnic inequality to both the
rural and urban income inequality declined, while the contribution of intra-ethnic
inequality increased over the period under study. This provides the explanation for the
marginal decrease in rural household income inequality observed earlier. The decline
in total rural income inequality was only marginal due to the significant increase in
intra-ethnic inequality. As indicated in Table 3.2.19, the contribution of intra-ethnic
inequality to total rural inequality increased quite substantially, i.e. from 86 percent in
1976/77 to 98 percent in 1988/89.
Table 3.2.20 below reports the contribution of rural-urban inequality to total
inequality for each ethnic group. As can be clearly seen from Table 3.2.20, the
contribution of rural-urban inequality to total inequality across all ethnic groups was
relatively small compared to the contribution of intra-area inequality. Indeed inter-
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area inequality contribution to each ethnic group inequality declined between 1976/77
and 1988/89. On the other hand, the contribution of intra-area inequality to total
inequality of the ethnic groups was large and increased between 1976/77 and 1988/89.
Table 3.2.20 also suggests that the contribution of inter-area inequality to the Malay
income inequality significantly declined from 11.4 percent in 1976/77 to 2.7 percent
in 1988/89. The decline seems relatively more significant compared to the Chinese
and the Indian. Besides, the increase in the contribution of intra-area inequality to
total inequality of the Malay is also more significant compared to that of the Chinese
and the Indians. Therefore, the Malay experienced quite a huge decline in inter-area
(rural-urban) inequality. However, this huge decline in inter-area inequality of the
Malay was not manifested in a huge decline in their total income inequality since
simultaneously there was also quite a huge increase in intra-area inequality amongst
them.
Table 3.2.19: MFLS Data: Theil Index and the Contribution of Inter- and Intra-Ethnic
Inequality to Total Inequality by Location, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Theil index % Contribution Theil index % Contribution
Rural Households
Inter-Ethnic 0.0588 13.87 0.0096 2.24
Intra-Ethnic 0.3650 86.13 0.4206 97.76
Total 0.4238 100.00 0.4303 100.00
Urban Households
Inter-Ethnic 0.0293 5.16 0.0118 3.90
Intra-Ethnic 0.5378 94.84 0.2897 96.10
Total 0.5670 100.00 0.3014 100.00
Table 3.2.20: MFLS Data: Theil Index and the Contribution of Inter- and Intra-Area (Rural
and Urban) Inequality to Total Inequality by Ethnic Groups, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Theil index % Contribution Theil index % Contribution
Malay Households
Inter-Area 0.0499 11.36 0.0120 2.71
Intra-Area 0.3889 88.64 0.4299 97.29
Total 0.4388 100.00 0.4418 100.00
Chinese Households
Inter-Area 0.0283 5.44 0.0138 4.25
Intra-Area 0.4916 94.56 0.3108 95.75
Total 0.5199 100.00 0.3246 100.00
Indian Households
Inter-Area 0.0758 11.90 0.0195 8.54
Intra-Area 0.5618 88.10 0.2086 91.46
Total 0.6376 100.00 0.2281 100.00
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For comparison, Table 3.2.21 below shows the contribution of inter-ethnic and inter-
area inequality to total inequality reported in the previous studies. It shows that the
results found in this study are in conformity with the findings in other studies such as
of Ikemoto (1985) and Shireen (1998). Thus, evidence shows that income inequality
in Malaysia is largely explained by intra-ethnic and intra-area (within group) rather
than inter-ethnic and inter-area (between group) inequalities. The implication of the
results is that, since intra-ethnic and intra-area inequality is the main determinants of
income inequality, the aim to reduce the overall income inequality in Malaysia will
only be effective if the focus is more on improving intra-ethnic and intra-area (within
group), rather than inter-ethnic and inter-area (between group) inequality.
Table 3.2.21: A Comparison of Inter-Groups Contribution to Income Inequality (%).
Ikemoto (1985) Shireen (1998) MFLS Data
1970 1979 1984 1987 1989 1976/77 1988/89
Inter-Ethnic 18.0 11.1 8.4 7.3 8.7 12.85 4.99
Inter-Area 16.0 9.7 11.3 9.0 9.7 13.02 6.25
Source: (i) Ikemoto (1985, Table IVD, p. 355); (ii) Shireen (1998, pp. 94-98).
3.3 Polarisation
This subsection examines the question of polarisation. In general, the concept of
polarisation is related to the degree by which the population is divided between the
"haves" and the "have-nots" (Ravallion and Chen, 1997, p.366). Polarisation occurs
when the income is largely concentrated in both end of the distribution, with less in
the middle. Thus, distribution X is said to be more polarised than distribution Y if
income distribution in X is more bimodal in the sense that it contain more poor and
rich, but fewer people in the middle. It is in this sense that the concept of polarisation
is also known as the "disappearing middle-class" phenomenon.
It is important to examine polarisation alongside inequality since inequality measures
such as the Gini index employed above are not able to capture all the distributional
changes that might have taken place, and which might be of concern and importance
in policy making. Wolfson (1994, 1997) demonstrates that inequality measures such
as the Gini index are unable to capture changes in the share of income held by the
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middle-income group. Thus, analysis that examines only the inequality aspect of an
income distribution miss relevant aspects of how the distribution has really changed.
Therefore, there is a need to investigate the question of polarisation, which is a new
aspect that has emerged in the discussion of income inequality in the recent literature
[See for instance Wolfson (1994, 1997); Levy and Murnane (1992); Jenkins (1995)].
Indeed, Wolfson (1994, p. 358) suggests that when examining a distribution of
income, measures related to polarisation should be included. Here, the analysis on the
question of polarisation is done by employing an index that has been proposed by
Wolfson (1994), which has already been discussed in Chapter 2.
Table 3.3.1 below shows Wolfson's polarisation index (W) calculated from the MFLS
data. Between 1976/77 and 1988/89, Wolfson's polarization index (W) for all
households decreased from 0.4836 to 0.4209. Thus, it seems that there is no evidence
that the Malaysian society has become more polarised between the two periods under
investigation. Therefore, generally speaking, between the 1976/77 and 1988/89, the
decline in overall income inequality observed earlier is followed by a decrease in
polarisation. Furthermore, there is also no evidence of polarisation amongst the rural
and urban households, or amongst the three major ethnic groups.
Table 3.3.1: MFLS Data: Wolfson's Index of Polarisation (W), 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
All Households 0.4836 0.4209
Rural Households 0.4255 0.4060
Urban Households 0.4976 0.3684
Malay Households 0.4795 0.4352
Chinese Households 0.4364 0.3706
Indian Households 0.3613 0.3380
The analysis is extended further to examine the question of polarisation amongst the
three major ethnic groups by their location. The Wolfson index of polarisation (W) of
each ethnic group by location is reported below in Table 3.3.2. The results show that
there was no evidence of polarisation amongst the urban households of the three
ethnic groups. However, the Wolfson index of polarisation (W) shows that there was
evidence of marginal increase in polarisation amongst the rural Chinese and the rural
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Indian households. The Wolfson's polarisation index (W) for the rural Chinese
increased from 0.3366 in 1976/77 to 0.3648 in 1988/89, while the Wolfson's
polarisation index for the rural Indian increased from 0.2627 to 0.2898. Therefore, the
rural Chinese and Indians became more polarised in 1988/89 than in 1976/77. In
contrast with the rural Chinese and Indians, while there was no significant
improvement of income inequality amongst the rural Malay, nevertheless they did not
become more polarised.
Table 3.3.2: MFLS Data: Wolfson's Index of Polarisation (W) by Location and Ethnic
Groups, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Rural Households
Malay 0.4863 0.4137
Chinese 0.3366 0.3648
Indian 0.2627 0.2898
Urban Households
Malay 0.4507 0.4381
Chinese 0.4861 0.3315
Indian 0.4445 0.2936
However, while the Wolfson polarisation index (W) does not indicate any increase in
polarisation within the Malay (and rural) households, another indicator for
polarisation, i.e. the income share of the "middle" income group, shows contrary
results. Table 3.3.3 below calculates the income share of the variously defined
middle-income group by population subgroups (see also Table 3.2.6, Table 3.2.10,
and Table 3.2.14). In general, the results shown in Table 3.3.3 mostly agree with the
results shown in Table 3.2.1 and Table 3.2.2 above. For instance, Table 3.3.3 shows
that the income share of the middle-income group for the total household increased
between 1976/77 and 1988/89. Thus, it confirms the calculated Wolfson polarisation
index (W) that there was no evidence of increase polarisation within the total number
of households. It also confirms the results for the urban as well as for the Chinese and
Indian households'
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Table 3.3.3: MFLS Data: Income Share of the Middle Income Group, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Middle
20%
Middle
40%
Middle
60%
Middle
20%
Middle
40%
Middle
60%
All Households 12.37 25.27 39.75 13.69 28.04 43.84
Rural Households 14.81 29.75 45.73 13.63 27.68 43.13
Urban Households 11.84 24.59 39.20 14.81 29.96 46.22
Malay Households 13.95 28.32 43.54 12.98 26.58 41.94
Chinese Households 12.89 26.15 41.25 14.64 29.82 45.97
Indian Households 11.82 23.29 36.68 15.87 32.26 50.40
Rural Households
Malay 14.45 29.57 45.85 13.09 26.62 41.53
Chinese 15.29 30.95 47.01 14.33 29.00 45.32
Indian 15.21 31.06 48.85 16.54 33.08 52.73
Urban Households
Malay 13.56 27.74 44.81 14.13 29.46 45.93
Chinese 12.46 25.50 40.35 14.99 29.74 46.63
Indian 9.95 20.31 32.05 17.12 33.21 51.79
Note:
Middle 20% = income share of decile 5 to decile 6 of the households; Middle 40% = income share of
decile 4 to decile 7 of the households; Middle 60% = income share of decile 3 to decile 8 of the
households.
However, Table 3.3.3 indicates that the income share of the middle 20%, middle 40%
and middle 60% of the Malay and rural households fell between 1976/77 and
1988/89. The income share of the rural Chinese middle-income group also fell
between the two periods, while the income share of the rural Indian middle-income
group increased. These figures appear to be contrary to the results from the Wolfson
polarisation index (W). While it did not indicate any increase in polarisation within
the Malay (and rural) households, the income share of their middle-income group, i.e.
another indicator for polarisation, indicated an increase in polarisation. On the other
hand, while the Wolfson index (W) indicated an increase in polarisation within the
rural Indian community, the income share of their middle-income group indicated this
is not the case. The only consistent result is for the rural Chinese household, where
both the Wolfson polarisation index (W) and the income share of their middle-income
group showed an increase in polarisation within them. Thus, the findings on
polarisation for the Malay and rural households, as well as for the Indian households
were inconclusive. It seems that the Wolfson index of polarisation (W) missed one
important aspect of intra-group changes amongst the Malays: that the top and the
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bottom income group fared better than the 'middle' income group between 1976/77
and 1988/89.
3.4 Poverty
Earlier discussions on income inequality have shown that there was an improvement
in the overall income inequality between 1976/77 and 1988/89. However, a decline in
income inequality does not necessarily imply that there will be improvement in the
standard of living of the poorest section of the households. Even when there has been
a declined in income inequality, one cannot conclude with certainty that there is also a
reduction in poverty, since it is possible to have an improvement in the overall income
inequality with, at the same time, the poorest section of the households becoming
poorer or at least to remaining the same. For instance, ceteris paribus, suppose there
is a transfer of income between the rich sections of the population, such that the loser
is richer than the gainer. In this case, income inequality may well be improving but
the situation of the poorest section of the society remains unchanged. Therefore, the
question on what happens to the poorest section of the household, i.e. the question of
poverty, needs examination. Indeed, this question is particularly important in
Malaysia because of the New Economic Policy, where one of the objectives is to
reduce poverty.
Table 3.4.1 below shows the head-count ratio, i.e. the poverty incidence in Peninsular
Malaysia reported in the government documents. It shows that poverty incidence was
remarkably reduced from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 15.0 percent in 1990. Furthermore,
the incidence of poverty amongst the rural and urban households also declined from
58.7 and 21.3 percent to 19.3 and 7.3 percent respectively. Poverty incidence amongst
all ethnic groups also showed a substantial reduction. In particular, the incidence of
poverty amongst the Bumiputera was reduced substantially from 65.0 percent in 1970
to 20.8 percent in 1990.
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Table 3.4.1: Incidence of Poverty (%) in Peninsular Malaysia, 1970 and 1990.
1970 1990
Peninsular Malaysia 49.3 15.0
Rural 58.7 19.3
Urban 21.3 7.3
Bumiputera 65.0 20.8
Chinese 26.0 5.7
Indians 39.0 8.0
Others 44.8 18.0
Source: Malaysia (1991).
However, it has been argued that the head-count ratio is not a satisfactory index to
show the state of poverty in a population [see for example Fields (1994), Sen (1997b)
and Zheng (1997)]. Basically, the head-count ratio is the proportion of total
population whose income falls below the specified poverty line. While it does give
some information on the state of poverty in the population, the shortcomings of the
head-count ratio as a measure of poverty is that it fails to take into account the extent
to which the income falls below the poverty line. Furthermore, it also fails to take into
consideration the distribution of income of those who fall below the specified poverty
line. In other words, the head-count ratio ignores the "depth" as well as the
"distribution" of poverty (Sen 1997b, p.168). Therefore, if income is transferred from
the poorest person to the least poor such that it enables the least poor to cross over the
poverty line, this seems to reduce poverty in terms of the head-count ratio. However,
while it reduces the head-count ratio of poverty, it also could be the case that the
quality of life of the remaining poor has worsened. Thus, apart from the head-count
ratio (H), which is normally reported in the government documents as well as in the
previous studies, there is a need for a better measure of poverty. Here, apart from the
head-count ratio (H), the indices employed in the study are the poverty-gap ratio (I),
Sen index (S), Clark, Hemming and Chu index (P*), and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke
index (FGT). These are among the better indices of poverty that have been proposed
in the literature.
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Table 3.4.2 below reports a set of poverty indices for 1976/77 and 1988/89, calculated
from the MYLS data. All of them indicate that poverty declined over the period under
study. The poverty incidence (H), i.e. the fraction of total household living below the
poverty line declined significantly from 45 percent in 1976/77 to 22 percent in
1988/89. The results also show that not only did the proportion of the total household
who lived in poverty decline, but that the depth of poverty also improved as reflected
by the decline in the poverty gap ratio (I) from 0.48 in 1976/77 to 0.35 in 1988/89.
Furthermore, the distribution of income among the poor also improved as reflected by
the decline in poverty indices of S, P* as well as FGT (cc=2). Poverty also declined
across all ethnic groups as well as across location (see Table 3.4.3 and Table 3.4.4).
In fact, further examination of rural and urban poverty by ethnic groups also indicates
a similar finding — poverty declined (see Table 3.4.5 and Table 3.4.6). In general,
there is agreement among all the poverty indices that poverty declined between
1976/77 and 1988/89. This finding therefore not only confirmed, but also
substantiated the government published figures that there was a substantial reduction
in poverty. With all the poverty indices showing agreement, it can be stated with
confidence that poverty really declined between the periods under study.
Since poverty indices are calculated for different population sub-groups — Malay,
Chinese and Indian as well as rural and urban - it might be an interesting exercise to
examine to what extent each population sub-group contributes to total poverty. Most
poverty indices are not decomposable, in the sense that they do not necessarily
establish sensible relationships between subgroup poverty and overall poverty with a
view to determining how much each subgroup contributes to total poverty. The index
proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984), however, addresses this problem.
The FGT index allows poverty to be decomposed into its various components'
contribution.
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Table 3.4.7 below reports the decomposition of poverty FGT (a=2) by area. It shows
that it is the rural household poverty that contributed the most to total poverty. Indeed
between 1976/77 and 1988/89, the contribution of rural household poverty to total
poverty increased. Table 3.4.8 reports the decomposition of poverty FGT (cc=2) by
ethnic groups. It shows that the contribution of Malay household poverty to total
poverty was similar to that of rural households. Further investigation shows that the
contribution of poverty amongst the Malay to the total poverty was significantly large
in both the rural and urban areas (Table 3.4.9 and Table 3.4.10). What these
decomposition exercises show is that, while poverty amongst the Malay household
has been substantially reduced, they still formed the largest group under poverty. This
implies, while poverty amongst the Malay has significantly declined, the decline was
much slower compared to that of the Chinese and the Indian.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the question of income inequality and poverty in Malaysia.
While many authors have investigated this question, most however normally
employed the income data set and the published figures from the government survey
data. This study uses a different data set from the previous studies, which is the MFLS
data set. The advantage of using a different data set is that it allows a comparison of
results to be made with the findings from the previous studies.
Furthermore, the availability and accessibility of the MFLS data set also allow
examination to be made on the question of polarisation, which a new aspect of
investigation on income inequality. This question never seems never to have been
addressed before in previous studies. Besides, in this study, a better index of poverty
has been calculated than that normally calculated in the previous studies as well as
government documents. Moreover, here the poverty index (FGT poverty index) has
also been decomposed to its various component contributions, which also has never
been done before. Thus, the information from a different data set could not only allow
comparison to be made, but also to complement and substantiate the findings of the
previous studies.
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The study found that there is evidence that overall income inequality declined
between the periods under study. In this regard, it appears that the results from the
MFLS data analysis seems to be in agreement with the results reported in previous
studies. However, while previous studies showed that rural income inequality
declined quite significantly, the results from the MFLS data showed that there is lack
of improvement in rural income inequality. The same could be said for income
inequality amongst the Malay. Therefore, as far as income inequality amongst the
rural and the Malay households are concerned, the results from the MFLS data
analysis appeared to cast some doubt on the prevailing perception in the previous
studies that income inequality amongst the rural and the Malay household was
considerably reduced during the NEP period. It appears that analysis of a different
income data set, i.e. the MFLS data, tells a different story on the rural and the Malay
households income inequality.
The study also shows that, even though declining, one of the possible explanations for
the persistence of the high level of income inequality in Malaysia is the growing
importance of intra-groups inequality in explaining the total income inequality. The
contributions of intra-ethnic as well as intra-area (urban and rural) inequalities to total
inequality are significantly large. Indeed, the contribution of intra-group inequality to
total inequality rose between 1976/77 and 1988/89. On the contrary, the importance of
inter-groups inequality to explain the changes in total inequality declined. This
finding seems to be in agreement with the findings of the previous studies such as
Anand (1983), Ikemoto (1985) and Shireen (1998). Therefore, it could be argued that
the decline in income inequality between 1976/77 and 1988/89 was mainly due to the
reduction in inter-group inequalities, i.e. a decline in income inequality between the
rural and urban households, as well as inequality between ethnic groups. However,
since intra-group inequality remains high (i.e. inequality within the rural and urban
households as well as within each ethnic group), the reduction in total income
inequality was not as significant as it would have been if there was also a significant
reduction in intra-group inequality. This explains the fact that even though total
income inequality declined between 1976/77 and 1988/89, it nevertheless still
remained quite high. This in turn also explains why there was almost no improvement
in the position of Malaysia relative to other countries in terms of income inequality.
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On the question of polarisation, there is no evidence that there is a "disappearing
middle-class" within the total households in Malaysia between 1976/77 and 1988/89.
Thus, the declining overall income inequality seems to be followed by the
enlargement of the middle-income group. However, further examination showed that
there was inconclusive evidence of polarisation for the rural and the Malay
households, as well as for the rural Indian households. The only evidence of
polarisation was found within the rural Chinese household. It seems therefore, while
the rural Chinese experienced a declining income inequality between 1976/77 and
1988/89, nevertheless they became more polarised. With regards to poverty, this study
confirms the results from previous studies as well as from poverty figures reported in
the government documents that there was a substantial reduction in poverty. All the
poverty indices employed in the study, which are better indices previously reported,
showed that poverty has been reduced substantially. Thus, the results found in this
study provide clear evidence and confirms that poverty has been reduced in Malaysia.
It was also found that, while poverty amongst the Malay has been substantially
reduced, nonetheless they still represent the major contributor to total poverty.
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Chapter 4
Inequality Decomposition By Income Sources
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the contribution of inequality in income
sources to total inequality in Malaysia. Previous studies on income inequality in
Malaysia, such as Anand (1983), Ikemoto (1985), and Shireen (1998) examined the
personal income distribution in Malaysia, which included examination of the
contribution of inequality within and between population sub-groups to the total
inequality. Therefore, while these studies contributed to the understanding of income
inequality in Malaysia, they did not however explain the whole story. The reason for
this was that these studies treated income as if it was a single lump. In reality,
however, income is usually derived from a range of sources such as income from
labour, capital and transfers. The proportion of each source in total income is unlikely
to be the same and also unlikely to be distributed evenly throughout the population.
The questions then arise as to what extent the inequality of these sources contributes
to total inequality and what impact they have on it. Thus, these questions merit
investigation. Unfortunately, examination of this aspect of income inequality is still
absent in Malaysia, which might be due to the unavailability and confidentiality of the
relevant income data in Malaysia. Using the Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS)
data, this study attempts to bridge the existing gap in the literature, and hopefully will
improve and shed further light on the understanding of income inequality in Malaysia.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes the data and
discusses the method of inequality decomposition. Section 4.3 examines the structure
of household income. The results of the decomposition, i.e. the contribution of the
various income components as well as their impact to total income inequality, is
examined and discussed in Section 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Data and Method of Inequality Decomposition
This chapter employs household income data from the MFLS, which has already been
described in Chapter 2. The MFLS gathered information generally on all income
received by the household — cash and non-cash income, which included the value of
self-activities such as domestic produces and services for own consumption. Income
data was collected on agricultural production, ownership of animals, businesses
owned, services performed, gifts from non-household members, inheritance or
dowries received, income from insurance, pensions and retirement programs, and
interest; income received from renting rooms, houses, or land; ownership of land; and
possession of durable goods. The household income of the MFLS refered to total
annual income received by each household. For the purpose of this chapter, household
income is broadly grouped into the following sources: (i) paid employment — refers to
income before tax received from work, which is mainly wages and salaries, including
bonuses as well as payments in kind; (ii) self-employment — refers to gross income
from self-employment which includes income from agriculture and business
activities; (iii) rent (from property such as housing and land), interest and dividends;
(iv) pensions and employment provident fund (EPF); (v) remittances; (vi) welfare
payment and zakat l ; (vii) inheritance, gifts and dowries; (viii) home produce and
consumption, and (ix) others.
Two decomposable measures of inequality are calculated - the Shorrock's index and
the Gini coefficient (Pyatt, Chen and Fei 1980; Shorrocks 1982; Adams 1994; Yao
1997). Reddy and Chakravarty (1998) for instance, have employed both these indices
in their study on the role of income from forestry in income inequality and poverty in
India. The decomposition of the Gini coefficient and Shorrock's inequality index is
also explained in Chapter 2.
I According to the Shariah (Islamic Law), zakat is a compulsory payment that is due to the poor from
the wealth of the well-to-do Muslims.
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4.3 The Structure of Household Income
Table 4.3.1a and Table 4.3.1b present the structure of household income for 1976/77
and 1988/89 respectively. It is clear that paid employment constituted the major
portion of total household income, followed by self-employment. About three fifths of
total household income was derived from paid employment. Self-employment made
up about one third to one fourth of the total household income. Therefore, taking both
the paid income and self-employment together, labour income formed the main source
of household income. The share of income from capital (rents, interests and
dividends, pensions and EPF) and transfers (welfare payments, remittances,
inheritance, dowries, and gifts) appeared to be relatively small compared to income
from labour. These facts appeared to be entirely true for rural and urban households,
as well as for each ethnic group. Thus, it is clear that across all households — either by
area or by ethnic - paid employment formed the major source of household income,
followed by self-employment.
Between 1976/77 and 1988/89, it was found that the share of self-employment in the
total household income declined. The share of paid employment remained almost
about the same. On the other hand, the share of income from capital and transfers -
particularly rents, interests, dividends, pensions, EPF and remittances - increased.
Nonetheless, it still remained relatively small. There also existed minor differences
between ethnic groups. In 1976/77, it appeared that the share of paid employment in
the Malay and Indian household income was relatively larger than that in the Chinese.
On the other hand, the share of self-employment in the Chinese household income
was relatively larger than that in the Malay and the Indian.
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A simple correlation was performed between total household income and its various
sources. The correlation coefficient for both 1976/77 and 1988/89 is shown in Table
4.3.2a and Table 4.3.2b respectively. There was a high correlation between total
income and income from paid employment as well as self-employment for both
1976/77 and 1988/89. In 1976/77 the correlation coefficient between total income and
self-employment appeared to be relatively higher than that between total income and
paid employment. In 1988/89, however, the reverse was true. The correlation
coefficient was relatively higher between total income and paid-employment than
between total income and self-employment. The correlation coefficient between total
income and income from capital (rent, interest, dividends, pensions and EPF) was
higher in 1988/89 than in 1976/77. Thus, generally speaking, paid and self-
employment were positively and relatively highly correlated with total income
compared to the rest of income sources. Capital income (particularly rent, interest and
dividends) was also found to be positively and quite highly correlated with total
income in 1988/89.
4.4 The Contribution and Effect of Income Sources on Overall Inequality
Table 4.4.1a and Table 4.4.1b respectively present the decomposition of Shorrock's
and the Gini inequality indices to their various income source components. The
magnitude of contribution of income source to aggregate inequality from Shorrock's
decomposition was not exactly similar to the Gini decomposition. However, both
decomposition methods showed that a significantly large portion of total income
inequality was contributed by labour income — paid and self-employment. This
finding is quite similar to Fields (1979) in his study on urban income inequality in
Colombia. The rest of the sources of income made only a relatively small
contribution. However, there was a growing role of rent, interest and dividends as
well as pensions and EPF as determinants of aggregate inequality. This could be seen
from the increased contribution of these sources to aggregate inequality between
1976/77 and 1988/89.
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The question that needed further investigation was why was it that labour income —
paid and self-employment - contributed a large portion of the aggregate income
inequality, while the rest of the sources were smaller? What was the explanation for
this observation? One possible explanation was that if paid and self-employment
accounted for a significantly large portion of aggregate income inequality, then it was
likely that paid and self-employment were highly unequally distributed. By the same
logic, if the rest of the sources accounted for only a relatively small portion of
aggregate inequality, then it was likely that these sources were relatively equally
distributed. However, this was not the case. Table 4.4.1a and Table 4.4.1b show that
the inequality indices (both Shorrock's and Gini) for both paid employment and self-
employment appeared to be relatively the most equally distributed sources of income
compared to the rest of the sources. Income from capital (rents, interests, dividends,
pensions and EPF) and transfers (welfare payments, remittances, inheritance, dowries
and gifts) on the other hand, appeared to be relatively highly unequally distributed.
The contribution of income source to total inequality depends on the degree of
inequality within each source and the importance of each source. The bulk of
household income comes from paid and self-employment. Their weight ensures that
they make a major contribution to total inequality, even though they are more evenly
distributed than other sources of household income. By extension, although capital
and transfer income are unequally distributed, their lack of weight ensures that their
contribution to household income inequality is limited.
The above observation was still unsatisfactory. It only showed how much each source
contributed to total income inequality. It did not tell the attribute of the sources, i.e.
the likely impact of each source on inequality. One of the ways to examine this
attribute was by comparing the percentage share of the income source to total
household income with the percentage contribution of the source to aggregate
inequality (Adger 1999). If the percentage share of the source in total household
income was larger than its percentage contribution to aggregate inequality, then the
source had an equalising (positive) effect on aggregate inequality. On the other hand,
if the percentage share of the source in total household income was smaller than its
percentage contribution to aggregate inequality, then the source had an unequalising
94
(negative) effect on aggregate inequality. Adger (1999) employed this method to
identify the effect of income source on income inequality in his study of income
inequality in Vietnam. However, Yao (1997, p. 28) pointed out that there was a more
direct way of identifying which income source served to increase or decrease
inequality. This attribute of income source could be identified by looking at the
relative concentration coefficient (g f) derived from the Gini inequality decomposition.
According to Yao (1997, p. 28), a relative concentration coefficient (g f) of more than
the value of unity (one) implied that an income source had an unequalising (negative)
effect on total inequality, while a value less than unity (one) implied that the income
source had an equalising (positive) effect on inequality.2
From Table 4.4.1b it could be observed that in 1976/77 the percentage contribution of
paid employment to aggregate inequality was smaller than its percentage share in total
household income. Meanwhile, the percentage contribution of self-employment to
aggregate inequality was higher than its percentage share in total household income.
Furthermore, the relative concentration ratio (gf) for paid employment was less than
one, while the relative concentration ratio (gf) for self-employment was more than
one. Thus, it is clear that in 1976/77 paid employment had an equalising (positive)
effect on aggregate inequality. On the other hand, self-employment had an
unequalising (negative) effect on aggregate inequality. 3 In 1988/89 however, both
sources had an equalising (positive) effect on aggregate inequality. Another
observation that is worth mentioning here is that rent, interest and dividends
consistently had an unequalising effect on aggregate inequality, both in 1976/77 and
1988/89. Besides, pensions and EPF had a positive impact on inequality in 1976/77.
In 1988/89 however, they became unequalising sources.
2 If the relative concentration coefficient (gf) of an income source has a value of more than one, it
implies that, ceteris paribus, additional increments of that income source will lead to an increase in
total income inequality. On the other hand, if the relative concentration coefficient (g f) of an income
source has a value of less than one, it implies that, ceteris paribus, additional increments of that income
source will lead to a decrease in total income inequality.
3 As being mentioned earlier, the contribution of each income source to aggregate inequality is not
similar between the two methods of decomposition. Thus comparing the percentage share of income
source in total income with the percentage contribution of income source in aggregate inequality
derived from the two methods might produce inconsistent results. Here the effect of income source on
inequality is identified by looking at the relative concentration ratio (gf) as well as comparing the
percentage share of income source in total income with the percentage contribution of income source in
aggregate inequality derived from the Gini decomposition only. The relative concentration ratio (go
derived from Gini decomposition appears to give a consistent results.
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Comparing the percentage share of income source in total income with 'be lt -rcentnse
contribution of that income source to aggregate inequality, or looking at the rellative
concentration ratio of that income source, revealed only the attribute of the income
sOillIWC. It did not give the real magnitude of the impact of the income SOOITCe on
aggregate inequality. The magnitude of the impact of each source of income on
aggregate inequality can be gauged from the respective figures of a and derived in
Shom.)ek's decomposition (see Table 4.4.1a). The figures of a and j for I, 1-1d1
employment and self-employment confirmed the importance of these sources in
determining aggregate inequality. The a for paid employment indicated that if all
other sources of income had been equalised except income from paid employment,
total household income inequality would have remained at about 35.0 percent of its
actual figure in 1976/77. Thus, if paid employment had been the only source of
differences in income, total household income inequality would have been reduced by
65.0 percent. Looking at it differently, if income from paid employment had been
equalised while the rest of the sources of income remained the same, the 13 for paid
employment would have indicated that total household income inequality would be at
73.0 percent of its current level. In other words, if inequality in paid employment had
been eliminated, the total household income inequality would have declined about
27.0 percent. On the other hand, if self-employment had been the only some of
income differences (a), total household income inequality would have remained at
about 69.0 percent of its current level. If the differences in paid employment had been
eliminated and the rest of the sources remained unchanged (r3), total household
income inequality in 1976177 would have been reduced to about 36.0 percent of its
current level of inequality — a reduction of 64.0 percent of the aggregate income
inequality. For sources other than paid and self-employment, it appeared that if
inequality in these sources had been eliminated, there would have been no significant
reduction in total income inequality. Thus, it appeared that the most effective way to
reduce total income inequality in 1976/77 was by reducing inequality in self=
employment, followed by reducing inequality in paid employment.
In 1988/89, the 13 for paid employment showed that if paid employment had been
equalised while the rest of the sources remained the same, total income inequality
96
would have been at about 54.0 percent of its actual figure — a reduction of about 46.0
percent. On the other hand if inequality in self-employment had been eliminated, then
total inequality would have been reduced by only about 29.0 percent. Therefore, while
eliminating inequality in self-employment had been the best strategy to reduce total
inequality in 1976/77, it appeared that this changed for 1988/89. In 1988/89, the most
effective way to reduce total income inequality was by reducing inequality in paid
employment. Furthermore, the p for rent, interest and dividends as well as for
pensions and EPF showed that, if these sources had been equalised, aggregate
inequality would have remained at 89.0 and 91.0 percent respectively. In other words,
aggregate inequality would have been respectively reduced by 11.0 and 9.0 percents.
While this was only a small reduction in aggregate inequality, nonetheless it was
significant compared to the figures in 1976/77. For example, the 13 for rent, interest
and dividends in 1976/77 showed that if inequality in this source had been eliminated,
aggregate inequality in 1976/77 would only have been reduced by about 2.0 percent.
This is relatively smaller than the 1988/89 figures where if inequality in rent, interest
and dividends had been eliminated, aggregate inequality would have been reduced by
about 11.0 percent. This result therefore confirms that there was a growing role of
inequality of rent, interest and dividends (as well as pensions and EPF) as
determinants of aggregate income inequality between 1976/77 and 1988/89.
4.5 The Contribution and Effect of Income Sources on Rural and Urban
Inequality
The decomposition of Shorrock's and Gini inequality indices was also carried out for
the rural and urban households. The results of Shorrock's decomposition for 1976/77
are shown in Table 4.5.1a, while those for 1988/89 are shown in Table 4.5.1b. The
results for the Gini decomposition for 1976/77 and 1988/89 are shown in Table 4.5.2a
and Table 4.5.2b respectively. With regards to rural household inequality, the
decomposition analysis showed that in 1976/77 paid employment contributed more
than 50.0 percent to rural household inequality. This was followed by self-
employment which contributed about one third of the rural household inequality.
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Besides, there was also a notable contribution of home produce and consumption (i.e.
more than 5.0 percent) in rural household inequality. The rest of the sources made
only a minor contribution. In 1988/89, paid employment continued to make the largest
contribution to rural household inequality, followed by self-employment. There also
had been a notable increase in the contribution of rent, interest and dividends of about
5.0 —8.0 percent to rural inequality.
Looking at the relative concentration ratio (gf) and also comparing the percentage
share of income source in rural household income with the percentage contribution of
the source in rural household inequality, in 1976/77 (see Table 4.5.2b), paid
employment was an equalising source, while self-employment, rent, interest and
dividends, as well as home produce and consumption were unequalising sources. In
1988/89 however, it was also found that paid employment became an unequalising
income source. On the other hand, self-employment, home produce and consumption
had become equalising income sources. Rent, interest and dividends continued to be
an unequalising income sources.
The value of 13 in Table 4.5.1a reveals that in 1976/77 reducing inequality in paid
employment would have been the best strategy to improve rural household inequality,
followed by reducing inequality in self-employment and home produce and
consumption. The 13 for paid employment for instance shows that if paid employment
had been made equal, while the rest of the sources remain unaffected, rural household
inequality would have been about 49.0 percent of it actual figure in 1976/77. This
means if paid employment had been made equal, then there would have been a
reduction about 51.0 percent from the current level of rural household inequality. In
1988/89 (see Table 4.5.1b), reducing inequality in paid employment continued to be
the most effective way to improve rural inequality, followed by reducing inequality in
self-employment. Besides, reducing inequality in the rent, interest and dividend would
also have been one of the significant strategies to improve rural household inequality
in 1988/89. The 13 for rent, interest and dividends shows that if rent, interest and
dividends had been made equal, ceteris paribus, rural household inequality could
have been reduced about 13.0 percent from its 1988/89 level.
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Decomposition analysis of the urban household inequality for 1976/77 reveals that
self-employment made the largest contribution to urban inequality, followed by paid
employment. The rest of the sources made only a minor contribution. In terms of the
attribute of the income source, paid employment was found to be an equalising
income source, while self-employment as well as rent, interest and dividends were
found to be unequalising income sources. In 1988/89, paid employment made the
largest contribution to urban inequality, followed by self-employment. Besides, there
was also quite a significant contribution of rent, interest and dividends (6.0 percent),
and also pensions and EPF (7.0 — 17.0 percent) in urban inequality. Paid employment
continued to be an equalising source in 1988/89 as in 1976/77. Self-employment, rent,
interest and dividends, and also pensions and EPF were unequalising sources in
1988/89.
The f3 for paid and self-employment indicates that reducing inequality in both sources
would have significantly improved urban household inequality in 1976/77. However,
it appeared that reducing inequality in self-employment was effective than reducing
inequality in paid employment. The p for self-employment indicates that if the rest of
the sources had been left unaffected, while equalising self-employment, urban
household inequality would have remained at 31.0 percent of the inequality level in
1976/77 — a reduction about 69.0 percent. In 1988/89, this no longer held. The 13 for
self-employment shows that if self-employment had been made equal, ceteris paribus,
urban household inequality would have remained at 77.0 percent of the inequality
level in 1988/89. Thus, the expected reduction in the level of urban inequality was
only about 23.0 percent. Reducing inequality in paid employment turned out to be the
most effective way to improve urban inequality in 1988/89. The p for paid
employment indicates that if inequality in paid employment had been eliminated and
inequality in the rest of the sources remained unchanged, urban inequality would have
been expected to decline to about 43.0 percent of the 1988/89 inequality level. In
addition, reducing inequality in rent, interest and dividends as well as inequality in
pensions and EPF would also have contributed to quite significant improvement in
urban inequality in 1988/89.
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4.6 The Contribution and Effect of Income Sources on Ethnic Groups Inequality
The decomposition of Shorrock's and Gini inequality indices was also carried out for
the major ethnic group — Malay, Chinese and Indian. The results from Shorrock's
decomposition analysis for 1976/77 and 1988/89 are respectively shown in Table
4.6.1a and Table 4.6.1b, while the results from Gini decomposition is shown in Table
4.6.2a and Table 4.6.2b. In general, the results of both Shorrock's and Gini
decomposition analysis for the major ethnic group shows quite a similar pattern to
that already found and described earlier. Therefore, the same remarks would apply.
The results show that across all ethnic groups, in a significant portion of each ethnic
group inequality was contributed to by paid and self-employment. The contribution of
rent, interest, and dividends increased quite notably between 1976/77 and 1988/89
across all ethnic groups. The rest of the sources made only a small contribution to
inequality of each ethnic group. For the Malay households, it was found that paid
employment was an unequalising source, while self-employment was an equalising
source, both in 1976/77 and 1988/89. Rent, interest and dividends were equalising
sources in 1976/77, but became unequalising sources in 1988/89. For the Chinese and
the Indian households, paid employment was an equalising source, while self-
employment and also rent, interest and dividends were unequalising sources.
Looking at the 13 for the Malay households, it is found that in 1976/77, reducing
inequality in paid employment would have significantly improved income inequality
of the Malay household, followed by reducing inequality in self-employment. For the
Chinese and the Indian however, it was the other way round. For these households,
reducing self-employment would have been the best strategy to improve their income
inequality in 1976/77, followed by reducing inequality in paid employment. In
1988/89 however, all three ethnic groups exhibited similar results. The f3 across all
ethnic groups shows that the best strategy to reduce inequality would have been by
reducing inequality in paid employment, followed by reducing inequality in self-
employment. Besides, there was also further scope for improving inequality through
reducing inequality in rent, interest and dividends. For the Indian household, it also
appeared that reducing inequality in pensions and EPF was also one of the ways to
improve their income inequality in 1988/89.
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4.7 Conclusion
Decomposition of income inequality by income source in Malaysia shows that a large
portion of the total inequality was attributable to labour income, i.e. paid and self-
employment. The large contribution of paid and self-employment to total inequality
was not because these sources were the most unequally distributed sources, but rather
due to their importance (large share) in total household income. The contribution of
capital and transfer incomes (i.e. rent, interest and dividends as well as pensions and
EPF) to total inequality appeared to be relatively small. Nonetheless, its contribution
increased between the two periods under study. This finding are quite similar to those
of Fields (1976).
With regard to effects of income source on income inequality, the results show
differences from one group to another. However, income from rent, interest and
dividends was found to have a consistently unequalising effect on all groups in
1988/89. This implies that, ceteris paribus, an enlarged share of rent, interest and
dividends in total household income would be likely to worsen income inequality.
Thus, in the context of an economic policy where attempts were made to enlarge the
Malay share of capital ownership, such effort would be likely to result in greater
inequality amongst the Malay in particular, and amongst Malaysian in general.
Indeed, as indicated in the decomposition analysis, reducing inequality in rent, interest
and dividends constituted one of the significant strategies to improve income
inequality.
The decomposition analysis highlighted the importance of reducing inequality in paid
employment, self-employment, as well as rent, interest and dividends. The importance
of reducing inequality in paid employment for instance, can be comprehended from
the fact that by eliminating inequality in paid employment in 1988/89, while leaving
the distribution of the rest of the sources unchanged, the overall inequality was
expected to decline roughly about 46.0 percent from its 1988/89 level. The figures for
eliminating inequality in self-employment as well as in rent, interest and dividends
(while leaving inequality of the rest of the sources unchanged) were 31.0 and 11.0
percent respectively. Thus, in terms of strategy to improve inequality, the
decomposition analysis indicated that the best strategy to reduce income inequality is
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by reducing inequality in paid employment, followed by reducing inequality in self-
employment as well as inequality in rent, interest and dividends.
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Chapter 5
Malay Nationalism, Income Inequality and the New
Economic Policy
5.1 Introduction
Malaysia inherited a multiracial society when independence was achieved from the
British in 1957. In the early years of independence, a marked income inequality
existed between the Malay (Bumiputera) and the non-Malay (non-Bumiputera). The
imbalance became untenable in the late 1960s, when racial riots occurred in May
1969. The riots proved to be damaging for nation-building. As a response, the
government introduced the New Economic Policy in 1970, which accorded the
Bumiputera preferential treatment to correct the perceived imbalances. Thus, the NEP
was basically an affirmative action, pro-Bumiputera economic policy, and in fact it
was also actually a realisation of the Malay nationalist economic aspirations. The New
Development Policy (NDP) succeeded the NEP when it came to an end in 1990.
While there were differences in priorities and strategies between the two, the NDP
was still basically a pro-Bumiputera policy. During its implementation, Malaysia
achieved tremendous economic growth and development, and brought the Malays into
the mainstream economic activities.
This chapter argues that while the nationalist economic policy, i.e. the NEP, has been
claimed as being behind Malaysia's notable economic success in the past, it might
have also sewn the seed of Malaysia's current political crisis. The pro-Malay economic
policy of distributing income appeared to be coherent and succeeded in the initial
years since the poor were overwhelmingly from the Malay community. During its
implementation from 1971 to 1990, the NEP successfully tackled the problem of
poverty amongst the Malay, and also was successful in bringing out the Malay from
the rural-agriculture sector into the urban-modern economic sector. On average, the
income of the Malays improved. However, the exclusive emphasis of the nationalist
approach on rectifying the problem of inter-ethnic inequality tended to overlook the
problem of intra-Malay inequality. Therefore, while the NEP might have reduced
inter-ethnic inequality and poverty amongst the Malays, the problem of intra-Malay
inequality remained. As a result, the Malays are no longer an economically
homogeneous community. The NEP subsequently became an incoherent policy to
develop the Malay community as it was in the past. The narrow ethnic focus of the
NEP created cleavages within the Malay community as well as the emergence of
cross-cutting cleavages in society, which made it difficult to address the new problem
of income distribution (i.e. intra-Malay inequality) through the political rhetoric of
ethnicity. Continuing the nationalist policy would apparently lead to internal
contradictions and tension within the Malays. Furthermore, this internal contradictions
lead to the reduction of appeal of ethnic politics, while multiethnic politics became
more promising for the future. This is the paradox of the NEP.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the idea of nationalism and
how it affects economic policy. Section 5.3 discusses the historical background of
Malaysian society. Section 5.4 examines the rise of Malay nationalism, while Section
5.5 examines the incorporation of the demands of the Malay nationalists into the
Social Contract of 1957 and the Malay Special Privileges. Section 5.6 reviews the
pattern and changes of income inequality between 1957 and 1970, and shows that the
narrow view of the Malay nationalists on the distribution of income and wealth tends
to overlook the problem of inequality within the Malays themselves. Section 5.7
examines the situation that led to the racial riots in 1969, which in turn led to the birth
of the NEP. Here, the main features and programmes of the NEP are discussed as
well. Section 5.8 briefly examines Malaysia's economic growth and development
during the NEP (1971-1990) period as well as examining the distributional
consequences of the NEP. Based on the figures on income distribution, Section 5.9
discusses why despite its achievements, the NEP appears to be paradoxical. The final
section, which is Section 5.10, concludes the chapter.
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5.2 Nationalism and Economic Policy
In order to understand how Malay nationalism has an impact on Malaysia's economic
policy, it is worthwhile to start by examining briefly the idea of nationalism in
general, as well as the general traits of nationalist policy. According to Gellner (1983,
p.1), nationalism is "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and
national unit should be congruent", while nationalist sentiment "is the feeling of anger
aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its
fulfilment". Nationalism is also a form of ideology and behaviour (Kellas 1991, p.3).
The ideology of nationalism creates people's awareness of the nation, as well as to
give them a set of attitudes and a programme of action — cultural, economic or
political.
A nation on the other hand, is "an imagined political community" (Anderson, 1983,
p.6). It is "imagined" because the members of a nation will never know most of the
other members of their nationality. However, through this "imagination" they will
know which individuals belong to their nationality and which do not. Thus, this
"imagination" entails exclusion of people and defines the terms for inclusion. For this
reason, what is needed for a nation to exist is that members must perceive that they
belong to the same group. It does not really matter if what they perceived is really a
truth or fiction. What is necessary is that members of the nation must be convinced or
make themselves believe that, for example, they share a common history, culture or
even ancestry. Therefore, in the process of creating a sense of belonging and
differentiating with others, more often than not, the creation of myths is involved (see
for example Hobsbawm, 1993).
One of the most common instruments to create a sense of belonging is ethnic identity.
This is easy to understand since an ethnic group by definition is "a named human
group claiming a homeland and sharing myths of common ancestry, historical
memories and a distinct culture" (Smith, 1999, p.127). It is also for this reason that
ethnic sentiment and appeal is usually manipulated by the nationalist as an instrument
for integrating the nation, as well as differentiating it from other nations. If a nation is
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"an imagined political community", therefore Gellner must be right to argue that a
nation can be invented (see Smith 1998, p.28). This invention is carried out by
nationalism, since the heart of nationalism is not just for the awakening of nations to
self-consciousness, but to invent nations where they do not exist.
The main concern here, however, is not with the nation and nationalism per se, but
rather with the significance of nationalism on economic policy. Therefore, there is a
need to understand in what way does nationalism influence economic policy, and what
impact a nationalist policy has on income distribution. Johnson (1968) examines the
significance of nationalism on economic policy of newly formed states. He argues
that, since nationalism appears to be the main motivation behind the formation of new
states, it is natural to find that nationalism appears to be one of the factors that
significantly shaped the philosophy of its economic policy, which in turn determines
policy preferences in the development plan of the country. For instance, if the nation
lacks productive facilities or certain types of industry that are seen to be important to
the nation, economic policy will be focused on creating such facilities or establishing
such industries.
However, the idea of nationalism goes beyond creating facilities or establishing
industry. Since nationalism attaches value to having property owned or having
economic functions performed by nationals, then facilities or industry must also be
under the control of nationals. This appears to be one of the major characteristics of
nationalist economic policy. Indeed, this is in agreement with the suggestion by
Breton (1964, p.377) that nationalism could be viewed as a claim to national wealth.
This explains why a nationalist economic policy is usually hostile to foreign
investment, as well as why a nationalist economic policy usually prefers public
ownership and public enterprises over private ownership and private enterprises.
Indeed, where foreigners control the facilities or industry, a nationalist policy might
prefer taking control of them through confiscation or nationalisation. In a situation
where public ownership and public enterprises are impractical, a nationalist economic
policy might prefer extensive regulation and control of private enterprises. What
appears to be more important in a nationalist policy is nationality. The economy must
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be under the control of the nationals. Nationalist economic policy is therefore not
concerned with development per se, but rather with ownership and control. The
question of nationality is considered more important than economic efficiency or the
competence and ability of workers. As a result, the pursuance of a nationalist policy
usually involves conflicting goals of encouraging rapid growth and development, and
the efficiency of the path to achieve it.
The importance attached by nationalism on ownership and control by the nationals
has a significant effect on the nationalist view of the question of equality. For the
nationalist, as long as the economy is under the control of the nationals, then it
does not really matter which individuals amongst the nationals really have the
ownership or control of it. It is just the question of "us and them". With regards to
income distribution, it follows that what really matters for the nationalist is equality
between the nationals and the non-nationals. Equality from the nationalist point of
view requires members of both groups (national and non-nationals) to be found all
the way along the social scale. Thus, what matters is that both groups (national and
non-nationals) must be equal in this sense. It does not really matter for the
nationalist what the extent of inequality is within the nationals (groups). Here, the
impact of a nationalist economic policy on equality of income is examined in the
case of Malaysia.
5.3 Background of Malaysian Society
Malaysian society is a multiethnic society, with the Malays, Chinese and Indians
forming the major ethnic groups. In 1996, the Bumiputera accounted for 61.0 percent
of the population, the Chinese 30.0 percent, the Indians 8.0 percent, and other
minority groups made up the remaining 1.0 percent (Gomez and Jomo, 1997, p.1). In
general each of the ethnic groups is different in terms of their language, culture and
religion. The Malay language is "Bahasa Melayu", the Chinese languages are
Cantonese and Hokkien, and the Indian language is Tamil. The Malays are mostly
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Muslim, while the Chinese and the Indian are mostly Buddhist and Hindu,
respectively.
The multiethnic characteristic of Malaysian society was inherited from the British
during their occupation of Malaya' from 1786 to 1957 (Snodgrass 1980, pp. 22-42;
Anand 1983, pp.1-4; Faaland et.al . 1990, p.2-4). While there were already some
Chinese and Indian in Malaya before the British occupation, it is during the British
occupation that the mass migration of the Chinese and the Indians took place. Starting
in the second half of the nineteenth century and up to the 1930s, the British had
encouraged large scale Chinese and Indian immigration to Malaya, to supply their
manpower need in the tin mining industries and rubber plantations which were mainly
located in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. The Chinese were brought by the
British to work in the tin mines, while the Indians to work in the rubber plantations.
The Malays remained in the traditional subsistence agriculture and thus were left out
of the modern sector of the economy.
As a result, in the early years of independence, each ethnic group was segregated in
terms of geographical area. The majority of the Malays were found in the north and
eastern states of Peninsular Malaysia such as Terengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis.
These states were basically agricultural states and relatively underdeveloped. On the
other hand, the Chinese and Indians were concentrated in the western states of
Peninsular Malaysia such as Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Perak and Pulau Pinang,
which are relatively more developed and prosperous. Besides, the Malay were less
urbanised compared to the Chinese and the Indians as indicated in Table 5.2.1 below.
In 1957, almost 90 percent of the Malays lived in the rural area, compared to about 55
percent of the Chinese and 70 percent of the Indians. This situation remained
throughout the 1960s.
'Before independent from the Colonial British in 1957, Peninsular Malaysia was known as Malaya.
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Table 5.2.1: Population by Community Groups and Degree of Urbanisation at 1957 and 1970
Census (Peninsular Malaysia).
1957 1970
Urban Area (%) Rural Area (%)	 Urban Area (%) Rural Area (%)
Malays 11.2 88.8 14.9 85.1
Chinese 44.7 55.3 47.4 52.6
Indians 30.6 69.4 34.7 65.3
Others 49.3 50.7 40.8 59.2
Total 26.5 73.5 28.7 71.3
Source: Mehden (1975).
During the British rule, each ethnic group also generally experienced different
education systems (Mahathir 1998, p.74-75; Shastri 1993, p.3). Most Malays were
educated in the government school system located in the rural areas that used the
Malay language as the medium of instruction. The Chinese on the other hand sent
their children to the Chinese medium schools, which were established by Chinese
voluntary associations. Nevertheless, the elite segment of each ethnic group generally
sent their children to the English medium schools located in the urban areas, where
the quality of education was far better than the rural Malay-medium school.
Furthermore, most secondary and tertiary education was available in the urban areas
with English as the medium of instruction. Those who were educated at the English-
medium schools tended to gain positions in the civil service, commerce, business, and
professions. Since most of the Malays were educated in the rural Malay medium
schools, this indirectly limited their upward social mobility.
Besides, in the early years of independence, each ethnic group was also separated by
their economic functions. The economic activities of the Malay were largely
subsistence agriculture and fishing. The Chinese were involved in commerce and
modern sectors of the economy, while the Indians were labourers in the rubber
plantations.' Thus, not only did each ethnic group differ in terms of their language,
2In 1957, 73 percent of Malays were in agriculture, forestry and fishing, compared to only 40 percent of
the Chinese and 56 percent of the Indians (Shastri 1993, p.3). Of the Malays, 37 percent of them were
engaged in rice cultivation, and 25 percent in the rubber smallholdings. Of the Indians, 48 percent of
them were labourers in the rubber plantations. In the modern economic sector, the Malays composed
only 7 percent of the manufacturing sector management in 1970, compared to 68 percent of the
Chinese, 4 percent Indian and 18 percent foreign (Mehden, 1975, p. 250).
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culture and religion, they were also separated in terms of geographical location,
education and economic functions. It is not surprising that there was very little
integration and interaction between the ethnic groups. Another reason for the lack of
integration and interaction was that many of the immigrant Chinese and Indians
perceived Malaya only to be a transition land rather than their new homeland. Hence,
no need was felt among the immigrant populations to integrate and interact with the
Malays since they intended to return back to China or India after accumulating enough
savings (Gomez and Jomo, 1997, p. 11). Communication between ethnic groups is
carried out by their political leaders, generally the elite of each ethnic group. The
political leaders therefore functioned as the spokespersons and brokers for their
respective ethnic groups (Shastri, 1993, p.3).
Ethnicity therefore cut across almost all spheres of life. Indeed, it was the differences
in their economic functions as well as their educational experience that probably
reinforced their ethnic differences and influenced their perceptions of each other.
Naturally the differences and lack of interaction between the ethnic groups led to the
prejudices and the preoccupation with ethnic issues in almost all spheres of Malaysian
life - social, cultural, economic and political. Thus while the issue faced by society
might have involved many other dimensions, it was the ethnic dimension that really
received most public and political attention. Ethnicity dominated all aspects of
Malaysian life and as a result, ethnic cleavages were found at almost all levels and
aspects of life, as explained by Mauzy (1997, p. 107):
"These groups were divided by coinciding cleavages of race, language,
religion, customs, area of residence and to a large extent, by type of
occupation. Predictably, they lined up on the same opposing sides on every
politically relevant issue".
As seen, despite the emergence of the multiracial society in Malaysia, there was very
little integration and interaction among the ethnic communities in the early years of
independence. Ethnicity cut across almost all spheres of life. Thus, the question of
unity and nation-building was an important question in the newly independent
Malaysia. However, nation-building was overwhelmed by the existence of economic
imbalance between the ethnic groups, as will be seen later.
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5.4 Malay Nationalism
The presence of European colonial power and the massive influx of the Chinese and
Indian immigrant to Malaya in the mid-nineteenth century planted the seeds of anti-
colonial and nationalistic sentiment among the indigenous Malays, and led to the rise
of the Malay nationalist movement. Malay nationalism served as a rallying point of
the Malays, who felt threatened by the increasing numbers of immigrants, the Chinese
and Indians, to Malaya. It was also used to promote a sense of identity and
homogeneity amongst the Malay, and thus exclude the participation of the immigrant
communities (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981, p. 668).
The Japanese occupied Malaya from December 1941 to September 1945. After the
Japanese were defeated in 1945, the British managed to re-establish their power in
Malaya. However, the lack of resistance to the Japanese invasion from the British
reinforced the anti-colonial and nationalistic sentiments amongst the Malay. The
Japanese occupation of Malaya proved to the Malay that even the strong British
colonialist could be defeated. Thus, for the Malay nationalist, their aim was clear and
straightforward — the creation of a Malay nation. As nation involved "imagination"
(Anderson 1983), it was not surprising to find that the heart of the Malay nationalist
discourse was on the question of what signify "Malayness," and, subsequently on the
vision and nature of the "Malay nation" (Shamsul 1997, p. 242). 3
 It was this
nationalist ideal of creating the "Malay nation" that motivated the Malay anti-colonial
struggle (Shamsul 1997, p240). Eventually, this discourse shaped two central agenda
of the Malay nationalist — the political agenda and the economic agenda.
3 Therefore Malay nationalism is defined in ethnic terms. Thus, it excludes even those who are
Malaysian citizens, but are not classified as Malay or butniputeras.
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The nationalist discourse focused on three important elements considered to signify
"Malayness". These elements were language, religion and royalty. Within the Malay
nationalist movement, there were generally three factions: the administrator-aristocrat
or what Shamsul (1997, p.243) called "administocrat" faction, the Malay left faction
and the Islamic faction. They differed on the importance of the elements that signified
"Malay". The "administocrat" faction emphasized the symbolic importance of royalty
as the custodian of Malay culture and religion. On the other hand, the Malay left
faction recognised the importance of religion but not royalty, while the Islamic faction
felt that the ultimate form of a Malay nation was an Islamic one. All of the three
factions however, agreed that the Malay language should be the sole medium of
official communication and education in their proposed "Malay nation". Thus, the
three element of "Malayness", i.e. language (Malay), religion (Islam) and royalty
(sultans), constituted the main foundation of the intended nation of the Malay
nationalists. These three elements were vital as it shaped the character of the intended
nation. Part of the Malay nationalist political agenda was realised and included in the
Malayan Constitution after the ethnic bargain of 1957, where these three pillars of
Malayness (language, religion and royalty) was guaranteed and protected.
Related to the political agenda of the Malay nationalists was their economic agenda.
The Malay nationalist economic agenda arose from the dissatisfaction of the Malay
nationalists with the economic condition of the Malay. The Malay nationalists argued
that the Malay had been neglected and discriminated against by the British. Under the
British colonial rule, the feeling of neglect and discrimination developed within the
Malay. Faalant et.al . (1990, p. 7) for instance has concisely explained the
discrimination as follows:
"Social and economic discrimination against the Malays by the commercial
and industrial circles controlled by the non-Malays took many forms. In
business, the British and Chinese banks refused to have anything to do with
them, for they were regarded as having no suitable experience. In wholesale,
retail, and export and import business, they were kept out by associations
and guilds. Even if the Malays sought jobs in the private sector, they were
kept out by clan, language and cultural preferences and barriers. The many
Chinese and Indian shops refused to employ Malays. Until recently, Indian
shops imported labour from India when they were short-handed. As for
urban jobs outside the government, only the lowest types of manual labour
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were open to the Malays: such jobs as trishaw pedalers, drivers and
watchmen."
Furthermore, the Malays were also denied the development of knowledge and skills.
As mentioned above, most of the Malays sent their children to the rural Malay
medium schools where the quality of education was far inferior to the urban English
medium schools. Besides, since English education was considered necessary for
government employment, and for further education, the majority of the Malays found
that the opportunities for their children were limited. The Malay nationalists argued
that it is the neglect and discrimination by the British had retarded their economic
development. In other words, the presence of the British and immigrant population
had limit their economic advancement and had also barred them from mainstream
economic life.
It was also argued that years of discrimination had resulted in the loss of self-
confidence and a deep feeling of inferiority amongst the Malay (Mahathir 1998, p.
77). The British occupation and the massive influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants
to Malaya, was therefore viewed as the major cause of their economic backwardness.
The Malay nationalists argued that before the presence of the colonial powers and the
immigrant population, they were actively involved in business and trade. The Malays
in the 15 th century kingdom of Melaka, which was the leading port in the East and the
centre of valuable spice trade, used to deal with foreigners from as far away as India,
China, and the Middle-East (Mahathir 1998, p. 77). Historically, the Malay
nationalists argued, the Malay excelled in commerce and trade. It was the presence of
the British and the immigrants that curbed their opportunities and hence kept them out
of the mainstream economy.
This has led the Malay to look at the colonialist and the immigrants as "dispossesors"
(Shamsul 1997, p. 245). The Malays felt that the British and the immigrants had
dispossessed them both politically and economically. Hence, it is not surprising to
find that the Malay nationalists articulated their struggle for independence as the
struggle to repossess the political and economic dominance from the British and the
121
immigrant population. The struggle of the Malays for independence can be seen as the
attempt to put them in their rightful place in their own country. As such, the struggle
of the Malay for independence entailed reclaiming their lost dignity and their identity
as a people, and to once become the definitive people of their own country (Mahathir
1998, p.79). As can be seen, the "imagined" Malay community has been created, and
hence they can be distinguished from the other communities. What seems to be
interesting is the fact that this analysis of national identity was accepted under the
Ethnic Bargain 1957 and embedded in the Constitution of Federation of Malaya in
1957, the newly created independent state. This will be discussed in the next section.
5.5 The Social Contract of 1957 and Malay Special Privileges
After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the British appeared to be ready for
accommodation and the granting of Malaya's independence. As the first step, the
British proposed the Malayan Union plan in 1946. Basically, under the Malayan
Union proposal, all states, except Singapore, would be united into a single political
entity under a centralised government. Special treatment of the Malays in matters
regarding land ownership, education, government jobs and so on would be abolished
and the sultans (Malay kings) reduced to mere symbols without power. More
importantly, citizenship would be granted freely to the entire immigrant Chinese and
Indians.
Since the non-Malay were then in the majority, the granting of citizenship to the non-
Malay under the British proposed Malayan Union would certainly dilute the Malay
political power. Thus, the majority of the Malays rejected the Malayan Union scheme.
This possible loss of Malay supremacy united the Malays and led to the formation of
United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) in May 1946. Consequently, there were
strong pressures on the British to withdraw the Malayan Union proposal. Finally, the
British had to abandon their Malayan Union proposal, but then the British opted for
the "federation nation", which was favoured by the Malay administocrat faction of the
Malay nationalist movement. In the meantime, the ethnic Indians also formed their
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political party — the Malayan (later Malaysian) Indian Congress (MIC) in 1946 and the
Chinese formed the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese Association (MCA) in 1949.
However, their motives were largely undefined compared to the Malays.
In the early 1950s, as it became clear that the British wanted to grant Malaya's
independence, the British instituted local and municipal elections in Malaya.
However, the British had openly indicated that Malaya would only be granted
independence if it was apparent that the various ethnic groups could live together
peacefully (Mauzy 1997, p.108). Thus, in the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election in
1952, UMNO and MCA formed a coalition, called the Alliance, as a gesture towards
inter-ethnic co-operation. The coalition was successful as it won the Kuala Lumpur
Municipal Election. Following their victory in Kuala Lumpur and in other local and
municipal elections, the leadership of both parties decided to link the organisation
nationally on a permanent basis. The MIC joined the Alliance in the following year.
In the 1955 Federal Legislative Council Elections, two years before independence, the
Alliance won an overwhelming majority, i.e. 52 out of 53 seats contested. Among the
first tasks of the Alliance was to negotiate the terms of independence from the British.
This required the coalition partners to negotiate, i.e. compromise, on the conflicting
claims of their ethnic constituencies and then present a united front to the British. The
main issue in the negotiation was the issue surrounding their status and the character
of the newly independent country. Since the Malays saw themselves as the indigenous
people of the country, the Malays felt that they should have the definitive say in
shaping the character of the country, and that their dominant position in the country
must be safeguarded. Besides, the Malays also felt that they must be assisted to place
them on an equal footing with the non-Malays, since they were lagging behind the
non-Malays in modern education and economic spheres. In short, the Malays
demanded special rights and their dominant position had to be safeguarded. Such
safeguards were felt imperative, as the Malay political elite feared that the more
advanced and aggressive non-Malays might overshadow them in their own country
(Rajakrisnan 1993, p. 220).
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Finally it was agreed that the non-Malays had to recognise the special rights of the
Malays as the indigenous people of the country. The non-Malays also had to recognise
Islam and the Malay language as the official religion and language of the country. In
return for this privilege, the Malays offered concessions in terms of political power by
granting citizenship to the non-Malays. 4 In addition, the non-Malays were also assured
that they were free to pursue their socio-economic interests, i.e. to conduct their
businesses unimpeded and also to retain and develop their own cultural and linguistic
heritage and separateness. This ethnic negotiation was occasionally called the "ethnic
bargain" or "social bargain" of 1957. With this "ethnic bargain", part of the Malay
nationalists political agenda was achieved.
The substance of the ethnic bargain was embedded in the Constitution of Federation
of Malaya in 1957 (See Appendix 1). Article 153 of the Constitution safeguarded the
Malay special rights, which could not be amended without the consent of the
Conference of Rulers (that is, the nine Malay kings). Article 153(1) of the constitution
recognised the special position of the Malays, and Article 153(2) ensured that they
received special reserved place in public service, education, and in the granting of
licences for the operation of any trade or business. In addition, the reservation of
certain land for exclusive use by Malays was also assured in Article 89. While the
Constitution made special provisions for the Malays, the non-Malay citizens had their
rights guaranteed and were safeguarded by Clause 8 of Article 153. The clause
recognised the "legitimate interest of the other communities" and gave the assurance
that the reservation of licences and permits for Malays could not be used to deprive
"any person of any right, privilege, permit or licence accrued to or enjoyed or held by
him" or to exclude anyone from a trade or business for which no licence was
previously required". On the 31 st August 1957, Malaya was granted independence
from the British.
4	 •With the agreement, it was estimated that about an additional one million of non-Malays were eligible
to apply for citizenship. As the population of Malaya at that time was roughly five million people, such
an agreement to give the citizenship to a large number of non-Malays diluted the Malay political power
considerably. Therefore the acceptance by the Malays of granting citizenship to the non-Malays was
considered generous. The Malays were willing to make this major concession as they were determined
to gain independence (Mahathir 1998, pp. 42-43).
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5.6 Income Inequality and the Economic Position of the Malay 1957- 1970
As discussed above, part of the political agenda of the Malay nationalists was
achieved in the "ethnic bargain" of 1957. However, their economic agenda of uplifting
the economic situation of the Malay, so as to put the Malay at their proper place in
their own country, was still unfulfilled. The priority put by the Malay nationalists on
the control of the political arena before the economic arena to a certain extent delayed
the Malay nationalist economic agenda (Shamsul 1997, p.234). Besides, it was only in
the late 1960s and the 1970s that the nationalist forces within the ruling Malay party,
UMNO, gained most of their influence and control (Toni, 1997).
After independence, while the Constitution did stress that the socio-economic
development of the Malay was to be promoted, active government intervention in the
economy to help the Malay was not implemented immediately. The Alliance
government continued the laissez-faire economic policy of the colonial government.5
One of the reasons for this was the fact that in the "ethnic bargain", the non-Malays
had been promised non-interference in their pursuance of economic interests. Thus,
the continuation of the laissez-faire approach was part of the bargain that assured the
protection of the economic interests of the Chinese (non-Malays). Besides, for the
Malay, the laissez-faire policy that among others favoured foreign investments seemed
to be acceptable since a large foreign stake in the economy was likely to act as a
counter balance to the Chinese economic power (Jesudason, 1997, p. 130).
Furthermore, in 1955 the World Bank advocated limited government intervention in
the economy and promotion of development led by the private sector for the post-
colonial development of the Malayan economy. Implicitly, it was assumed that this
approach was expected to generate high economic growth, where the benefits would
then trickle down to the majority of the lower income group, i.e. the Malay. It
appeared that the World Bank proposal coincided with the interest of the Alliance
government and the British (Gomez and Jomo, 1997, p. 14). The laissez-faire
5 Nonetheless, while there was no active government intervention in the economy after independence
was achieved, there was increased government expenditure for agriculture and the rural areas aimed at
the development of the Malays.
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approach nevertheless resulted in rapid economic growth. Real GDP growth rate was
4.1% in 1956-1960 period, 5.0% in the 1961-1965 period and 5.4% in the 1966-70
(Bank Negara 1994, p.4). However, despite the rapid growth, the trickle down process
did not appear to work as expected. Towards the end of 1960s, about half the
population was living under poverty as indicated in the incidence of poverty (see
Table 5.5.1).
Table 5.5.1: Incidence of Poverty in Peninsular Malaysia (%), 1957 and 1970.
1957/58 1970
All Households 51.2 49.3
Rural households 59.6 58.7
Urban households 29.7 21.3
Malay
All households 70.5 65.9
Rural households 74.9 70.3
Urban households 32.7 38.8
Chinese
All households 27.4 27.5
Rural households 25.2 24.6
Urban households 29.4 30.5
Indian
All households 35.7 40.2
Rural households 44.8 31.8
Urban households 31.5 44.9
Source: Ikemoto (1985).
The complexity of the poverty problem arose from the fact that there was an
association between poverty incidences with a particular ethnic group. The bulk of the
poor were notably high among the Malays compared to the non-Malays. While in the
period of 1957 to 1970 there was a reduction in the incidence of poverty among the
Malays, they remained the largest. In 1970, 65.9 percent of the Malays were poor,
compared to only 27.5 and 40.2 percent respectively of the Chinese and Indians.
Besides, poverty incidence was more serious in the rural than in the urban areas.
Therefore, while there were Chinese and Indian poor, as well as urban poor, generally
the problem of poverty was perceived to be the problem of the rural and the Malay
households. As the majority of the rural households were Malay, the Malay then
became synonymous with the poor, i.e. the poor were generally the Malays, and the
Malays were generally poor.
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In addition, there was also a significant imbalance in terms of wealth (equity)
ownership between the Malays and the Chinese. As shown in Table 5.5.2, by 1970 the
Malays owned only about 2.4 percent of the ownership of share capital, while the
Chinese owned 27.2 percent. Furthermore, there also existed inter-ethnic inequality in
terms of employment and occupation, which reflected the differences in skills,
education and experiences of each ethnic group. By 1970, about two-third of those
employed in the primary sector were Malays, while the non-Malays on the other hand,
were largely employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors as shown in Table 5.5.3.
Besides the difference in the pattern of employment, there were also significant
differences in terms of occupation. The professional, technical, sales and managerial
jobs were predominantly held by the Chinese, while about three-quarter of the Malays
were agricultural workers mostly involved in small, subsistence farming and fishing
activities (Klitgaard and Katz, 1983: P. 335). Thus, not only were the Malays found to
be poor, but also they were primarily associated with agriculture, a low productivity
sector. On the other hand, the non-Malays were associated with mining,
manufacturing and construction, a high productivity sector.
Table 5.5.2: Ownership of Share Capital (at par value) of Limited Companies, 1970 (%).
Ownership Group 1970
Malay/Bumiputera 2.4
Malay/Bumiputera individuals & institutions 1.6
Trust agencies 0.8
Non-Malaysinon-Bumiputera 28.3
Chinese 27.2
Indian 1.1
Others
Nominee companies 6.0
Foreigners 63.4
Source: Gomez and Jomo (1997).
Table 5.5.3: Sectoral Employment of Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera (%) in Peninsular
Malaysia, 1970.
Sector	 Bumiputera	 Non-Bumiputera
Primary'	 67.6	 32.4
Secondary 2
	30.8	 69.2
Tertiary3
	 7.9	 62.1 
Note:
'Agriculture
2Mining, manufacturing, construction, utilities and transport.
3Wholesale and retail trade, finance, government and other services.
Source: Malaysia (1991).
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However, while it was true that the bulk of the poor were Malays, and there existed
economic imbalances between the Malay and the Chinese, an ethnic perspective of the
problem appeared to be a narrow and simplistic view of the complex problem of
poverty and inequality. This point became more obvious when income inequality was
examined. Table 5.5.4 shows the mean income and income distribution in Peninsular
Malaysia from 1957/58 to 1970. It shows that while the mean monthly household
income in real terms increased from RM 207 in 1957/58 to RM261 in 1970, income
inequality however worsened, as indicated by the increase in Gini coefficient from
0.412 to 0.513. The rich appeared to benefit the most from the rapid economic growth
at the expense of the poor (middle and lower-income groups). The share of the
national income captured by the high-income group (top 20 %) rose from 48.6 to 55.9
during the above period. The share of the poorest 40 per cent of the population fell
from 15.9 to 11.6 per cent, and this fall was especially sharp between 1967/68 and
1970.
Table 5.5.4: Distribution of Household Income in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1970.
1957/58 1967/68 1970
Mean income (RM Per Month)* 207 226 261
Median income (RM Per Month)* 150 145 164
Mean to Median Income Ratio 1.38 1.56 1.59
Gini coefficient 0.412 0.444 0.513
Income Share of:
Top 20% 48.6 51.3 55.9
Middle 40% 35.5 34.4 32.5
Bottom 40% 15.9 14.3 11.6
Note:
*1959 RM prices
Source: Perumal (1989).
Besides, it appeared that the rich were mostly urban and the bulk of the poor were
mostly rural (see Table 5.5.5). The ratio of the mean income between the urban and
rural households -- the urban-rural disparity ratio -- went up, and there was a sudden
increase in the two years before 1970. Income inequality worsened, but more for the
rural population. Not only did the rural population become poorer than their urban
counterparts on average, but also there was another development in the countryside.
The Gini coefficient went up dramatically. Income inequality among the rural,
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predominantly Malay population, increased faster than inequality amongst the urban
dwellers.
Table 5.5.5: Distribution of Household Income in Peninsular Malaysia by Area, 1957-1970.
1957/58 1967/68 1970
Urban Households
Mean Income (RM Per Month)* 307 340 424
Median Income (RM Per Month)* 207 232 262
Gini Coefficient 0.429 0.447 0.494
Income Share of:
Top 20% 49.6 51.8 55.0
Middle 40% 33.2 34.0 32.8
Bottom 40% 17.2 14.2 12.2
Rural Households
Mean Income (RM Per Month)* 166 175 198
Median Income (RM Per Month)* 126 126 138
Gini Coefficient 0.374 0.399 0.463
Income Share of:
Top 20% 44.5 46.8 51.0
Middle 40% 37.3 36.7 35.9
Bottom 40% 18.2 16.7 13.1
Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio 1.84 1.95 2.14
Note:
*1959 RM prices
Source: Perumal (1989) and Snodgrass (1980).
Income distribution also worsened for each of the three ethnic groups (see Table
5.5.6). The Malays moved from the least unequal to the most unequal, measured in the
Gini coefficient of income distribution, amongst the three ethnic groups. The poor
amongst the Indian population fared the worst in the following sense. The median and
the mean income were identical for this group in 1957/58, but the median income was
considerably lower than the mean in 1970. The median income had, in fact, declined
between these two periods uniquely for the Indians. Besides, the picture of intra-group
distribution painted in Table 5.5.6 was reflected in both urban and rural areas. The
intra-group inequality increased amongst both the rural and urban Malays more than it
did for their Chinese counterparts. 6 It was particularly pronounced amongst Malay
rural households.
6 Ikemoto (1985) breaks down the rural and urban households into three ethnic groups, and calculates
the relevant Gini coefficients. He then demonstrates that intra-group inequality worsened most for the
bumiputeras, in both the rural and urban areas.
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Table 5.5.6: Distribution of Household Income by Ethnic Groups in Peninsular Malaysia,
1957-1970.
1957/58 1967/68 1970
Malay
Mean Income (RM Per Month)* 134 154 170
Median Income (RM Per Month)* 108 113 119
Gini Coefficient 0.342 0.400 0.466
Income Share of:
Top 20% 42.5 48.2 52.5
Middle 40% 38.0 34.8 34.8
Bottom 40% 19.5 17.0 12.7
Chinese
Mean Income (RM Per Month)* 288 329 390
Median Income (RM Per Month)* 214 246 265
Gini Coefficient 0.374 0.391 0.455
Income Share of:
Top 20% 45.8 46.7 52.6
Middle 40% 36.2 36.3 33.5
Bottom 40% 18.0 17.0 13.9
Indian
Mean Income (RM Per Month)* 228 245 300
Median Income (RM Per Month)* 228 180 192
Gini Coefficient 0.347 0.403 0.463
Income Share of:
Top 20% 43.7 48.1 54.2
Middle 40% 36.6 35.6 31.5
Bottom 40% 19.7 16.3 14.3
Note:
*1959 RM prices
Source: Perumal (1989) and Snodgrass (1980).
Unfortunately, the observation that there was a widening gap between the rich and the
poor, even within groups, did not form the central focus of the Malay nationalists
political debate. Instead, the problem of distribution was viewed from the narrow
ethnic perspective. As a result, even though the gap between the rich and the poor
widened even within groups, the perception of injustice was focused only on the
distribution between ethnic groups. The problem of intra-group inequality, particularly
intra-Malay inequality, was ignored in the nationalist political discourse. The heart of
the nationalist political debate fell on inter-group inequality, especially between the
Malay and Chinese populations, had increased (see Table 5.5.7).
130
Table 5.5.7: Disparity Ratio Between Ethnic Groups in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1970.
1957/58 1967/68 1970
Chinese-Malay 2.16 2.14 2.25
Indian-Malay 1.71 1.60 1.75
Chinese-Indian 1.27 1.34 1.29
Source: Calculated from Table 3.7
This ethnic analysis of income distribution seemed to be supported and encouraged by
foreign economic advisers. For instance, it was noted that Just Faalant from the
Harvard Development Advisory Service encouraged the Malay nationalist politicians
to analyse the plight of the Malay community in ethnic terms (Jomo, 1991, p. 471). As
the distributional problem was looked at from ethnic dimension, the complexity of the
problem of poverty and inequality was reduced to just a simple problem of inter-
ethnic inequality, i.e. Malay-Chinese inequality. Naturally, ethnicity then became the
cornerstone of the nationalist solution to the Malay economic problem, as will be
discussed in the next section.
5.7 The New Economic Policy 1971-1990
The poor economic condition of the Malays as well as the notable economic
imbalance between the Malays and the Chinese was unsatisfactory to the Malay
nationalists. Since to a certain degree the Malay nationalists had achieved their
political agenda, they now embarked on their economic agenda. The momentum
peaked in the 1960s. The Malays organised the First Bumiputera Economic Congress
in June 1965, where the economic problems of the Malay were discussed and the
strategies and programs to enhance the Malay economic position were drawn up. In
September 1968, the second Bumiputera Economic Congress was held. This time
around, the Congress reassessed the progress and achievements since the first
congress. Basically, the Congress came to the conclusion that after almost ten years of
independence, the progress made to uplift the economic position of the Malays had
not matched the expectations of the Malays. The government was perceived as having
failed to restore their position as the indigenous people to its proper place, as inspired
in their struggle of independence. Feelings of dissatisfaction and strong criticism of
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the government laissez-faire approach emerged from the Malays. For the Malays, the
continuation of the colonial laissez-faire economic policy by the Alliance government
after independence in 1957 had only ensured the growth of the Chinese economic
interest, but it had not done much to increase the plight of the Malays. To the Malay
nationalists, the Alliance government was too friendly to Chinese interests. A more
aggressive government intervention was called for to speed the upward mobility of the
Malays in education, employment and the economy of the country to keep them
abreast with the non-Malays.
What made the situation explosive was the fact that the frustration was almost
equivalent amongst the Chinese ethnic group. Towards the end of 1960s, the feeling
of being discriminated against by the "Malay special rights" swelled up amongst the
Chinese, even though they had accepted the "ethnic bargain" in 1957. From their
perspective, the government was biased towards the Malays, and they thus became
more vocal in criticising the "Malay special rights". Lee Kuan Yew, the leader of
People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore called for a "Malaysian Malaysia" rather
than a "Malay Malaysia" as has been agreed in the "ethnic bargain" of 1957. The
challenge of the Chinese to the Malay political primacy ended up with the ejection of
Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965. The ejection of Singapore, which
was a predominantly Chinese populated island, somewhat weakened the Chinese
opposition to the "Malay special rights". However, the feeling of bitterness among the
Chinese still remained and affected their support of the Alliance government in the
1969 general election.
Thus, towards the end of 1960s, both Malays and the Non-Malays had come to
question the "ethnic bargain" of 1957. The Malays felt that the government was not
doing enough nor speedily enough to overcome their economic problems and to
restore them to their proper position as the indigenous people. The Chinese on the
other hand felt that the government was doing too much for the Malays and felt
discriminated. The growing frustration amongst the Malays and the non-Malays
resulted in both groups voting against the Alliance government in the 10 May 1969
general election. It has been estimated that about half the Malays and about two-thirds
132
of the non-Malays voted against the Alliance (Jomo 1991, P. 471). The Alliance lost a
few states to the opposition but still controlled the federal government. From the
Malay perspective, the results of the election showed that the granting of citizenship
to the non-Malays increased their political power and majority of them voted for the
opposition. Thus, there existed fears among the Malays, that the non-Malays could
even eliminate their political dominance. This led the Malays to perceive that the
bargain of 1957 was a mere sell-out out to the non-Malays. The announcement that
MCA would withdraw from the Alliance reasserted the fears of the Malays that the
Chinese were renouncing the bargain of 1957 (Snodgrass 1980, pp. 55-56). The rising
tension came to a peak with racial riots on the May 13 1969. It appeared that the racial
riots marked a major turning point in Malaysia's development policy as they paved the
way for affirmative action policies in favour of the Malay to be implemented. With
the racial riots of 1969, the inter-ethnic bargain of 1957 was in essence terminated
(Mauzy 1997, p.111). A new policy, called the New Economic Policy (NEP), was
announced in 1970. The NEP represented a "new social contract" between the various
ethnic groups (Mauzy, 1997, p. 113) or a "restatement" of the 1957 social bargain
(Milne, 1976, p.239).
There are at least two versions on the underlying reasons behind the racial riots. Some
Chinese politicians concluded that the problem was due to insufficient private
investment and low economic growth during the economic recession in 1967-68,
which the government had done little to counter (Snodgrass 1980, p. viii). Top
UMNO leaders however, had concluded that the riot was due to the dissatisfaction of
the Malays over economic matters (Mauzy 1997, p. 111). From UMNO point of view,
the riot was inevitable due to the inter-ethnic economic imbalances, not only in
income but also in employment patterns and in the ownership and control of wealth.
As the demands from the Malay nationalists to implement their economic agenda
peaked towards the end of 1960s, the riots appeared to give them the necessary
justification to pursue their economic agenda rigorously by asserting a pro-Malay
economic policy. In other words, the racial riots served as a convenient excuse for the
nationalist factions in UMNO, which was the dominant political party in the Alliance
government, to accommodate a pro-Malay economic policy (Stafford, 1997: p. 560).
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The riots therefore, became a "blessing in disguise" to the Malay nationalists
(Shamsul 1997, P. 250). Finally, as already mentioned above, a new economic policy,
which was called the New Economic Policy (NEP), was announced in 1970. The NEP
was to be implemented in the span of twenty years (1971-1990). The approach of the
NEP to overcome the perceived socio-economic imbalances in society was by giving
preferential treatments to the Malays and other indigenous people.'
The ultimate aim of the NEP was to achieve national unity and to foster nation-
building. The way to unite the multiethnic population visualised in the NEP was
through active government intervention to reduce inter-ethnic inequality by employing
preferential treatments in favour of the Malays. Implicitly, therefore, inter-ethnic
equality was depicted as a prerequisite to social peace and stability, as well as
prosperity. As such, the NEP implicitly regarded that unity was synonymous with the
correction of ethnic economic imbalances (Mauzy 1997, p. 120), and considered it
inevitable but necessary to solve the inter-ethnic economic imbalances that existed in
the country (Jomo 1991, p.469). There were two specific objectives of the NEP. The
first was to eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment
opportunities for all Malaysians irrespective of race, while the second was to
restructure the society so that the identification of ethnic groups with economic
function was eliminated (Malaysia, 1991).
The strategy to reduce poverty consisted of three major components (Shireen, 1998).
The first was to improve the quality of life of the poor by improving the provision of
social services to them such as housing, health, education and public utilities. The
second was to increase the income and productivity of the poor. This was to be done
by expanding their productive capital and utilising the capital efficiently by adopting
modem techniques and the provision of better facilities such as land, replanting and
redevelopment of crops, irrigation, introduction of new crops, and improved
marketing, credit, financial and technical assistance. Finally, to increase employment
opportunities for inter-sectoral mobility out of low productivity areas and activities. In
7 For a discussion on the "special rights" as a strategy for development in Malaysia, see Means (1972).
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this regard, the necessary education, training, financial and technical skills would be
provided to facilitate the movements into the modern sector of the economy. With
regard to the second objective, it was to be achieved through the restructuring of the
employment pattern, ownership of share capital in the corporate sector, and the
creation of a Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC). The creation
of BCIC was regarded as important since this would ensure a meaningful participation
of the Bumiputera in the modern sector of the economy. Thus, the NEP envisaged
restructuring of society in three levels. First, to increase the share of Bumiputera
employment in the modern industrial sectors. Second, to increase the Bumiputera
share in corporate ownership, and third, to increase the number of Bumiputera
entrepreneurs and Bumiputera managerial control. The targets of the NEP with
regards to its objectives are shown in Table 5.6.1 below.
Table 5.6.1: Selected Socio-Economic Targets of the NEP.
1970 Target (1990)
I. Incidence of Poverty'
Overall 49.3 16.7
Rural 58.7 23.0
Urban 21.3 9.1
II. Corporate Equity Ownership
Bumiputera 2.4 30.0
Other Malaysians 34.3 40.0
Foreigners 63.3 30.0
III. Bumiputera Employment by Sector (% of total employment)
Primary 67.6 61.4
Secondary 30.8 51.9
Tertiary 37.9 48.4
IV. Bumiputera Employment by Category (% of total employment)
Professional and Technical 47.2 50.0
Administrative and Managerial 22.4 49.3
Clerical 33.4 47.9
Sales 23.9 36.9
Agricultural 68.7 62.3
Production 31.3 52.0
Services 42.9 52.3
Note:
'Peninsular Malaysia only
Source: Malaysia (1991), Table 2-1, p. 34.
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In order to achieve these targets, various economic and social institutions were
developed to assist the Bumiputera (Kok Swee Kheng, 1994; Rajaluishnan, 1993;
Stafford, 1997). Government agencies that already existed in the 1960s to assist the
Bumiputera such as FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority), MARA (Peoples
Trust Council), FAMA (Food and Marketing Authority) and MARDI (Malaysian
Agricultural Research and Development Institute) were supported with huge funds to
implement and accelerate rural development projects. Besides the existing
government agencies, new agencies such as RISDA (Rubber Industry Smallholders
Development Authority), MAJUIKAN (Fisheries Board) and MAJUTERNAK (Cattle
Board) were established to increase income and productivity of the Bumiputera.
In addition, UDA (Urban Development Authority) and SEDCs (State Economic
Development Corporations) were also set up to carry out commercial and industrial
projects, which in turn would allow and encourage greater participation of the
Bumiputera in these activities, and hence induce them to move from rural to urban
areas. Credit facilities, advisory services and the physical infrastructure such as shops
and houses were also provided through agencies such as MARA, MIDF (Malaysian
Industrial Development Foundation), CGC (Credit Guarantee Corporation) and Bank
Bumiputera. Of significance in increasing Bumiputera participation and ownership in
the economy was the establishment of PERNAS (Perbadanan Nasional or National
Corporation) in 1970. PERNAS was responsible for buying and developing
companies and holding them in trust for the Bumiputera, and latter selling them on to
private Bumiputera interests.
Table 5.6.2 shows the amount of funds allocated in various Malaysia Five-Year Plans
to carry out the two objectives of the NEP - poverty eradication and restructuring the
society. From the Second to the Fifth Malaysia Plans, total allocation for both
objectives of the NEP averaged more than 30%. It appears that poverty eradication
formed a large proportion of the allocation. Nevertheless, the share of the restructuring
increased over time, particularly in the Fourth Malaysia Plan.
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Table 5.6.2: Federal Allocation for the NEP, 1971-1990 (RM Million).
Poverty
Eradication
Restructuring
Society Overlapping Total
Total Federal
Government
Allocation
2"d Malaysia Plan 2350.0 508.3 3.4 2861.7 8950
(1971-1975) (26.3) (5.6) (0.0) (31.9)
3fli Malaysia Plan 6373.4 2376.0 149.0 8898.4 31147
(1976-1980) (20.5) (7.6) (0.5) (28.6)
4th Malaysia I'lan 9319.2 4397.6 300.5 14017.3 39330
(1981-1985) (23.7) (11.2) (0.8) (35.7)
5" Malaysia Plan 15835.1 4201.6 0.0 20036.7 48860
(1986-1990) (32.4) (8.6) (0.0) (41.0)
4th Malaysia Plan 10497.0 6576.8 464.5 17538.3 74000
(1981-1985) (Revised) (14.2) (8.9) (0.6) (23.7)
51h Malaysia Plan 13661.4 2711.6 0.0 16373.0 57512
(1986-1990) (Revised) (23.8) (4.7) (0.0) (28.5)
Note:
Figures in parentheses show percentage of total allocation.
Source: Kok Swee Kheng (1994).
As the demand from the Malay nationalists to implement their economic agenda
peaked towards the end of 1960s, it was not surprising that the two stated objectives
of the NEP were actually associated with the Malay nationalist economic agenda.
Thus, the NEP could be viewed as a fulfilment of the Malay nationalist economic
agenda, as suggested by Shamsul (1997, p. 251):
"If seen from the Malay nationalist perspective, the two central objectives of
the NEP, to eradicate poverty and to restructure society, are essentially
parts of the overall nationalist economic agenda."
Therefore, it was not a coincidence to find that between the two stated objectives of
the NEP, more emphasis was given on the restructuring objective (Toh Kin Woon
1989, p. 244; Jomo 1991, p. 479). It was also the most controversial, since the
restructuring objective involved inter-ethnic redistribution measures. It raised concern
among the non-Malays that the restructuring objective would deprive and limit their
economic opportunities (Heng Pek Koon, 1997). As a consequence, implementation
of the NEP had to be in the context of rapid economic growth, thus ensuring that no
other sections of the community would be deprived as a result. Therefore, rapid
economic growth was of paramount important to realise the NEP's objectives.
Towards this end, the NEP projected an annual growth rate of GDP 8.0 percent
(Malaysia, 1991).
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The reason for the concern of the non-Malays with regard to the restructuring
objective of the NEP was attributed to the fact that this second objective of the NEP
constituted the claim of the Malay nationalists to the national wealth. In fact, it was
for this reason that the restructuring objective received the greatest public attention
and more controversy than the poverty eradication objective. For instance, to ensure
the success of the restructuring objective, there was increased regulation of the
economy. Most important among the many moves, was the Industrial Co-ordination
Act (ICA). The ICA was instituted in 1975 and became an instrument by which the
government pressurised foreign and domestic businesses to restructure their equity
and employment in line with NEP guidelines. The ICA also required manufacturers to
acquire licences to enable them to operate. A license would only be issued if the
manufacturer complied with the NEP guidelines with regard to employment and
equity. The ruling of the ICA was that Malaysian companies with fixed investments
above RM2.5 million and 75 workers 8 , had to set aside 30.0 percent of their equity for
Malay ownership. Also, manufacturing companies had to ensure that the composition
of their workforce reflected the composition of the population, i.e. about half of the
workers were expected to be Malays. Moreover, companies had to ensure that at least
30 percent of turnover was from work undertaken by Malay distributors (Kok Swee
Kheng, 1994, p. 91). As a result, the ICA became the centre of some of the NEP's
greatest criticism (Stafford 1997, p. 562).
5.8 Economic Growth and Development During the NEP Period
During the NEP period, Malaysia experienced a remarkably high economic growth. In
the 1970s, the economy was growing at an average annual growth rate of 8.3 percent
(Table 5.7.1). The economy was in recession in the 1985-86 period, but started to
recover in 1987. Since then, GDP growth rate has been sustained at roughly more than
8.0 percent annually. The rapid growth was accompanied by relatively low and stable
8 It was changed to RM500000 and 25 workers in 1986. For discussion on the impact of ICA on the
Malaysian economy, see Yasuda (1991).
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prices (Table 5.7.2) as well as a low and declining unemployment rate (Table 5.7.3).
The remarkable growth and development record of Malaysia during the past decades
has been widely acknowledged. Indeed, Malaysia has been recognised as one of the
"economic miracles" of East Asia (World Bank, 1993).
Table 5.7.1: Annual Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product (%, at constant prices). 
Malaysia Five-Year Plans
Year
1S1
1966-1970
(1965=100)
1971-1975
(1970=100)
3"I
1976-80
(1970=100)
4th
1981-1985
(1978=100)
5th
1986-1990
(1978=100)
6th
1991-1995
(1978=100)
1 6.2 10.0 11.6 6.9 1.2 8.7
2 1.0 9.4 7.8 6.0 5.4 7.8
3 4.2 11.7 6.7 6.2 8.9 8.3
4 10.4 8.3 9.3 7.8 9.2 9.2
5 5.0 0.8 7.4 -1.1 9.7 9.5
Averag
e
5.4 8.0 8.6 5.2 6.9 8.7
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (1994, 1996).
Table 5.7.2: Annual Growth Rate of Consumer Prices (%).
Malaysia Five-Year Plans
1'
1966-1970
2"1
1971-1975
3m
1976-80
4th
1981-1985
5th
1986-1990
6th
1991-1995
Year (1967=100) (1967=100) (1967=100) (1980=100) (1980=100) (1994=100)
1 1.0 1.6 2.6 9.7 0.7 4.4
2 5.8 3.2 4.8 5.8 0.3 4.7
3 -0.2 10.5 4.9 3.7 2.5 3.6
4 -0.4 17.4 3.6 3.9 2.8 3.7
5 1.9 4.5 6.7 0.3 3.1 3.4
Averag
e
1.6 7.4 4.5 4.7 1.9 4.0
Note:
Up to 1980, data refers to Peninsular Malaysia only
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (1994, 1996).
Table 5.7.3: Unemployment Rate (%), 1960 - 1995. 
No. Employed	 Labour force	 Unemployment rate
Year	 ('000)	 ('000)	 (%) 
1960	 2310	 n.a.	 n.a.
1970	 3396	 3682	 7.8
1980	 4817
	
5122	 5.7
1990	 6621	 7047	 5.6
1995	 7915	 8140	 2.8
Note:
n.a. = not available
Source: (i) Kok Swee Kheng (1994). (ii) Malaysia (1996).
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There was also a rapid structural transformation of the economy. Between 1970 and
1995, the contribution of agriculture to GDP declined from 29.0 percent to 13.5
percent, while the contribution of the manufacturing sector increased from 13.9
percent to 33.1 percent (Table 5.7.4). The economic structural changes were also been
reflected in the structure of employment. The share of agriculture in total employment
fell from 50.5 percent in 1970 to 18.0 percent in 1995, while the share of
manufacturing sector has increased from 11.4 percent in 1970 to 25.9 percent in 1995
(Table 5.7.5).
The rapid growth of the economy was also reflected in the increase in per capita
income. It was merely RM721 in 1960 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 1994), but increased
significantly to RM6099 in 1990 and further to RM9786 in 1995 (Malaysia, 1996, p.
36). Besides, there was tremendous improvement in the quality of life among the
Malaysians, such as in health and education (see Table 5.7.6).
Table 5.7.4: Composition of Gross Domestic Products (% at constant prices).
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 29.0 27.7 22.9 20.8 18.7 13.5
Construction 3.8 3.8 4.6 4.8 3.5 4.5
Manufacturing 13.9 16.4 19.6 19.7 27.0 33.1
Mining and Quarrying 13.7 4.6 10.1 10.5 9.7 7.5
Services 36.2 47.5 42.8 44.2 42.3 41.4
Source: (i) Bank Negara Malaysia (1994, p. 6); (ii) Malaysia (1991, p. 72); (iii) Ministry of
Finance (1996, p. xiv - xv), Economic Report 1996/97.
Table 5.7.5: Employment by Sector (% of total employment).
1970 1980 1990 1995
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 50.5 39.7 27.8 18.0
Construction 4.0 5.5 6.4 8.3
Manufacturing 11.4 15.6 19.5 25.9
Mining and Quarrying 2.6 1.7 0.6 0.5
Services 31.5 37.5 45.7 47.3
Source: (i) Kok Swee Kheng (1994); (ii) Malaysia (1996).
140
Table 5.7.6: Selected Quality of Life Indicators
1970 1990a
Life expectancy (years) b
Males 61.6 69.0
Females 65.6 73.5
Birth rate (per 1000 population) 32.4 27.1
Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live birth) 39.4 13.5
Death rate (per 1000 population) 6.7 4.7
Primary school enrolment ratio (%) 88.2 98.9
Teacher/Pupil ratio (primary and secondary) 28.9 20.9
Doctor/Population ratio 1:4302 1:2656
Television sets (per 1000 population) 22 100
Passenger cars (per 1000 population) 26 96
Telephones (per 1000 population) 1.0 9.7
Total roads (km) 21182 39113
Notes:
'Refers to 1989 figures
bPeninsular Malaysia only
Source: Malaysia (1991).
The NEP also appeared to have been successful in reducing poverty. Indeed,
government official figures show that the NEP reduced poverty beyond its target (see
Table 5.7.7). Furthermore, the identification of ethnic group with economic function
was reduced during the NEP period. Table 5.7.8 below shows that the percentage of
Bumiputera in professional and technical occupation increased from 46.7 percent in
1970 to 64.3 percent in 1995. Indeed, the percentage of Bumiputera in all other
occupations, except for agricultural occupation, increased. There was also an increase
in the number and percentage of registered professionals from the Malay (Bumiputera)
ethnic group (see Table 5.7.9). In 1970, only 225 Bumiputera were registered as
professionals, which is about 5.0 percent of the total registered. In 1995 however, the
number increased significantly to 19344, which was about one third of the total
registered. These were a reflection of the significant increase in Malay enrolment in
higher learning institutions, as well as in various technical training institutes during
the NEP period. The ownership of share capital by the Bumiputera increased from 2.4
percent in 1970 to 20.6 percent in 1995 (see Table 5.7.10). Thus, even though it still
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fell short of the NEP target of 30.0 percent, the Bumiputera seemed to have made
quite a significant progress in terms of ownership and control of capita1.9
Table 5.7.7: Incidence of Poverty in Peninsular Malaysia: Targets and Achievements of NEP.
1970 OPP1 Target 1990 Achieved 1990
Peninsular Malaysia 49.3 16.7 15.0
Rural 58.7 23.0 19.3
Urban 21.3 9.1 7.3
Bumiputera 65.0 20.8
Chinese 26.0 5.7
Indians 39.0 8.0
Others 44.8 18.0
Source: Malaysia (1991, 1996).
Table 5.7.8: Employment by Occupation and Ethnic Group.
Bumiputera Chinese Indians
1970 1990 1995 1970 1990 1995 1970 1990 1995
Professional & 46.9 60.5 64.3 39.5 29.1 26.2 10.8 7.7 7.3
Technical
Teachers and Nurses 68.5 72.3 24.6 20.5 6.4 6.6
Administrative & 24.1 28.7 36.1 62.9 62.2 54.7 7.8 4.0 5.1
Managerial
Clerical & Related 35.4 52.4 57.2 45.9 38.6 34.4 17.2 8.6 7.7
Workers
Sales & Related 26.7 29.9 36.2 61.7 58.4 51.9 11.1 6.8 6.5
Workers
Service Workers 44.3 57.8 58.2 39.6 26.8 22.8 14.6 9.5 8.7
Agricultural Workers 72.0 69.1 63.1 17.3 13.8 12.9 9.7 7.3 7.5
Production Workers 34.2 43.6 44.8 55.9 39.6 35.0 9.6 10.8 10.3
Sources: (i) Rajakrisnan (1993), Table 4, p. 224. (ii) Malaysia (1996), Table3-3, pp. 82-83.
Table 5.7.9: Registered Professionals' by Ethnic Groups, 1970-995.
1970b 1980 1990 1995
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Bumiputera 225 4.9 2534 14.9 11753 29.0 19344 33.1
Chinese 2793 61.0 10812 63.5 22641 55.9 30636 52.4
Indian 1066 23.3 2963 17.4 5363 13.2 7542 12.9
Others 492 10.8 708 4.2 750 1.9 939 1.6
Total 4576 100.0 17017 100.0 40507 100.0 58461 100.0
Notes:
'architects, accountants, engineers, dentists, doctors, veterinary surgeons, surveyors, lawyers.bexcluding surveyors and lawyers
Source: (i) Jomo (1991), p.498, Table 6; (ii) Malaysia (1996), Table 3-4, p. 84.
9 Some have argued that the actual size of Bumiputera share of corporate capital is considerably
underestimated (see Gomez and Jomo 1997, p. 166).
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Table 5.7.10: Ownership of Share Capital (at par value) of Limited Companies
Ownership Group 1970 1990 1995
Bumiputera 2.4 19.3 20.6
Bumiputera individuals & institutions 1.6 14.2 18.6
Trust agencies 0.8 5.1 2.0
Non-Bumiputera 28.3 46.8 43.4
Chinese 27.2 45.5 40.9
Indian 1.1 1.0 1.5
Others	 . 0.3 1.0
Nominee companies 6.0 8.5 8.3
Foreigners 63.4 25.4 27.7
Source: Gomez and Jomo (1997), Table 6.3, P. 168.
Thus, during the NEP period, not only was there remarkable economic growth and
development of the country, there was also improvement in the economic position of
the Malays as well. Poverty eradication in particular was successful under the NEP.
Furthermore, there was the emergence of the Malay middle-class, as well as a
noticeable Malay business-class, never before imagined.
5.9 The Paradox of the New Economic Policy
The success of the NEP in bringing the Malay community into mainstream economic
activities has been highlighted as a vindication of the NEP (OPP2 1991, p.97-98). The
assertion that Malaysia's growth and development was due to the NEP, however,
raises a problem. First, which elements of the NEP have really had an impact on
growth? Was it the restructuring element or was it the poverty eradication element?
While both elements were redistributive in nature, they were different. The
restructuring element, aimed at correcting inter-ethnic economic imbalances implied
inter-ethnic redistribution of income and wealth from the non-Bumiputera to the
Bumiputera. This element was the nationalist claim to the national wealth. Meanwhile
poverty reduction implied a general redistribution of income and wealth from the rich
to the poor. As the majority of the Malays were poor and the non-Malays were
generally better-off in the early period of the NEP, it appeared that a redistribution
from the rich to the poor coincided with inter-ethnic redistribution. This implied that
there was a possibility that it was not really the pro-Bumiputera policy that promoted
economic growth, but rather the poverty eradication element. However, the pro-
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Bumiputera policy appeared to be coherent in the early years of the NEP as majority
of the Malay were poor. Thus the claim that the remarkable growth of the economy
was due to the NEP needs scrutiny. The problems with this claim is that it might have
increased expectation for continuation of the pro-Bumiputera policy, with the
perception that it has worked well for the development of the country. However, this
might not be the case. Secondly, there is a disturbing development concurrent with the
success of the NEP. While the incidence of poverty was significantly reduced, income
inequality began to increase after 1990. The inequality trend is shown in Table 5.8.1
and Table 5.8.2 below.
Table 5.8.1: Trends in Household Income Distribution in Peninsular Malaysia
1970 1990 1995
OVERALL
Mean Income (RM per month) 267 1167 2007
Median Income (RM per month) 167 n.a. n.a.
Gini Coefficient 0.502 0.446 0.464
Share of Top 20% 56.1 50.3 n.a
Share of Middle 40% 32.7 35.2 n.a
Share of Bottom 20% 11.2 14.5 n.a
Source: (i) Snodgrass (1980); (ii) Malaysia (1990, 1996).
Table 5.8.2: Gini Coefficient by Ethnic Groups, 1957-1995.
Overall	 Malay	 Chinese	 Indian
1957/58	 0.412	 0.342	 0.374	 0.347
1967/68	 0.444	 0.400
	 0.391	 0.403
1970	 0.502	 0.466	 0.455	 0.463
1976	 0.529	 0.494	 0.505	 0.458
1979	 0.493	 0.488	 0.470	 0.460
1984	 0.480	 0.469	 0.452	 0.417
1987
	 0.458	 0.447	 0.428	 0.402
1990	 0.446	 0.428	 0.423	 0.394
1995	 0.464	 n.a.	 n.a.	 n.a.
Note:
n.a..not available
Source: (i) Snodgrass (1980); (ii) Shari and Zin (1990); (iii) Malaysia (1990, 1996).
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The government appears to have stopped publishing intra-ethnic distribution figures,
which were readily available until 1990, and it is likely that intra-ethnic inequality has
worsened for at least the Malay community. Indeed, the government acknowledged
that intra-ethnic income inequality is still high, particularly among the Bumiputera.
The concern for the high intra-Malay inequality could be drawn from the following
excerpt (Malaysia 1991, p.100):
"Intra-ethnic income disparities are still sizeable, with inequality among the
Bumiputera being higher relative to that of the non-Bumiputera. The Gini
coefficient in 1990 for the Buntiputera was 0.428 while that for the Chinese
was 0.423 and the Indians 0.394. As another comparison, whilst the mean
income of the top 20 percent of the Chinese household was about 8.6 times
the income of the bottom 20 percent, the disparity between the top and
bottom income households for the Bunziputera was about 9.2 times."
As mentioned earlier, the claim that the NEP was responsible for Malaysia's economic
success might have raised expectation for the continuation of the pro-Bumiputera
policy. The expectation of greater equality of income distribution, an expectation
which was encouraged by the NEP, could be fulfilled at least in terms of inter-ethnic
equality for a period. However, as the NEP was successful in reducing poverty
amongst the Malay, the expectation can no longer be fulfilled through inter-ethnic
equality. Income redistribution policy must address the question of intra-ethnic (intra-
Malay) inequality, but the nationalist policy (as will be seen below) cannot respond
effectively to this question. The nationalist policy in essence becomes incoherent.
For the nationalist policy to be coherent, there must be a coherence of interests among
its members. This implies that the Malays must not be deeply divided — be it socially,
economically or politically. Therefore, as poverty amongst the Malay has been
successfully reduced under the nationalist policy (NEP), the fact that intra-Malay
inequality remained high throughout the NEP period must be an inconvenient fact for
the nationalists. In other words, the success of the NEP has resulted in the Malays
become no longer economically homogeneous as before. There has now emerged for
example, a Malay urban working class, a Malay middle (professional) class and also a
Malay business (capitalist) class. Hence, deeper social and political cleavages have
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evolved in the nationalist (Malay) community. The Malays therefore no longer share a
common economic and political interest amongst them as before. Besides, there is
another interesting development. Cross-cutting cleavages also began to emerge in the
society (Rae and Taylor, 1970) where the interests of some quarters of the Malay are
coinciding with some quarters of other ethnic groups such as the Chinese and the
Indians. These developments have brought about significant changes to the political
landscape of the country.
As cleavages began to appear within the nationalist (Malay) community, the
instruments of NEP were unable to respond to this new challenge. The political
rhetoric of Malay nationalism is too impoverished to articulate a coherent response to
the new reality that the Malays are no longer an economically homogeneous
community. Thus, a nationalist political party (UNLNO) that has gain political support
previously through the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism (by creating the expectations of
greater equality in the distribution of income between ethnic groups), finds it now
difficult to address this new problem of intra-ethnic (intra-Malay) inequality. As the
Malays are now economically and socially divided, UMNO is unable to articulate the
interests of all the factions that existed within the Malays. The failure to address this
intra-Malay distribution issue, in turn, has brought about major political crises facing
UMNO today. In the 1999 general election, it has been estimated that about 70 percent
of the Malays voted against UMNO (see Kamaruddin Jaafar, 2000, p. 27). The
political rhetoric of ethnicity has become less appealing to the society and hence
ethnicity is no longer the main criterion that divides the society.
There is also another significant development. The emergence of cross-cutting
cleavages in the society has not only made the political rhetoric of ethnicity less
appealing, but it also has encouraged the development of multiethnic political parties,
which did not have much appeal to society before. What this development implies is
that the emergence of cross-cutting cleavages has brought about a paradigm shift
among the electorate on how politics will be shaped in future. While it was almost
necessary for a particular ethnic group to have its own representative to articulate its
interests previously, this is no longer true. Therefore the political interest of a
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particular ethnic group is now no longer a monopoly of the political party of that
particular ethnic group. In other words, it is no longer necessary to have a Malay
politician expressing the political interests of the Malays, a Chinese politician
expressing the political interests of the Chinese, or an Indian politician expressing the
political interests of the Indians. The success of ethnic nationalism has paradoxically
made ethnic politics less appealing, and multiethnic politics become promising in the
future. Thus, while the success of the NEP might have raised expectation for the
continuation of the pro-Bumiputera policy, the policy is now not only incoherent for
development of the Malays (Bumiputera), it also can no longer draw considerable
support from them as before.
5.10 Conclusion
A desire to develop a country where inequality between ethnic groups is significant
raises the question of the way to achieve it. The nationalist ideology appears to
provide a solution. For the nationalist ideals to be fulfilled, it must invent nation.
Nation is "an imagined political community", where the members perceive themselves
to belong to the same group. It entails exclusion of people and defines the terms for
inclusion. Therefore, economic development to the nationalist is not only a question
of opening up economic opportunities and creating wealth, but more importantly, it is
also the question of who owns and controls the economy. The nationalist ideal could
be viewed as the claim to national wealth, i.e. the stock of wealth in a geographical
area that belongs to the nationals of that geographic entity. It follows that what matters
for the nationalist with regards to equality is the equality between groups rather than
between individuals. In this chapter, the nationalist economic policy that aimed at
improving the economic position of the Malay ethnic group in Malaysia is examined
to explore the nationalist claim.
It has been shown that since the 1970s, Malaysia has achieved a remarkable growth
and development. The economic structure of the country has also been transformed
from dependence on agriculture to a more broadly based economy. An exceptional
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success has been made in poverty eradication. These successes have been made
against the background of nationalist rhetoric informing economic policy. A closer
examination of the record suggests the problems that the nationalist analysis claims to
solve, cannot be solved. The policy of distributing income on an ethnic basis
succeeded in the initial years because the poor were overwhelmingly from the Malay
community. However, this rhetoric has made it difficult for the government to respond
to cross-cutting cleavages which arose when the poor were no longer entirely from the
Malay ethnic group. Consequently, internal contradictions of the nationalist policy
become more and more apparent as the government pressed on with continuing the
nationalist policy to develop the Malay ethnic group. But continuing the nationalist
policy is no longer effective when the Malay is no longer economically homogeneous.
The nationalist policy cannot respond effectively to the new problem of high intra-
Malay inequality, which in effect results from the nationalist policy itself. Indeed, this
internal contradiction might explain the current political turmoil in Malaysia. It is
shown here that the nationalist solution, while it has been successful in past, has also
sewn the seeds of Malaysia's current problems. In other words, a policy that is
sustained through the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism has become obsolete due to the
policy's own successes. The nationalist analysis therefore cannot solve the problem it
claims it is capable of solving. As examined here, this idea of ethnic nationalism does
not sit well with the search for evidence in the discipline of economics.
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Chapter 6
Income Distribution and the Changing Tolerance Towards
Inequality
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is inspired by a puzzling observation with regard to the New Economic
Policy (NEP) in Malaysia. Why is it that despite the success of the NEP in improving
the economic position of the Malay community, the support of the Malay to UMNO
(the Malay nationalist political party that inspired the NEP) has started to fall apart?
The argument advanced in this chapter is that this could be explained by Hirschman's
(1973) "tunnel effect" proposition. Hirschman's tunnel effect describes the underlying
reason for the changing tolerance of a society towards inequality in the course of
economic development. Hirschman (1973) argues that at an earlier stage of
development, society seems to accept and tolerate the existence of high level of
income inequality. The reason for this is that, societal tolerance towards inequality is
great at the initial stage of development due to the expectation that in due course
everybody will gain from development programs undertaken by the government.
However, if high inequality persists, societal tolerance to inequality will be eroded.
As the beneficiary of the development programs is identified as a small section of the
society, then a perception of injustices will emerge in the rest of society. The
existence of high inequality in the society would no longer be tolerated.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 describes the framework of analysis
of this chapter and explains the tunnel effect proposed by Hirschman (1973). Section
6.3 describes the puzzling observation on the success of the NEP. Section 6.4
examines income inequality and poverty during the pre-NEP period and shows how,
even though there exists a high intra-Malay inequality, the existence of glaring
Malay-Chinese inequality has be used by the Malay nationalists to garner the support
from the Malay community. Section 6.5 reports analysis on income inequality and
poverty during the NEP period as well as discussion on the underlying reason for the
erosion of the tunnel effect among the Malays. Section 6.6 presents the conclusion of
the chapter.
6.2 Rational Choice and Hirschman's Tunnel Effect
To understand the paradox of the NEP, it requires an understanding of the reason why
a nationalist political party that initially received a solid support from the nationalist
community later found that support falling away. This in turn, requires an
understanding of how a nationalist individual would behave in a situation where
nationalism is used as a strategy to secure political support. One way to understand
this question is to examine the behaviour of an individual from the rational choice
framework. According to this approach, an individual is nothing more than a set of
preferences (or tastes), which is summarised in the individual utility function. The
individual is assumed to be only interested in furthering his or her own interest.
Given the constraint, the individual is assumed to maximise his utility. Thus,
individuals are viewed as "living, choosing, economising persons" (Buchanan 1978,
p.5); or the individuals as a "resourceful, evaluative, maximising man" (Brunner
1987, p.371). Society is therefore viewed as a collection of individuals engaged in
furthering self-interest. In pursuing his or her own self-interest, an individual might
also pursue the collective or social interest. However, it is not the intention of the
individual to further the collective or common interest. That is just coincidental or
unintentional. The objective of the individual is just to further only his or her own
self-interest.
This rational choice framework appears useful in analysing the behaviour of the
individual in making choices with regards to politics, in particular where nationalism
exists. Here the model of economic nationalism proposed by Johnson (1965) is
followed.' Following Johnson (1965), nationalism could be viewed as a form of
discrimination, where discrimination against one group of people by another, based
I Johnson (1965) in turn, derives the model from Becker (1957), Downs (1957) and Breton (1964).
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solely on the criterion of group identity, arises from a "taste for discrimination". The
taste for discrimination ensures that there exists enjoyment, value or utility from
avoiding contact with the group discriminated against. Therefore an individual with a
taste for discrimination will derive utility from having certain jobs held or certain
property owned by, or for having the rights on certain kind of jobs to, members of his
national or ethnic group rather than by the non-members. The utility could be in the
form of psychological satisfaction or material gains. Thus, a person with a taste for
discrimination is willing to pay higher prices or accept lower prices in their economic
transactions in order to enjoy the satisfaction from discrimination.
This analysis of discrimination is extended to the analysis of nationalism. This is
simply done by substituting the taste for discrimination with a "taste for nationalism".
Therefore in this context, an individual could be imagined to have a taste for
nationalism. An individual with such a taste could be regarded as having certain
preferences, demands or claims on some other national or ethnic group, and this
individual derives enjoyment or utility from them. As with an individual with a taste
for discrimination, an individual with a taste for nationalism will also derive utility for
having certain jobs held or certain property owned by, or for having the rights on
certain kind of jobs to, members of his national or ethnic group rather than by the
non-members. Besides, as an individual with a taste for nationalism is assumed to be a
rational individual, this individual will attempt to maximise his utility, including the
enjoyment from that taste for nationalism.
Now, in the context of a democratic setting, where individuals (or electorates) are
assumed to have a taste for nationalism, how then can a political party win or sustain
power? In other words, given that the electorate has a taste for nationalism, what is
the likely behaviour of a political party in a democratic setting? In this regard, Downs
(1957) has extended the rational choice framework to analyse the process of selecting
a government in a democratic setting. His central argument is that, political parties
formulate or promote a certain policy with a motive to gain votes, and hence power.
Political parties do not seek to gain power in order to carry out certain predetermined
policies or to serve any particular interest groups. It is the other way round. Political
parties are assumed to offer certain policies and serve interest groups in order to gain
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power. Thus, a political party that seeks to gain or sustain power, i.e. to gain votes or
become elected, must supply the policies demanded by the voters. In this sense, a
political party could be viewed as a firm that sell policies for votes, instead of product
for money. Voters give up votes for policies, instead of giving up money for products.
Political parties therefore are assumed to maximise the number of votes they receive
just as a firm in the market that maximises profits. Therefore, in a situation where the
majority of the electorate are assumed to have a taste for nationalism, and hence have
a strong demand for nationalistic policies, political parties are expected to pursue
nationalistic policies in order to maximise votes and win power.
Now, suppose that a nationalist political party has won the vote and has the power to
implement its nationalistic policy. It is interesting then to know who within that
national or ethnic group will actually get the benefits from such a policy. This would
be an interesting investigation since it is not uncommon for a nationalist political
party to claim that their nationalist policy is good for all individuals of the national or
ethnic group that their party represents. Is this really the case? In other words, are the
benefits from a nationalist policy equally divided amongst the national or ethnic
group, or the gains are accrued only to some within that national or ethnic group? In
short, it is interesting to predict how income and wealth is distributed among the
national or ethnic group under a nationalist policy. For this purpose, the idea of
nationalism develop by Breton (1964) is useful. He identified nationality (or ethnicity)
with ownership of wealth. According to Breton (1964, p.377):
"...nationality or ethnicity to an individual or to a group is the fraction of the
total stock of wealth, in a given territory, owned by persons of the same
ethnic or national origin as the person or groups under consideration.... [It]
is a form of capital which can be augmented through investment or reduced
through depreciation and consumption. Nationalism is both the disposition
that leads an individual to favour and to justify investment in nationality and
the encouragement which he gives to the investment of present scarce
resources for the alteration of the interethnic or inter national distribution of
ownership."
Looking from Breton's perspective, nationalism therefore is about investment in
nationality or ethnicity. A political party that pursues nationalistic policies could be
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viewed as seeking to extend the property or wealth owned by the national or ethnic
group through investment. What seems to be interesting is that this investment brings
utility to a nationalist (i.e. an individual with a taste for nationalism) even though he
or she might not have ownership of it because what matters for an individual with a
taste for nationalism is the ownership of that investment. As long as the ownership
belongs to his ethnic or national group, regardless of who they are, this individual will
derives utility from the investment. The reward from investment in nationality comes
in two forms — tangible (monetary) and intangible (non-monetary) rewards. Of course
the tangible rewards such as income as well as the prestige from the investment
accrue to the individual (of the national or ethnic group) who holds the assets or
offices allocated to the national or ethnic groups. For the rest of the group, i.e. those
having the taste for nationalism, the rewards or satisfaction derived from investment
in nationality is only "of a psychic order and is usually referred to as pride, sense of
identity, and the like" (Breton 1964, p. 379). Therefore, while the intangible rewards
are generally dispersed to the whole national or ethnic group (as long as they have a
taste for nationalism), the tangible rewards accrue only to some within the national or
ethnic group, most likely the educated, entreprenewially qualified, wealthy and the
elite of the group. Breton (1964, p. 380) argues that, even though nationalist policies
might redistribute income from one national (or ethnic) group to another, the policies
will only succeed in redistributing it from one social group to another within their
own national (or ethnic) group. Since not everybody within that national or ethnic
group will receive the tangible rewards (i.e. income or wealth), then examination on
income and wealth distribution within that national group is important.
The above discussion only predicts the distributional consequences of a nationalistic
policy. It does not however tell us how the support from the nationalist community
changes in line with income distribution changes over time. Therefore, the above
framework needs to be extended to incorporate the changes in the voter attitude (or
perception) towards the nationalist policy. In this regards, Hirschman's (1973)
explanation on changing societal tolerance towards inequality is helpful. Hirschman
explains the changes in societal tolerance towards inequality using the following
analogy, or what he called the tunnel effect (1973, p.545):
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"Suppose that I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same
direction, and run into a serious traffic jam. No car moves in either lane as far as I
can see (which is not very far). I am in the left lane and feel dejected. After a while
the cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, for I
know that the jam has been broken and that my lane's turn to move will surely come
any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better off than before
because of the expectation that I shall soon be on the move. But suppose that the
expectation is disappointed and only the right lane keeps moving: in that case I,
along with my left lane cosufferers, shall suspect foul play, and many of us will at
some point become quite furious and ready to correct manifest injustice by taking
direct action (such as illegally crossing the double line separating the two lanes)."
According to Hirschman (1973), it is this tunnel effect that responsible for generating
and sustaining the tolerance of the society to a high or increasing income inequality at
an earlier period of economic development. However, if inequality does not improve
over a certain period of time, then the societal tolerance towards inequality will run
out. Once again, in Hirshman (1973, p. 545) own words:
"In the early stages of rapid economic development, when inequalities in the
distribution of income among different classes, sectors, and regions are apt to
increase sharply, it can happen that society's tolerance for such disparities will be
substantial. To the extent that such tolerance comes into being, it accommodates, as
it were, the increasing inequalities in an almost providential fashion. But this
tolerance is like a credit that falls due at certain date. It is extended in the
expectation that eventually the disparities will narrow again. If this does not occur,
there is bound to be trouble and, perhaps, disaster."
The tunnel effect operates because the advances of others provide information to an
individual about a better or promising future. This information in turn produces
satisfaction to the individual and it in turn "overcomes, or at least suspends, envy
(Hirschman 1973, p.546). Thus, the expectation of the individual that he or she will
eventually improve as did the others, brings about satisfaction that allows the
individual to have tolerance about the advances of the others. It is this expectation that
eventually he or she will gain that forms the basis for the acceptance or tolerance of
inequality.2
2 Societal tolerance towards inequality is also affected by the context in which inequality exists. For
instance, the tolerance towards inequality (as well as economic hardship) might increase in time of
economic growth and prosperity, but will decline in time of economic crisis. Nevertheless, if the
economic crisis is due to uncontrollable factors (e.g. natural disaster or foreign sabotages), the existing
inequality or hardship might be justifiable or tolerated. Societal tolerance towards inequality might also
decline in a situation where there is an excessive display of wealth on the part of the few rich. Thus in a
society where the rich are more easily visible, societal tolerance towards inequality might be lower than
in a society where the rich are unnoticeable. See Adelman and Robinson (1989, pp. 950-952).
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Following Hirschman's tunnel effect proposition, it could be predicted that voters'
support for the nationalist economic policy will change over time. Initially, voters that
have the taste for nationalism will vote for a nationalist economic policy (or
nationalist political party). The reason is that a person with a taste for nationalism
would be happier if income redistributed occurs from other ethnic groups to his or her
ethnic group. However, the main reason for him or her to support the nationalist
policy is that he or she expects to secure the tangible benefits from investment in
nationality, such as in terms of jobs or property allocated to the ethnic group.
However, as mentioned earlier, the distribution of the tangible rewards from
investment in nationality is unlikely to be evenly distributed amongst the national or
ethnic group. Only some might succeed in securing the tangible rewards, while others
might not. Now, as the beneficiaries of the nationalist policy become obvious, the
individual who is not successful in securing the tangible rewards will start to question
his rationale for supporting the nationalist policy. As those who got the tangible
rewards from the investment in nationality become apparent, nationality is likely to
mean different things to those who got the tangible rewards and those who did not.
For those who did not, they are likely to cease supporting the nationalist economic
policy. In other words, if an individual with a taste for nationalism did not realise any
economic improvement (relative to others in his group) from the nationalist economic
policy over a certain period of time, there is no reason to expect that the individual to
continue to support the nationalist policy. This is a sensible thing to do given that the
individual is rationale and interested only in pursuing his or her interest, rather than
the interest of his or her national or ethnic group. In this situation, the tunnel effect or
the psychic satisfaction begins to diminish. Therefore, as the beneficiaries of the
nationalist policy become apparent (or the distributional impact of nationalist policy
becomes noticeable), it is expected that support for the nationalist political party
would start to fall apart.
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6.3 The Puzzle of the New Economic Policy
Racial riots occurred in Malaysia in 1969. From the Malay nationalist perspective, the
riots were a predictable consequence of inter-ethnic (Malay-Chinese) economic
imbalances that existed in the society. Therefore, from a Malay nationalist point of
view, continuing the liberal economic policy that had been pursued since
independence in 1957 would only ensure the widening of the inter-ethnic economic
imbalance. The Malay nationalists called for more aggressive government
intervention to speed the upward mobility of the Malays in education, employment
and the economy of the country, and hence to keep them abreast with the non-Malays.
The government announced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 with achieving
national unity as the ultimate aim. The NEP's main objectives were: (i) to eradicate
poverty irrespective of race; and (ii) to restructure society so that the identification of
ethnic groups with specific economic function would be eliminated. With regards to
the second objective, the NEP gave preferential treatment to the Malays and other
bumiputeras to overcome the perceived socio-economic imbalances in the society. In
essence, what really mattered for the NEP was to make ethnic groups more equal,
regardless of inequality within each group. Thus, intra-ethnic inequalities seemed to
be acceptable under the NEP (see Mahathir 1998, pp. 33-34). Three measures were
visualised in the NEP to ensure the restructuring objective was met. First, to increase
the share of bumiputera employment in the modern industrial sectors. Second, to
increase the bumiputera share in corporate ownership, and third, to increase the
number of bumiputera entrepreneurs and bumiputera with managerial responsibilities.
When the NEP came ended in 1990, the National Development Policy (NDP)
replaced it. While there were changes in strategy and priorities, the main spirit of the
NEP, i.e. to preferentially uplift the economic and social status of the Malay was
maintained in the NDP.
During the NEP period, Malaysia experienced a remarkably high economic growth.
This remarkable growth record of Malaysia during the past decades was widely
acknowledged. The World Bank (1993) recognised Malaysia as one of the "economic
miracles" of East Asia. The rapid growth was accompanied by relatively low and
stable prices as well as a low and declining unemployment rate. There was also a
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rapid structural transformation of the economy from an economy based on agriculture
to an economy based on industry. The NEP appears not only to have brought about
rapid growth and structural change to the economy, but also to have been successful
in improving the economic position of the Malay ethnic group. Poverty incidence
among the Malays (bumiputera) was significantly reduced from 65.0 percent in 1970
to 20.8 percent in 1990. Furthermore, the identification of ethnic group with economic
function was also reduced during the NEP period. In terms of ownership and control
of capital, the Malay (bumiputera) seem to have made quite significant progress, even
though it still fell short of the NEP target of 30.0 percent. The ownership of share
capital by the bumiputera increased from 2.4 percent in 1970 to 20.6 percent in 1995.
To the government, the success of the NEP in bringing the Malay community into
mainstream economic activities was highlighted as a vindication of the NEP (OPP2
1991, p.97-98).
As mentioned above, the NEP was successful not only in achieving rapid growth and
development of the country, but also in uplifting the economic position of the Malay.
However, towards the end of the NEP period, despite this success, the support of the
Malay community towards UMNO began to fall apart. This was evidenced in the
general elections in the 1990s. In the 1990 general election, the number of UMNO
seats fell from 83 in 1986 to 71 (Table 6.3.1).
Table 6.3.1: Number of Seats won by UMNO in the Parliamentary General Elections.
1986 1990 1995 1999
Total Parliamentary Seats 177 180 192 193
No. of Seats won by the National Front 148 127 162 148
No. of Seats won by UMNO 83 71 88 72
Percentage of UMNO Seats to Total Seats 46.89 39.44 45.83 37.31
Percentage of UMNO Seats to the no. of Seats won by
the National Front 56.08 55.91 54.32 48.65
Source: (i) Kok Swee Kheng (1994); (ii) Azman Anuar (1998); (iii) Nurbaiduri Ramli (2000).
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Besides, UMNO lost control of Kelantan, a state heavily populated by the Malays, to
PAS (and Semangat 46). In the 1995 general election however, UMNO managed to
regain and increase their parliamentary seats to 88. The clearest evidence of the
declining support of the Malay to UMNO however, was revealed in the most recent
(1999) general election when the number of UMNO seats fell from 88 in 1995 to 72.
It was for the first time that UMNO won less than half of the total seats won by the
National Front. Four federal ministers and one State Chief Minister from UMNO lost
their seats. In fact, in almost the entire seats won by UMNO, their majority was
reduced significantly (see Table 6.3.2). Furthermore, besides Kelantan, which has
been controlled by PAS since the 1990 general election, PAS won another state,
Terengganu, from UMNO. PAS and other parties in the Alternative Front3 also made
significant advances in other states such as Kedah, Perlis, Perak, Pahang, Selangor,
Negeri Sembilan and Melaka (see Table 6.3.3). The results of the 1999 general
election showed that UMNO significantly lost its traditional support from the Malays.
It was a known fact that UMNO only won its seats mainly with the support of the
non-Malay voters. In a constituency where 90-100 percent of the voters were Malays,
UMNO (National Front) only managed to win four out of 25 seats (Table 6.3.4).
Furthermore, in all by-elections after the 1999 general election saw that the majority
gain by UMNO/National Front declined further. There is a puzzling observation here.
The Malay nationalist approach to the Malay economic problem (i.e. the NEP)
appeared to have been successful in uplifting the Malay economic position. However,
despite this success, the support of the Malay community for UMNO, which inspired
the NEP, started to erode. UMNO appeared to have lost their traditional support from
the Malay, particularly in the 1999 general election.
3 Alternative Front consists of four main opposition parties: PAS (Malaysian Islamic Party), PRM
(Malaysian Peoples Party), KeADILan (National Justice Party) and DAP (Democratic Action Party).
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Table 6.3.2: Peninsular Malaysia: Majority of UMNO Parliamentary Seats in the 1995 and
1999 General Election.
Parliament Constituency
UMNO's Majority in
1995
UMNO's Majority
in 1999
Changes Between
1995-1999
1 P1 Padang Besar 10070 4519 -5551
2 P2 Kangar 11000 4049 -6951
3 P3 Arau 6929 1586 -5343
4 P4 Langkawi 8425 6547 -1878
5 P6 Kubang Pasu 17226 10138 -7088
6 P14 Merbok 22201 15376 -6825
7 P15 Sungai Petani 26221 12133 -14088
8 1'18 Kulim Bandar Baharu 14302 8067 -6235
9 1'32 Gua Musang 8980 2925 -6055
10 P41 Kepala Batas 17834 11175 -6659
11 P42 Tasek Gelugor 12651 4236 -8415
12 P51 Balik Pulau 30046 9434 -20612
13 P53 Larut Won Without Contest 4009
14 P55 Bagan Serai 6250 1584 -4666
15 P56 Bukit Gantang 15154 5101 -10053
16 P58 Cenderoh 11793 3990 -7803
17 P60 Tambun 26639 7084 -19555
18 P64 Kuala Kangsar 10649 2774 -7875
19 P70 Pasir Salak 17115 5045 -12070
20 P72 Bagan Datoh 14830 4617 -10213
21 P75 Lipis 10113 6356 -3757
2 7 P77 Jerantut 7194 1463 -5731
23 P78 Kuantan 23096 7361 -15735
24 P79 Paya Besar 16759 3563 -13196
25 P80 Pekan 10793 241 -10552
26 P81 Maran 14046 3748 -10298
27 P84 Temerloh 7852 213 -7639
28 P85 Rompin 12825 6028 -6797
29 P86 Sabak Bernam 14452 901 -13551
30 P87 Tanjung Karang 15818 2075 -13743
31 P89 Kuala Selangor 18342 9920 -8422
3 7 P91 Gombak 30878 803 -30075
33 P93 !lulu Langat 30812 3866 -26946
34 P98 Shah Alam 40715 1440 -39275
35 P101 Kuala Langat 9211 8020 -1191
36 P102 Sepang 15669 7162 -8507
37 P105 Wangsa Maju 27890 5618 -22272
38 P107 Titiwangsa 18966 1513 -17453
39 P109 Lembah Pantai 13389 1454 -11935
40 P145 Labuan 5147 6515 1368
41 P113 Jelebu 2940 7119 4179
42 P114 Jempol 15704 11919 -3785
43 P115 Tampin 23452 9979 -13473
44 P116 Kuala Pilah 20600 2818 -17782
45 P120 Alor Gajah 25096 12332 -12764
46 P122 Batu Berendam 22325 7288 -15037
47 P124 Jasin 22128 10691 -11437
48 P126 Ledang 23361 13507 -9854
49 P127 Pagoh 17599 12857 -4742
50 P129 Mersing 13525 10861 -2664
51 P131 Parit Sulong 25354 17657 -7697
52 P133 Muar 9483 7182 -2301
53 P134 Sri Gading 26350 17558 -8792
54 P135 Batu Pahat 24993 17448 -7545
55 P136 Tenggara 24518 20817 -3701
56 P137 Sungai Benut 21142 20692 -450
57 P139 Kota Tinggi 33760 32161 -1599
58 P140 Tehran 39140 35485 -3655
59 P141 Johor Baru 34118 24558 -9560
60 P142 Pulai 29403 24568 -4835
Average 18428 8669 -9452
Source: Kamaruddin Jaafar (2000), Table 1, pp. 24-25.
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Table 6.3.3: Percentage of Votes received by the National Front in the General Election by
States (1986, 1990, 1995 and 1999).
Percentage Votes Received by the
National Front
Changes in the Percentage Votes
Received
States 1986 1990 1995 1999 1986-90 1990-95 1995-99
Perlis 66.5 65.5 67.0 56.2 -1.00 1.50 -10.80
Kedah 60.2 62.3 61.8 55.7 2.10 -0.50 -6.10
Kelantan 54.1 32.7 42.1 38.9 -21.40 9.40 -3.20
Terengganu 60.2 54.1 52.8 41.2 -6.10 -1.30 -11.60
P.Pinang 49.4 51.0 59.1 51.4 1.60 8.10 -7.70
Perak 55.4 56.2 62.4 55.5 0.80 6.20 -6.90
Pahang 64.3 63.0 66.6 57.4 -1.30 3.60 -9.20
Kuala Lumpur 40.7 43.1 57.0 50.2 2.40 13.90 -6.80
Selangor 63.2 58.2 71.6 54.7 -5.00 13.40 -16.90
N.Sembilan 64.4 60.2 66.5 59.2 -4.20 6.30 -7.30
Melaka 58.4 60.6 64.8 56.6 2.20 4.20 -8.20
Johor 65.7 61.5 75.6 72.9 -4.20 14.10 -2.70
Labuan 28.0 59.7 64.8 71.3 31.70 5.10 6.50
Sabah 47.4 16.7 50.4 59.4 -30.70 33.70 9.00
Sarawak 55.1 57.1 61.5 65.9 2.00 4.40 4.40
Malaysia 57.6 53.4 65.1 56.5 -4.20 11.70 -8.60
Source: Strategic Info Research Development (2000), P. 60.
Table 6.3.4: Number of Seats won by the National Front and Alternative Front in the
Malay Majority Constituents (Peninsular Malaysia) in the 1999 General Election.
Percentage of
Malay Voters Total Seats
No. of Seats
Won by the
National
Front
No. of Seats
Won by the
Alternative
Front
Percentage
Votes
Received by
the National
Front
Percentage
Votes
Received by
the
Alternative
Front
90 - 100 25 4 21 42.4 57.6
80 - 90 15 8 7 54.5 45.5
70 - 80 12 10 2 53.3 46.7
60 - 70 19 17 2 60.8 39.2
50 - 60 27 27 0 61.7 38.3
Total 98 66 3/ 55.2 44.8
Source: Strategic Info Research Development (2000), p. 20.
The reasons underlying the decline in Malay support for UMNO in the 1999 general
elections are complex. There was internal dissension within UMNO, culminating in a
public dispute between the Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammed, and his erstwhile
deputy, Anwar Ibrahim. The latter was removed not only from his government post as
Deputy Prime Minister but his party post as Deputy President of UMNO as well. He
was committed to trial in a criminal court. The elections were also conducted in the
shadow of the Asian financial crisis, in which the Malaysian economy suffered much
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in 1997-1998. It is the argument of this chapter that the failure of UMNO to rally
supporters sufficiently to offset the above background effects — nearly 70 percent of
the Malay voters are estimated to have voted against the government (Kamaruddin
Jaafar, 2000, p. 27) — may have to do with the Hirschman's tunnel effect. The
plausibility of this line of reasoning is strengthened by the fact that the economy had
began to recover at the time of the elections in 1999, having emerged from the trough
reached at the nadir of the Asian crisis in 1998. The Prime Minister's defensive
statements about the irrelevance of intra-group inequality amongst the Malays
(Mahathir 1998) is an indication that the government had perceived a concern
amongst the Malay community about the failure of the NEP to address the problem of
intra-group inequality.
6.4 Income Inequality and Poverty 1957- 1970
Let us start examining how the nationalist economic policy initially became appealing
to the Malay ethnic group in Malaysia. As will be seen shortly, at the onset of the
NEP, besides the existence of glaring inter-ethnic (Malay-Chinese) inequality, there
was also a significant problem of intra-ethnic (intra-Malay) inequality. Indeed, intra-
group inequality was worst among the Malays. Given this fact, why did the NEP
disregard the question of intra-Malay inequality and yet still manage to retain
considerable support from the Malay community? In other words, why could the
Malay community be tolerant towards intra-Malay inequality, but intolerant towards
Malay-Chinese inequality? This section attempts to shed some light on this question.
Table 6.4.1 presents income distribution during the pre-NEP period. It is clear that
between 1957 and 1970, income inequality worsened as shown by the increase in Gini
coefficient from 0.412 in 1957 to 0.513 in 1970. The income share of the high-income
group (top 20%) rose from 48.6 to 55.9 percent. The share of the poorest 40 per cent
of the population fell from 15.9 to 11.6 per cent. Thus, it appeared that during the pre-
NEP period, the rich did better.
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Table 6.4.1: Household Income Distribution in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1970.
1957/58 1970 %i
Mean income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 207 261 26.1
Median income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 150 164 9.3
Gini Coefficient 0.412 0.513
Percentage Share of Top 20% 48.6 55.9
Percentage Share of Middle 40% 35.5 32.5
Percentage Share of Bottom 40% 15.9 11.6
Source: Perumal (1989) and Snodgrass (1980).
The rich were mostly urban and the poor were mostly rural. It happened that the rural
population was predominantly Malay. While both urban and rural households
experienced an increase in mean and median income, the percentage increase for the
urban households was significantly larger than that for the rural households (see Table
6.4.2). Thus, there was quite a clear demarcation in terms of percentage change in
income between the rural and urban household. As a result, the urban-rural disparity
ratio, which is the ratio of the mean income between the urban and rural households,
went up from 1.8 in 1957/58 to 2.1 in 1970 (see Table 6.4.3). It appeared that not only
were the rural population becoming poorer than their urban counterparts on average,
but that there was also a dramatic increase in their Gini coefficient. As can be seen,
income inequality worsened, but more so for the rural population.
Table 6.4.2: Rural-Urban Income Distribution in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1970
1957/58 1970 %L
Urban Households
Mean income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 307 424 38.1
Median income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 207 262 26.5
Gini Coefficient 0.429 0.494
Percentage Share of Top 20% 49.6 55.0
Percentage Share of Middle 40% 33.2 32.8
Percentage Share of Bottom 40% 17.2 12.2
Rural Households
Mean income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 166 198 19.3
Median income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 126 138 9.5
Gini Coefficient 0.374 0.463
Percentage Share of Top 20% 44.5 51.0
Percentage Share of Middle 40% 37.3 35.9
Percentage Share of Bottom 40% 18.2 13.1
Source: Perumal (1989) and Snodgrass (1980)
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Table 6.4.3: Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1970. 
Disparity Ratio 
1957/58
	 1.8
1970	 2.1 
Source: Calculated from Table 6.4.2
Table 6.4.4 shows income distribution by ethnic groups. The Gini index shows that
inequality among the Malays worsened. Indeed, between 1957 and 1970, income
inequality worsened more among the Malays than among the Chinese. The Malays
were less unequal compared to the Chinese in 1957/58, but become more unequal
than the Chinese in 1970. This picture of intra-group distribution shown in Table 6.4.4
was also reflected in both urban and rural areas. The intra-group inequality increased
among both the rural and urban Malays more than it did for their Chinese
counterparts. It was particularly pronounced among rural households!' Furthermore,
the Chinese-Malay disparity ratio went up from 2.16 in 1957/58 to 2.25 in 1970
(Table 6.4.5). One thing that is clear from Table 6.4.4 is the fact that there was a clear
economic division between the Malay and the Chinese as shown by the percentage
change of their mean and median incomes during the 1957-1970 period. The
improvement in the Chinese household income was greater than that of the Malays.
Table 6.4.4: Income Distribution by Ethnic Groups in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1970
1957/58 1970 % A
Malay
Mean income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 134 170 26.9
Median income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 108 119 10.2
Gini Coefficient 0.342 0.466
Percentage Share of Top 20% 42.5 52.5
Percentage Share of Middle 40% 38.0 34.8
Percentage Share of Bottom 40% 19.5 12.7
Chinese
Mean income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 288 390 35.4
Median income, RM Per Month in 1959 Prices 214 265 23.8
Gini Coefficient 0.374 0.455
Percentage Share of Top 20% 45.8 52.6
Percentage Share of Middle 40% 36.2 33.5
Percentage Share of Bottom 40% 18.0 13.9
Source: Perumal (1989) and Snodgrass (1980).
4 Ikemoto (1985) demonstrates that intra-group inequality worsened most for the Bumiputeras, in both
the rural and urban areas.
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Table 6.4.5: Chinese-Malay Disparity Ratio in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-1970.
Disparity Ratio 
1957/58	 2.16
1970	 2.25 
Source: Calculated from Table 6.4.4
Besides the clear economic division between the Malays and the Chinese, the bulk of
the Malays were poor (Table 6.4.6). The Malays in fact were synonymous with the
poor: the poor were mostly the Malays, and most Malays were the poor. These factors
well suited the nationalist argument for inter-ethnic redistribution. Thus, despite the
above observations that show the gap between the rich and the poor widened, which
was more apparent within the Malay ethnic group, the nationalist political debate,
interestingly enough, focused on the Chinese-Malay inequality. What seems to be
interesting is that the Malay nationalists were not only successful in capitalising on
the existence of Malay-Chinese income inequality, but simultaneously also successful
in suppressing the problem of intra-Malay inequality, which worsened more than that
of the Chinese.
As there is a clear economic division between the Malay and the Chinese, and the
majority of the Malays are poor, it seemed sensible for the Malay to support the
nationalist argument for inter-ethnic redistribution programs. From the Malay
perspective, their identity and economic interest reinforced each other, and hence
there was quite a coherence of economic interest of the Malays as a group. On the
other hand, the economic differences between the Malays and the Chinese reinforced
their differences in other aspects such as language, culture and religion. Thus, the
differences between the Malay and the Chinese became more and more visible. In this
kind of situation, it was relatively easy for the nationalists to suppress the question of
intra-Malay inequality and to focus on the question of Malay-Chinese inequality. In
fact, this became easier since the Malay viewed the Chinese immigrants (as well as
the colonial British) as "dispossessors" (Shamsul 1997, p. 245). The uneasiness of the
Malay therefore was easily focused on the economic advances of the Chinese.
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Table 6.4.6: Incidence of Poverty 1957 and 1970 in Peninsular Malaysia (%).
1957/58 1970
All Households 51.2 49.3
Rural 59.6 58.7
Urban 29.7 21.3
Malay Households 70.5 65.9
Rural 74.9 70.3
Urban 32.7 38.8
Chinese Households 27.4 27.5
Rural 29.4 30.5
Urban 25.2 24.6
Indian Households 35.7 40.2
Rural 31.5 44.9
Urban 44.8 31.8
Source: Ikemoto (1985).
A nationalist solution to the Malay economic problem therefore, was possible and
easily appealed to the Malays. From the Malay perspective, the nationalist policy
(NEP) of inter-ethnic redistribution would open up opportunities for them to improve
their standard of living. Thus, the NEP created an expectation of improvement among
the Malays, which in effect drove the Malays to accept and support the nationalist
economic solution. Besides, as the majority of the Malays were poor and also
economically weaker than the Chinese, supporting the NEP coincided with their
common interest, i.e. to increase their pride as a group versus the Chinese immigrants.
Since most of the Malays were poor, any Malay that could achieve economic success
through the NEP not only signified the success of the individual, but also symbolised
the success of the Malay as a group. Furthermore, as the liberal economic policy in
the 1957-1970 period had worked against the Malay interest, i.e. widening the
Chinese-Malay income gap, the choice to the Malay appeared to be clear and
straightforward.
6.5 Income Inequality and Poverty in the NEP Period
As examined in section 6.4 above, despite the fact that there was a high intra-Malay
inequality, the Malays supported the NEP. By supporting the NEP, the Malay in
essence actually accepted and tolerated intra-Malay inequality. As will be seen, as
intra-Malay inequality remained persistently high during the NEP, the tolerance
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towards it began to erode. The erosion began when the beneficiaries of the NEP
became obvious, and those who were unable to secure the benefits from the NEP
began to question the injustices of the NEP, a policy that they had initially supported.
Consequently, the support for the nationalists began to fall apart. This point is
illustrated here using the results from the Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS) data
analysis.5
As mentioned in Section 6.3, the period following the introduction of the NEP (1971-
1990) witnessed Malaysia experiencing an exceptionally rapid economic growth and
development. With regard to the Malays, their economic situation was improved.
They were represented in most sectors in the economy, including the industrial sector.
The NEP brought about the migration of the Malays from the rural to the urban areas,
which led to the emergence of the urban Malay middle-class. In particular, poverty
incidence amongst the Malay was significantly reduced. However, the only poverty
index reported is the head-count ratio (i.e. the poverty incidence). The head-count
ratio, while useful, is an unsatisfactory poverty index [see for example Fields (1994),
Sen (1997b) and Zheng (1997)]. Here, besides the head-count ratio measure of
poverty usually reported by the government, a range of better poverty indices is
calculated.
Table 6.5.1 below reports the set of poverty indices, which is calculated from the
MFLS data. It is clear that, between the early and towards the end of the NEP period,
all the poverty indices — from the simple head-count ratio to the more complex and
better indices - indicate that poverty actually declined. Poverty also declined across all
ethnic groups as well as across location (see Table 6.5.2 and Table 6.5.3). In fact,
further examination on rural and urban poverty by ethnic groups also indicates a
similar finding — poverty declined (see Table 6.5.4 and Table 6.5.5). Thus, there is no
doubt at all that poverty was successfully reduced during the NEP period. This finding
therefore confirms and substantiates the government published figures.
5 The data as well as the measures of inequality and poverty employed in this chapter are explained in
chapter 2.
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However, there was a disturbing development on the other side of these achievements.
There was the emergence and growing recognition of cross-cutting cleavages (Rae
and Taylor, 1970) due to the intra-group effects of distributional policy (NEP). Table
6.5.6 below reports the distribution of household income, which was analysed from the
MFLS data. The results suggest that between the earlier and towards the end of the NEP
period, income inequality seems to have improved. The Gini index of inequality fell from
0.5418 in 1976/77 to 0.4666 in 1988/89. The middle and lower income groups were gaining
their income share, while the upper income group was losing out.
Income inequality among the urban households improved quite dramatically (see
Table 6.5.7). The Gini index for the urban household decreased from 0.5362 in
1976/77 to 0.4252 in 1988/89. However, there was no significant improvement in the
distribution of rural household income. The Gini index for rural households only fell
marginally from 0.4807 in 1976/77 to 0.4781 in 1988/89. What seems to be
interesting is that the percentage change in the mean income of the rural households
was greater than their urban counterpart, while the percentage change in the median
income of the rural households was less than the urban households. Thus in terms of
percentage change in income, the economic division between urban and rural
household became blurred during the NEP period.
Table 6.5.6: MFLS Data: Distribution of Household Income, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89 ')/0 A
Mean (RM)
Median (RM)
Gini Index (G)
Income share of:
Top 10%
Top 20%
Middle 40%
Bottom 40%
6232
3840
0.5418
41.76
57.88
32.21
9.91
13172
9000
0.4666
35.65
51.77
34.90
13.34
111.36
134.38
171
Table 6.5.7: MFLS Data: Distribution of Rural and Urban Household Income, 1976/77 and
1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89 04 A
Urban Households
Mean 9123 17199 88.52
Median 5425 12738 134.80
Gini Index (G) 0.5343 0.4230
Income share of:
Top 10% 41.37 32.66
Top 20% 57.79 48.41
Middle 40% 31.68 36.29
Bottom 40% 10.53 15.30
Rural Households
Mean 4139 10910 163.59
Median 3106 7310 135.35
Gini Index (G) 0.4824 0.4708
Income share of:
Top 10% 34.81 36.86
Top 20% 51.65 52.47
Middle 40% 37.20 34.06
Bottom 40% 11.15 13.47
This is obviously in contrast with the pre-NEP period, where the percentage change in
rural household income significantly lagged behind that of the urban household (see
Table 6.4.2). As can be seen in Table 6.5.8, this was reflected in the decline of the
income disparity ratio between the urban and rural households. Thus, while the urban-
rural income disparity ratio declined, income inequality within the rural households
did not experience significant change. Indeed, inequality within the rural households
was greater than the urban households.
Table 6.5.8: MFLS Data: Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio in Peninsular Malaysia, 1976/77 and
1988/89. 
Year	 Urban-Rural Disparity Ratio 
1976/77	 2.204
1988/89	 1.576
Source: Calculated from Table 6.5.7.
Table 6.5.9 below reports the distribution of household income of the Malays and the
Chinese. The Gini index shows that there was only a marginal improvement in
income inequality among the Malay households. In contrast to the Malays, there was
quite a substantial improvement in income inequality among the Chinese. What is
more interesting is that their percentage change in mean income significantly lagging
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behind the Malays. Thus during the NEP period, the Malays experienced a larger
increase in income compared to the Chinese. This was in contrast to the period before
the NEP (see Table 6.4.4). As a result, the income disparity ratio between the Chinese
and the Malays fell (see Table 6.5.10). Thus, while the Malays experienced a
significant growth in their income during the NEP period (1971-1990), it was less
equally distributed compared to the Chinese. In fact, while the Malay household
income was more evenly distributed than the Chinese in 1976/77, it became the most
unevenly distributed in 1988/89.
Table 6.5.9: MFLS Data: Distribution of Household Income by Ethnic Group in Peninsular
Malaysia, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89 % A
Malay
Mean 3795 11153 193.89
Median 2647 7200 172.01
Gini Index (G) 0.5009 0.4810
Income share
Top 10% 36.43 37.54
Top 20% 53.91 53.72
Middle 40% 35.66 33.24
Bottom 40% 10.42 13.04
Chinese
Mean 8850 17300 95.48
Median 5747 12140 111.24
Gini Index (G) 0.5130 0.4249
Income share
Top 10% 39.77 32.68
Top 20% 55.70 48.65
Middle 40% 32.78 35.71
Bottom 40% 11.52 15.64
Table 6.5.10: MFLS Data: Chinese-Malay Income Disparity Ratio, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
Year	 Disparity Ratio 
1976/77	 2.332
1988/89	 1.551 
Source: Calculated from Table 6.5.9.
The analysis is taken further to examine income distribution among the Malay and the
Chinese households by their location, i.e. rural and urban. The results are presented in
Table 6.5.11. It shows that both the Malay and Chinese rural households experienced
a worsening income distribution. Income inequality among the urban Malay and
Chinese households improved. It also appears that the Malays, both in the rural and
urban areas, were the more unequal compared to the Chinese. However, the
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percentage change in income of both the rural and urban Malays was larger compared
to their Chinese counterparts. Furthermore, while income distribution among the rural
Malay household was the worst compared to the others (urban Malay, urban Chinese
and rural Chinese), they were the ones to experience the largest percentage change in
income during the NEP period. Thus, a fall in the Chinese-Malay income disparity
ratio was observed for both in the rural and urban areas (Table 6.5.12), but income
inequality among the Malays both in the rural and urban areas were higher than their
Chinese counterparts in 1988/89.
Table 6.5.11: MFLS Data: Distribution of Household Income by Ethnic Group and Area in
Peninsular Malaysia, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
Malay Chinese
1976/77 1988/89 % A 1976/77 1988/89 % A
Rural Households
Mean 3044 10142 233.2 6351 14184 123.3
Median 2202 6531 196.6 4944 10200 106.3
Gini Index (G) 0.4880 0.4878 0.4254 0.4328
Income share
Top 10% 34.83 38.93 33.26 34.63
Top 20% 51.51 54.18 48.54 49.71
Middle 40% 38.02 32.68 36.50 35.51
Bottom 40% 10.47 13.13 14.96 14.79
Urban Households
Mean 5890 14272 142.3 10553 19913 88.7
Median 4007 10102 152.1 6545 14820 126.4
Gini Index (G) 0.4589 0.4324 0.5339 0.4042
Income share
Top 10% 33.98 31.20 41.05 32.31
Top 20% 51.03 48.89 57.16 47.35
Middle 40% 35.53 36.93 32.63 35.79
Bottom 40% 13.44 14.18 10.22 16.85
Table 6.5.12: MFLS Data: Chinese-Malay Income Disparity Ratio by Location, 1976/77 and
1988/89.
1976/77 1988/89
Rural
Urban
2.086
1.792
1.399
1.395
Source: Calculated from Table 6.14
The above results show that during the NEP period there was not much improvement
in income inequality among the rural as well as the Malay households. Indeed,
income inequality worsened among the rural Malay households, despite their
significant improvement in income. Nonetheless, during the NEP period, it appeared
that the urban-rural and the Chinese-Malay income inequality declined. This was also
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observed from the Theil decomposition analysis, shown in Table 6.5.11 and 6.5.12.
Both tables show that the contribution of inequality between ethnic groups, as well as
urban-rural inequality to total inequality fell. Thus, a large portion of the total
inequality was contributed by intra-group inequality. Furthermore, this contribution
increased during the NEP period. This result is not surprising since the intention of
the NEP was to reduce inter-group inequality, rather than within-group inequality as
being mentioned earlier.
Table 6.5.13: MFLS Data: Theil Index and the Contribution of Inter- and Intra-Area (Rural-
Urban) Inequality to Total Inequality, 1976/77 and 1988/89. 
1976/77	 1988/89
Theil index % Contribution Theil index % Contribution
Inter-Area 0.0766 13.02 0.0254 6.25
Intra-Area 0.5121 86.98 0.3802 93.75
Total 0.5887 100.00 0.4055 100.00
Table 6.5.14: MFLS Data: Theil Index and the Contribution of Inter- and
Inequality to Total Inequality, 1976/77 and 1988/89.
1976/77	 1988/89
Intra-Ethnic
Theil index % Contribution Theil index % Contribution
Inter-Ethnic 0.0756 12.85 0.0196 4.99
Intra-Ethnic 0.5130 87.15 0.3734 95.01
Total 0.5887 100.00 0.3931 100.00
6.6 The Erosion of Hirschman's Tunnel Effect
The above findings show that before the NEP, i.e. between 1957 and 1970, the
income of the Chinese improved more than that of the Malays. Besides, the bulk of
the poor households are Malays. Thus, there existed quite a clear division in the
economic achievement between the Malay and the Chinese. While there also existed a
high level of intra-Malay inequality, this was ignored and tolerated by the Malays as
the Malay nationalists successfully capitalised on the differences between the
economic positions between the Malays and the Chinese. Furthermore, as the majority
of the Malay were poor, it seemed sensible for them to support the nationalist
argument for inter-ethnic redistribution.
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During the NEP period, the income of the Malays increased more significantly than
that of the Chinese. Despite the significant growth in their income, intra-Malay
inequality remained high. This means that during the NEP period, as the income of
the Malays improved significantly, the improvement was not even. It was particularly
apparent in the rural area. Furthermore, the difference in income improvement
between the Chinese and the Malays became less obvious. Indeed, it was better for the
Malays, particularly the rural Malay households. As a result, the income gap between
the Chinese and the Malay as well as between the urban and rural household fell
during the NEP period.
As its power base was mainly among the rural Malays, this finding did not well suit
UMNO. As there was a persistence of high intra-Malay inequality, the NEP began to
be perceived as benefiting just a selected few Malay, both in the rural and urban areas.
Even though the NEP was articulated in the political rhetoric of Malay-Chinese
inequality, and raised the expectation of inter-ethnic redistribution, it has an
unintended effect. It also raised the expectation for inequality within the Malay
community. While it was true that the NEP improved the standard of living of most
Malays, the pace of improvement was not the same. There was a perception that only
a small segment of the Malay community did actually receive the benefits of the NEP.
The above findings are also observed by Milne (1976, p. 259):
"...although it [the NEP] was intended to bring benefits particulary to
the Malays, these have been restricted to a small "special class",
"coterie" or "elite".
Bowie (1988) also appears to agree with Milne's observation. He observes that not
only the NEP benefited a small segment of the Malay community, it also accentuated
division within them. Bowie (1988, p. 58) mentions that:
"The NEP also accentuated class division within the Malay community.
Poor Malay took offense at members of the new Malay capitalist class
flaunting their wealth. Moreover, many small Malay-owned firms found
themselves crowded out by public enterprises and by a few large Malay
companies that came to be the primary beneficiaries of Bumiputera
privileges."
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Jomo (1989, P. 47) documents yet another similar observation. He observes that:
"...the question of ownership, whether share capital or other wealth,
only involves the interest of a small elite. For instance, it has been shown
that although 45 percent of adult Bumiputeras own national unit trust
(ASN) shares, only 1.3 percent own 75 per cent of the total ASN shares."
Consequently, as the beneficiaries of the NEP became apparent, i.e. a small group of
the Malays, the perception of intra-Malay economic injustices from the NEP began to
emerge. This was initially ignored due to the expectation that the NEP would provide
opportunities for all of the Malay to benefits. The perception that the success of the
selected few Malay was due to their political connection, i.e. the existence of crony
capitalism, only made the matter worse (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Jomo 1989, p.4-3).
Thus, while the findings did show that Malay-Chinese inequality still existed, the
spotlight of the political debate began to shift from the Malay-Chinese inequality to
intra-Malay inequality. Dissatisfaction of the Malay who did not really benefit much
from the NEP began to emerge. Accordingly, the support for the nationalists (UMNO)
began to fall apart.
It is interesting to note that, while intra-Malay inequality increasingly became a
problem, and hence the erosion of the tunnel effect, this problem was once again
ignored. As argued in Chapter 5, it was difficult for the nationalists who argued in the
political rhetoric of ethnicity to address the new problem of intra-Malay inequality.
Thus, rather than finding policy alternatives, UMNO continued to press on with the
nationalist approach as the one that would develop the Malays (see Mahathir
Mohamed 1998, pp. 33-34). Probably the perception of the Malay nationalists
(UMNO) was that the tunnel effect was still intact among the Malays. This, however,
was an illusion on their part. The continuing neglect of intra-Malay inequality only
assured a continuing erosion of the tunnel effect among the Malays. The result of the
1999 general election, already mentioned above, expressed clearly the fact that the
Malays are abandoning UMNO. This shows the tunnel effect has been eroded among
the Malays.
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6.7 Conclusion
The argument advanced in this chapter is that the NEP was sustained by Hirschman's
tunnel effect. In the early period of the NEP, the Malay nationalists received
considerable support from the Malay community and the support appeared to stem
from the ability and success of UMNO in capitalising on the glaring economic gap
between the Malay and the Chinese. The support of the Malay to the Malay
nationalist economic policy arose from the expectation of securing benefits from
Malay identity. Intra-Malay inequality, while it existed, was tolerated. However, as
the benefits of the NEP became obvious to only a small segment of the Malays, the
support to the Malay nationalists began to fall apart.
It appeared that UMNO was under the illusion that the Malays would continue to
support its argument, given that it had been widely accepted that during the NEP
period, Malaysia had achieved remarkable economic growth and improvement in the
economic position of the Malays. Here, it has been shown that as intra-Malay
inequality remained high, the tolerance of the Malays seemed to be running out.
While intra-Malay inequality appeared to have been ignored by the Malays at the
earlier period of the NEP, the persistence of high intra-Malay inequality throughout
the NEP period could no longer be concealed from the Malay community. However,
the political rhetoric of ethnicity of the Malay nationalists (UMNO) was unable to
respond to the emerging problem of intra-Malay inequality. Reiteration of the
nationalist argument for inter-ethnic redistribution, while perhaps still having some
merit, no longer appealed to the Malays. It is evidenced here that the initial approval
or "psychic" satisfaction of the Malays with the advances of a few Malay turned
(without being noticed by the nationalists) to disappointment with and resentment at
the prevailing social injustices. Hirschman (1973, p.552) has already warned that this
might happen:
"Providential and tremendously helpfid as the tunnel effect is in one respect
(because it accommodates the inequalities almost inevitably arising in the course of
development), it is also treacherous: the rulers are not necessarily given any
advance notice about its decay and exhaustion, that is, about the time at which they
ought to be on the lookout for a drastically different climate of public and popular
opinion; on the contrary, they are lulled into complacency by the easy early stage
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when everybody seems to be enjoying the very process that will later be vehemently
denounced and damned as one consisting essentially in the "rich becoming richer".
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion
7.1 The Argument of the Study
In response to the racial riots in 1969, the government formulated the New Economic
Policy (NEP). The underlying objective was to attain national unity and foster nation-
building. These objectives were to be achieved through a two-pronged strategy:
eradicating poverty irrespective of race, and restructuring society so as to correct the
economic imbalances that existed between ethnic groups. This imbalance was
perceived as the main reason for the racial riots. The NEP represented a complete
change in government approaches to economic development, from a laissez-faire
approach to active government intervention in the economy. Under the NEP, the
government played an active role in raising the Malay income through poverty
reduction measures in the rural areas, expansion of employment opportunities in the
urban areas, and an increase in the share of corporate wealth of the Malay ethnic
group. The National Development Policy (NDP) replaced the NEP when it ended in
1990. The main spirit of the NEP, to preferentially uplift the economic and social
status of the Malay, continued to be the focus of NDP. It has been argued that these
policies originated from Malay economic nationalism. During the implementation of
the NEP and the NDP, Malaysia achieved a remarkable rate of economic growth.
Economic well-being of the Malay in particular generally improved. This created an
expectation that the policy would be continued.
The fundamental question asked in this study is this: was the NEP, a policy based on
ethnicity, sustainable? The argument advanced in this study is that it was unlikely due
to the following two reasons. First, the NEP was concerned with equality between the
Malay and the non-Malay rather than with equality within the Malay themselves.
Thus, the NEP did not really address the question of income and wealth distribution
within the Malays. Therefore, while the NEP might have achieved its objective of
reducing inter-ethnic inequality, the question of intra-Malay inequality was not
addressed. Thus cross-cutting cleavages emerged. The formation of cross-cutting
cleavages deepened socio-political divisions and conflicts in the society, not only
between the Malays and the non-Malays, but within the Malays themselves. The
Malays no longer had a coherent economic interest. As a consequence, the Malay
nationalist solution to the Malay economic problem, which is an ethnicity-oriented
policy (NEP), no longer appeared coherent. Secondly, since the NEP exclusively
focused on inter-ethnic rather than intra-ethnic inequality, a high degree of tolerance
towards intra-ethnic inequality was needed for the ethnicity-oriented policy to be
sustained and supported. If, throughout the NEP period, there was high intra-Malay
inequality due to the exclusive focus on inter-ethnic inequality, then it was most likely
that the tolerance of the Malay towards inequality, or what Hirschman (1973) called
the tunnel effect, would run out. The reason for the erosion of the tunnel effect was
obvious. The Malay eventually realised that the NEP, while being articulated as the
saviour of the Malay in general, disproportionately benefited only a few among them.
This awareness led to the weakening of support for the ethnicity-oriented policy as
well as for the Malay nationalists. Both the emergence of cross-cutting cleavages as
well as the erosion of the tunnel effect was likely to result in difficulties for the
continuation of the NEP, and hence it would become unsustainable.
7.2 The Methodology of the Study
The exploration of the issues raised above entailed an examination of income
distribution in Malaysia, particularly inter and intra-ethnic income inequality. The
central aim of the study, therefore, was to investigate the trends and changes in
income inequality and the related issues such as polarisation and poverty in Malaysia
during the implementation of the pro-Malay economic policy (NEP). Based on the
trends and changes in income inequality, the political implications of income
distribution were drawn. This was not new. Many authors have investigated the
question of income distribution and the politics of the NEP in Malaysia before.
However, the previous studies seemed detached from each other. On the one hand
there were studies (mostly by economists) that examined income distribution before
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and after the implementation of the NEP but without examining the political
implication of the results. There were other studies (mostly by political scientists) that
examined the politics of the NEP without placing income distribution at the center of
the argument. The novelty of the present study, therefore, lies in its attempt to marry
the two approaches. This study examines the distributional impact of the nationalist
economic policy, i.e. the NEP. It also examines how the distribution of income might
explain Malaysia's current economic and political problems.
Another aspect that distinguishes this study from previous studies is the data. Except
Anand (1983), most previous studies on income distribution in Malaysia used
government survey data that was published in aggregate form. While aggregate data
did contribute to understanding changes in income distribution in Malaysia, the
factors that contributed to inequality and poverty were difficult to examine from that
aggregate data. In this study, besides the income data available so far, additional data
from the Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS) were employed. It was possible to
disaggregate the MFLS income data not only by location (rural-urban) and ethnic
groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian), but by the sources of income as well. Thus, the
MFLS data permitted analysis to be carried out to identify the factors that contributed
to inequality and poverty. Therefore, the broader and deeper analysis on the different
income data set (MFLS) undertaken by this study could be used to compare findings
from previously studies that used the government survey data, and also used to
substantiate and verify the previous findings. What is interesting is that it was found
that the aggregate data of the MFLS was more or less similar to the government
survey data. Indeed, it also produced quite similar results.
Here, some of the most commonly used measures of inequality were employed. These
were the Theil, Gini and Shorrock's indices of inequality. The Theil index of
inequality was decomposed to examine the contribution of within and between
population subgroups' inequality to total inequality. Gini and Shorrock's indices of
inequality are also decomposed, but to examine the contribution as well as the effect
of different sources of income to total inequality. The study also examined the
question of polarisation, i.e. the disappearing middle-class, a topic not investigated in
previous studies. Examination of polarisation was important since the conventional
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measures of inequality such as the Gini index was not able to capture the
distributional changes with regards to changes in the share of income held by the
middle-income group. Here, the Wolfson index of polarisation (W) was used to
examine the question of polarisation. This study also assessed the extent of poverty.
Besides the usual simple head-count ratio (H) and poverty-income gap ratio (I) that
were reported in the previous studies as well as in the government documents, other
poverty measures employed in this study included Sen (S), Clark, Hemming and Ulph
Index (P*), and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) indices of poverty. They provided
a richer picture of the nature of poverty. The FGT index of poverty was decomposed
to examine the contribution of different groups to total poverty.
7.3 Main Findings of the Study
In general, the result from the MFLS data analysis confirmed the findings of the
previous studies. It showed that the overall income inequality fell during the NEP
period. Income inequality among the urban households and also among the Chinese
and Indian households also experienced an improvement. Furthermore, inter-ethnic
income inequality — fell between ethnic groups — has also fallen between the two
periods under study (i.e. 1976/77 and 1988/89). What seems to be interesting from the
result of the MFLS data analysis is that there was only marginal improvement in
income inequality among the rural and Malay households. This finding was contrary
to the claims made in government documents. Thus, the results from the MFLS data
analysis suggested caution in accepting the claim that the NEP had been successful in
reducing income inequality among the rural as well as among the Malay households.
The results from the Theil decomposition analysis showed that there was a large and
increasing contribution of intra-group (intra-ethnic and intra-area) inequality to total
inequality during the NEP period. The contribution of inter-group (inter-ethnic and
inter-area) inequality to total inequality appeared to be small. Indeed, it was declining.
The results appeared to be similar to the findings of Anand (1983), Ikemoto (1985)
and Shireen (1998). What these results implied was that the best and most effective
strategy to reduce the overall inequality in Malaysia was by reducing intra-group
183
(intra-ethnic and intra-area) inequality. Since the focus of the NEP was exclusively on
reducing inter-groups inequality rather than reducing intra-groups inequality, the high
level of income inequality in Malaysia (though declining) throughout the NEP period
could be well understood.
Decomposition of income inequality by income source in Malaysia showed that a
large portion of the total inequality was attributable to labour income, i.e. paid and
self-employment. The contribution of capital and transfer incomes appeared to be
relatively small. Nonetheless, its contribution (i.e. rent, interest and dividends as well
as pensions and EPF) increased between the two periods under study. The
contribution of paid and self-employment was large not because these sources were
the most unequally distributed sources of income, but rather due to their importance
(large share) in total household income. This finding seemed quite similar to the
findings of Fields (1976). With regards to effects of income source on income
inequality, the results showed that income from rent, interest and dividends had a
consistently unequalising effect on all groups in 1988/89. Thus, in the context of an
economic policy where attempts were made to enlarge the Malay share of capital
ownership, such efforts would likely result in greater inequality amongst the Malay in
particular, and amongst Malaysians in general. In terms of a strategy to improve
inequality, the decomposition analysis by income sources indicated that the best
strategy was to inequality in paid employment, followed by reducing inequality in
self-employment and also in rent, interest and dividends.
The analysis on polarisation indicated that there was no evidence of a "disappearing
middle-class" within the total households in Malaysia between 1976/77 and 1988/89.
The declining overall income inequality seemed to be followed by the enlargement of
the middle-income group. Further examination showed that there was inconclusive
evidence of polarisation for the rural and the Malay households, as well as for the
rural Indian households. The only evidence of polarisation was found within the rural
Chinese household. It seems, therefore, while the rural Chinese experienced a
declining income inequality between 1976/77 and 1988/89, nevertheless they became
more polarised. With regard to poverty eradication, there was a clear indication that
the achievement of the NEP was exceptional. All the indices of poverty employed in
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this study, which provided a richer picture than the indices reported in previous
studies, confirmed that poverty was reduced substantially, particularly among the
Malay households. However, it was also found that, while poverty among the Malay
household substantially declined, the Malay poor still formed the largest group living
under poverty. Decomposition exercises showed that the contribution of poverty
among the Malays to the total poverty was significantly large in both the rural and
urban areas. Indeed, the contribution of Malay poverty to total poverty was not only
significantly large, but it also increased between the two periods under investigation.
These findings above appeared to lend support to the arguments advanced in this
study: that the desire to develop the Malay ethnic group through a nationalist solution
(NEP) would result in a new problem — caused by the negligence of the intra-Malay
inequality problem. There is no doubt that the NEP significantly improved the
economic position of the Malay. As the results of this study indicated, the income of
the Malays increased significantly, poverty among the Malays was reduced
substantially, and there might also have been a growing Malay middle-class.
However, intra-Malay inequality remained persistently high throughout the NEP
period. As a result, while the policy had been successful in improving the economic
position of the Malay in the past, the policy had no coherent prescriptions to address
the current problems. It was unsustainable.
It was found that the nationalist policy of distributing income on an ethnic basis
succeeded in the initial years because the poor were overwhelmingly from the Malay
ethnic group. The NEP successfully improved the economic position of the Malay,
albeit disproportionately, and significantly eradicated poverty among them so that the
poor are no longer disproportionately from the Malay ethnic group. As there was a
persistently high intra-Malay inequality, this implied the Malays were no longer
economically homogeneous. Consequently, cross-cutting cleavages emerged in
society. In this situation, it was difficult for a government that relied on the political
rhetoric of ethnicity to respond effectively to challenges of intra-Malay inequality. As
the government continued to articulate its political rhetoric of ethnicity to solve the
Malay economic problem, internal contradictions of the redistribution policy became
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more apparent. This internal contradiction could explain the current political turmoil
in Malaysia.
The high level of intra-Malay inequality found in the MFLS data analysis (as well as
in the previous studies) also supported another related argument advanced this study.
It was argued that public support for the nationalist policy (NEP) was initially
sustained by Hirschman's tunnel effect. The NEP initially received considerable
support from the Malay community. The support appeared to stem from the ability
and success of UMNO, the political party that had been in power since the inception
of the policy, to capitalise on the glaring economic gap between the Malay and the
Chinese. The findings of the study showed that at the initial period of the NEP, a high
level of intra-Malay inequality already existed. However, it was argued here that at
the early stage of the implementation of the nationalist policy (NEP), this high intra-
Malay inequality was tolerated by the Malays. The notable income gap between the
Malay and the Chinese at the early period of the NEP overwhelmed the problem of
intra-Malay inequality. The nationalists received support at the polls by paying the
ethnic card. As intra-Malay inequality continued to remain high during the NEP
period, as the findings of the study showed, the focus shifted to the persistence of
intra-Malay inequality. This shift in focus followed from the fact that the economic
demarcation between the Malay and the Chinese became blurred as a result of the
success of the NEP itself. This shift in focus changed the attitude of the Malay
towards intra-Malay inequality. As it was now clearer to the Malay group that the
benefits of the nationalist policy (NEP) accrued disproportionately to a small segment
of the Malay, the tolerance of the Malay towards intra-Malay inequality declined.
Malay support for the Malay nationalist party began to fall apart.
Besides, another factor that might also have contributed to the alienation of the
Malays from the NEP was the perception that the policy was not effective enough to
reduce poverty among the Malays. While it was true that poverty declined
substantially among the Malay households, they still remained the largest group under
poverty and the decline was much slower compared to that of the Chinese and the Indians.
Since the NEP was articulated in terms of the rhetoric of ethnicity, this fact was not
acceptable to the Malays. The political rhetoric of ethnicity might have created a
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suspicion among the Malays that the success of the NEP in reducing Malay poverty
was even a failure since they, the Malays, were still the largest group under poverty.
7.4 Conclusion of the Study
Nationalism more often than not involves the creation and cultivation of myths.
Hence, the nationalist arguments might not have had a sound economic basis behind
them. Ironically, nationalism has become an effective vehicle to draw popular
political support. Nationalist ideology might be irrational, but it serves as an effective
vehicle for political purposes. In this regard, Malaysia's experience of nationalism as
a strategy to develop the economically backward Malay ethnic group seems
interesting. The Malaysian experience showed that not only were the nationalists
successful in gaining political support, but their nationalistic economic policy (the
NEP) also brought about remarkable economic growth and development to the
country. Malaysia made great progress in eradicating poverty, sustaining high
economic growth, and transforming her economic structure from dependence on
agriculture to a more broadly based economy. Furthermore, the economic position of
the Malay ethnic group, which was once overwhelmingly poor, significantly
improved. To the nationalists, their approach to economic development was
vindicated.
However, a closer examination of the record suggested that the policy of distributing
income on an ethnic basis succeeded in the initial years mainly because the poor were
overwhelmingly from the Malay community. When the poor were no longer entirely
from the Malay ethnic group and cross-cutting cleavages began to emerge in the
society, the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism made it difficult for the government to
respond to the new problem of reduced tolerance of intra-Malay inequality. The
nationalist policy appeared impotent to respond to the changes that took place within
the Malay community. While the success of the NEP has been highlighted as
vindication of the nationalist approach to economic development, continuation of the
nationalist policy did not achieve what it had achieved in the past. It failed to correct
the inequality within the Malay community and hence held back their development,
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and failed to gain the support from the Malay community. Therefore, while Malaysia
has been praised for its economic success, the ethnicity-oriented policy that brought
about her success was now incoherent, and hence no longer sustainable. In this regard,
the success of the NEP was paradoxical. The policy was initially successful, but its
own success also sowed the seeds of future problems for itself.
The results of this study could also be extended to examine the effects of economic
globalisation. Rodrik (1997a, 1997b) argues that a country can only secure the
benefits from integrating with the global market if globalisation is compatible with
domestic, social and political stability. Globalisation produces social conflicts, as
some people will gain and others will massively lose out as a result of it. Therefore, if
the distributive conflict entailed in the globalisation process is not to disrupt the
economy from securing the benefits of globalisation, Rodrik (1997a, 1997b) argues
that coherent redistribution policies are essential to intervene in the economy to
mitigate income inequality. Thus, the most serious challenge for a country is to
formulate a redistribution policy to mitigate income inequalities arises from
globalisation. As a small and open economy, Malaysia is exposed to the forces of
globalisation. Rodrik's argument is relevant here in that, while the ethnicity-oriented
policy is an attempt to mitigate income inequality, could it be effective in reducing the
tensions arising from globalisation of the Malaysian economy? In other words, is the
redistribution policy that is based on ethnicity compatible with globalisation in
Rodrik's sense? The results of this study showed that the continuation of an ethnicity-
oriented policy would be unlikely to reduce the tensions arising from globalisation,
and may in fact deepen them.
This study therefore asks that some common sense should return in future, as the
political rhetoric of ethnic nationalism cannot respond to the new aspect of
distributional problems, more so now with regard to tensions arising from
globalisation of the Malaysian economy. The political rhetoric of ethnic nationalism
has probably gone too far in Malaysia. As the Malay community has changed, ethnic
politics are no longer suitable for developing the Malays. It is important therefore to
bring up and highlight the internal contradictions that are inherent in the NEP as a
solution to the Malay economic problem in particular and to Malaysian economic
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development in general, so that a better policy can be designed. Thus, for economic
policy to be brought back on the right track, it is important to expose the paradox of
NEP. Nonetheless, given the current political realities, some Malays, who have been
so long accustomed to, and who have benefited from, the NEP framework, might find
it difficult if not impossible to accept the main arguments of this study. Even so, the
study believes that such changes in policy, sooner or later, are unavoidable and that
indications of this exist. What is more important is to keep the discussions open, until
favourable circumstances arise to make the change. Thus, the inherent contradictions
of the NEP should be highlighted and debated, even though any changes to it might
not be politically acceptable at present. The contribution of this study therefore, to
quote Milton Friedman (1982, p. ix), is "to keep them alive and available until the
politically impossible become politically inevitable".
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Appendix 1
Extract from the Federal Constitution (as of 25 January 1989).
(Source: Faaland et.al ., 1990, pp.18-19).
3.	 Religion of the Federation
(1)	 Islam is the religion of the Federation, but other religions may be practised in
peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.
32.	 Supreme Head of the Federation, and his Consort
(1) There shall be a Supreme Head of the Federation, to be called the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong, who shall take precedence over all persons in the Federation and shall
not be liable to any proceedings whatsoever in any court.
89.	 Malay reservations
(1) Any land in a State which immediately before Merdeka Day was a Malay
reservation in accordance with the existing law may continue as a Malay reservation
in accordance with that law until otherwise provided by an Enactment of the
Legislature of that State.
(2) Any land in a State which is not for the time being a Malay resevation in
accordance with the existing law and has not been developed or cultivated may be
declared as a Malay reservation in accordance with that law. ...
(3)	 Subject to Clause (4), the Government of any State may, in accordance with
the existing law, declare as a Malay reservation --
(a) any land acquired by that Government by agreement for that purpose;
(b) on the application of the proprietor, and with the consent of every person
having a right or interest therein, any other land;
and shall, in accordance with the existing law, immediately declare as a Malay
reservation, in a case where any land ceases to be a Malay reservation, any other land
of a similar character and of an area not exceeding the area of that land.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall authorise the declaration as a Malay reservation of
any land which at the time of the declaration is owned or occupied by a person who is
not a Malay or in or over which such a person has then any right or interest.
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(5) Without prejudice to Clause (3), the Government of any State may, in
accordance with the law, acquire land for the settlement of Malays or other
communities, and establish trusts for that purpose.
(6) In this Article "Malay reservation" means land reserved in alienation to Malays or
to natives of the State in which it lies; and "Malay" includes any person who, under
the law of the State in which he is resident, is treated as a Malay for the purposes of
the reservation of land.
90.	 Special provisions relating to customary land in Negri Sembilan and
Malacca, and Malay holdings in Trengganu
(1) Nothing in this Constitution shall affect the validity of any restrictions
imposed by law on the transfers or lease of customary land in the State of Negri
Sembilan or the State of Malacca, or of any interest in such land.
152. National language
(1)	 The national language shall be the Malay language and shall be in such script
as Parliament may by law provide:
Provided that:
(a) no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using (otherwise than for
official purposes) or from teaching or learning, any other language; and
(b) nothing in this Clause shall prejudice the right of the Federal Government or
of any State Government to preserve and sustain the use and study of the
language of any other community in the Federation.
153. Reservation of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc., for Malays and
natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak
(1) It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the
special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak
and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of
this Article.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, but subject to the provisions of
Article 40 and of this Article, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall exercise his functions
under the Constitution and federal law in such manner as may be necessary to
safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah
and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for the Malays and natives of any of the
States of Sabah and Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of
positions in the public service (other than the public service of the State) and of
scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special
191
facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government and, when any permit or
license for the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law, then,
subject to the provision of that law and this Article, of such permits and licenses.
(3) The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may, in order to ensure in accordance with
Clause (2) the reservation to Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and
Sarawak of positions in the public service and of scholarships, exhibitions and other
educational or training privileges or special facilities give such general
directions as may be required for that purpose to any Commission to which Part X
applies or to any authority charged with responsibility for the grant of such
scholarships, exhibitions or other educational or training privileges or special
facilities; and the Commission or authority shall duly comply with the directions.
(4) In exercising his functions under this Constitution and federal law in
accordance with Clauses (1) to (3) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall not deprive any
person of any public office held by him or of the continuance of any scholarship,
exhibitions or other educational or training privileges or special facilities enjoyed by
him.
(5) This Article does not derogate from the provisions of Article 136.
(6) Where by existing federal law a permit or licence is required for the operation
of any trade or business the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may exercise his functions under
the law in such manner, or give such general directions to any authority charged under
that law with the grant of such permits or licences, as may be required to ensure the
reservation of such proportion of such permits or licences for Malays and natives of
any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may deem
reasonable; and the authority shall duly comply with the directions.
(7) Nothing in this Article shall operate to deprive or authorise the deprivation of
any person of any right, privilege, permit or licence accrued to or enjoyed or held by
him or to authorise a refusal to renew to any person any such permit or licence or a
refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of a person any permit or licence
when the renewal or grant might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of
events.
(8) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, whereby any federal law and
permit or licence is required for the operation of any trade or business, that law may
provide for the reservation of a proportion of such permits or licences for Malays and
natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak; but no such law shall for the
purpose of ensuring such a reservation --
(a) deprive or authorise the deprivation of any person of any right, privilege,
permit or licence accrued to or enjoyed or held by him; or
(b) authorise a refusal to renew to any person any such permit or licence or a
refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of any person any permit or
licence when the renewal or grant might in accordance with the other
provisions of the law reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events,
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or prevent any person transferring together with his business any transferable
licence to operate that business; or
(c) where no permit or licence was previously required for the operation of the
trade or business, authorise a refusal to grant a permit or licence to any person
for the operation of any trade or business which immediately before the
coming into force of the law he had been bone fide carrying on, or authorise a
refusal subsequently to renew to any such person any permit or licence, or
refusal to grant to the heirs, successors or assigns of any person any permit or
licence when the renewal or grant might in accordance with the other
provisions of the law reasonably be expected in the ordinary course of events.
(8A) Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, where in any University,
College and other educational institution providing education after Malaysian
Certificate of Education or its equivalent, the number of places offered by the
authority responsible for the management of the University, College or such
educational institution to candidates for any course of study is less than the number of
candidates qualified for such places, it shall be lawful for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
by virtue of this Article to give such directions to the authority as may be required to
ensure the reservation of such proportion of such places for Malays and natives of any
of the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may deem
reasonable; and the authority shall duly comply with the directions.
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